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PROTECTION OF MINORITIES; EMPLOYEE PARTICIPATION; 
DIRECTORS' DUTIES - ANALYSIS AND REFORM 
by 
CHUE KAI CHAN 
ABSTRACT OF THESIS 
The o b j e c t o f t h i s t h e s i s i s t o p r e s e n t an account o f s e l e c t e d 
c o n t r o v e r s i a l aspects of E n g l i s h company law c o n c e r n i n g p r o t e c t i o n 
o f m i n o r i t i e s , employee p a r t i c i p a t i o n , and d i r e c t o r s ' d u t i e s , make 
c r i t i c a l e v a l u a t i o n s o f e x i s t i n g law and t o propose r e f o r m . 
V a r i o u s ways o f enforcement by m i n o r i t y s h a r e h o l d e r s o f t h e i r 
r i g h t s i n t h e company are f i r s t examined, analysed and c r i t i c i s e d 
w i t h t h e c o n c l u s i o n t h a t a l t h o u g h r e c e n t l y t h e r e has been a g r e a t e r 
r e a d i n e s s on t h e p a r t o f the c o u r t s t o i n t e r v e n e t o c o r r e c t abuse 
o f m a j o r i t y power and u n f a i r n e s s , t h e r e i s s t i l l a need f o r g r e a t e r 
p r o t e c t i o n f o r m i n o r i t y s h a r e h o l d e r s . Reform i s t h e n proposed i n 
r e s p e c t o f the newly improved " a l t e r n a t i v e remedy" i n c l u d i n g i n t r o -
d u c t i o n o f c o n t i n g e n t f e e system. 
Next, the pr e s s u r e s f o r and arguments o f employee p a r t i c i p a t i o n 
are examined. B u l l o c k ' s p r o p o s a l s and v a r i o u s c h o i c e s are then d i s -
cussed and v a r i o u s ways o f employee p a r t i c i p a t i o n i n d i f f e r e n t 
c o u n t r i e s are compared. I t i s concluded t h a t employee p a r t i c i p a t i o n 
s h o u l d be i n t r o d u c e d . The impact o f employee p a r t i c i p a t i o n on d i r e c -
t o r s ' d u t i e s and o t h e r aspects i s then examined. 
F i n a l l y some areas i n t h e f i e l d o f d i r e c t o r s ' d u t i e s which have 
been s u b j e c t s o f debates o r which have caused some d i f f i c u l t i e s are 
examined and i t i s concluded t h a t r o u g h l y d i r e c t o r s ' d u t i e s o f l o y a l t y 
are v e r y s t r i c t whereas t h e i r d u t i e s o f care d i l i g e n c e and s k i l l are 
g u i t e l a x and w i t h some i n c o n s i s t e n c i e s i n t h e i r d u t i e s o f care and 
d i l i g e n c e . I t i s then proposed t h a t t h e law should c l a s s i f y l i m i t e d 
companies i n t o t h r e e groups w i t h s e p a r a t e s t a n d a r d s o f d i r e c t o r s ' 
d u t i e s and t h a t i n the case o f t h e l a r g e s t group o f companies t h e r e 
P O T 9 0 O 
s h o u l d be an e v o l u t i o n o f m a n a g e r i a l p r o f e s s i o n w i t h the e x c e p t i o n 
o f employee d i r e c t o r s and a w a t c h i n g committee be s e t up„ Proposals 
f o r b e t t e r enforcement o f d i r e c t o r s ' d u t i e s are a l s o discussedo 
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INTRODUCTION 
The l i m i t e d l i a b i l i t y company, measured by volume of t r a d e , 
i s t h e o v e r w h e l m i n g l y p redominant b u s i n e s s f o r m i n t h e U n i t e d 
Kingdom as i n a l l o t h e r Western economies.. I n t h i s c o u n t r y i t 
emerged i n i t s modern f o r m a f t e r t h e f i r s t Companies A c t o f 1862 
and s i n c e t h a t t i m e i t has been employed i n a l l forms o f manu-
f a c t u r e , t r a d e and commerce by companies r a n g i n g f r o m t h e one 
man b u s i n e s s t o t h e m u l t i - n a t i o n a l c o n g l o m e r a t e . L i n k i n g t h i s 
d i v e r s i t y i s a m i s l e a d i n g l y s i m p l e p r e m i s e , v i z . , t h a t companies 
a r e "democracies" governed by d i r e c t o r s who a r e answerable t o a 
g e n e r a l meeting of s h a r e h o l d e r s armed w i t h t h e u l t i m a t e power o f 
d i s m i s s a l . To d a t e much company law r e f o r m has been p r e - o c c u p i e d 
w i t h a t t e m p t i n g t o b r i n g r e a l i t y t o t h i s c o n c e p t i o n , i n c r e a s i n g 
t h e range o f d i s c l o s u r e t o s h a r e h o l d e r s and t h e number of m a t t e r s 
w h i c h have t o be r e f e r r e d t o t h e g e n e r a l m e e t i n g . But doubts 
p e r s i s t about t h e p r a c t i c a l e f f i c a c y o f these measures and, more 
i m p o r t a n t l y , t h e i r f u n d a m e n t a l o r i e n t a t i o n . 
Even w i t h i n t h e l i m i t e d f o c u s of company law, which u n t i l 
t h e Companies A c t 1980 made n o t even t h e most f o r m a l r e c o g n i t i o n o f 
t h e i n t e r e s t s o f employees, i t may be g u e r i e d w hether s h a r e h o l d e r s ' 
i n t e r e s t s a r e s u f f i c i e n t l y p r o t e c t e d by d i s c l o s u r e p r o v i s i o n s 
and t h e e x e r c i s e o f m a j o r i t y r u l e . T h i s t h e s i s w i l l c o n s i d e r 
t o what e x t e n t m i n o r i t i e s can and sh o u l d be a b l e t o a s s e r t 
c l a i m s and i n t e r e s t s f o r themselves and t h e company d e s p i t e t h e 
o p p o s i t i o n o f a m a j o r i t y o r by those who are i n e f f e c t i v e c o n t r o l 
of t h e company. The w o r s t examples of m i n o r i t y o p p r e s s i o n t e n d t o 
occur i n t h e s m a l l e r companies, and g i v e n t h e p r e s e n t Government's 
hopes, r e a l i s t i c o r o t h e r w i s e , t o encourage g r e a t e r i n v e s t m e n t 
i n s m a l l b u s i n e s s e s t h e p r o v i s i o n o f e f f e c t i v e l e g a l p r o t e c t i o n i s 
a necessary complement t o t h e f i s c a l i n c e n t i v e s r e c e n t l y awarded 
- i i -
i n t h e F i n a n c e A c t 1980. 
Of more f u n d a m e n t a l concern i s t h e q u e s t i o n whether company 
law can c o n t i n u e t o be so n a r r o w l y f o c u s e d or whether i t must 
make an accommodation w i t h l a b o u r and g r a n t some f o r m a l r e c o g n i t i o n 
w i t h i n t he company s t r u c t u r e i f t h e i n t e r e s t s of t h e employees 
i n t h e e n t e r p r i s e are t o be e f f e c t i v e l y p r o t e c t e d * The c o n c e n t r a -
t i o n o f c a p i t a l and l a b o u r i n modern companies g i v e s them a 
s t r o n g p o s i t i o n i n t h e market and a f f o r d s them many o p p o r t u n i t i e s 
f o r . f a r - r e a c h i n g i n f l u e n c e i n economic, s o c i a l and p o l i t i c a l 
a f f a i r s . I t has been argued t h a t t h e reason why a l a r g e s e c t i o n 
of t he w o r k i n g p o p u l a t i o n i s n o t committed t o our p r e s e n t system 
i s t h a t i t f a i l s t o g i v e employees r e a s o n a b l e s e c u r i t y , s a t i s f a c -
t i o n and i n v o l v e m e n t and i s o r g a n i s e d p r i m a r i l y f o r t h e b e n e f i t 
o f d i s t a n t s h a r e h o l d e r s who c o n t r i b u t e l i t t l e and a r e p r e p a r e d 
t o r u n away when t r o u b l e comes. The r e s t o r a t i o n o f c o n f i d e n c e o f 
t h e w o r k f o r c e may t h e r e f o r e b r i n g i n a tremendous amount of 
energy, i m a g i n a t i o n and commonsense i f t h e y have t h e power, 
commitment and i n c e n t i v e , and l e g a l r e c o g n i t i o n and p r o t e c t i o n 
o f t hose who s u p p l y l a b o u r t o t h e e n t e r p r i s e may improve t h e 
p r e s e n t sad s t a t e o f i n d u s t r y and t h e economic p o s i t i o n o f t h e 
c o u n t r y . P o l i t i c a l l y now t h a t t h e U n i t e d Kingdom have j o i n e d 
t h e European Economic Communities t h e q u e s t i o n of employee 
p a r t i c i p a t i o n has become a l l t h e more important., 
The w e l f a r e o f t h e company, whatever t h e i n t e r e s t s w h i c h 
a r e r e p r e s e n t e d t h e r e i n , u l t i m a t e l y depends upon t h e q u a l i t y 
and a c c o u n t a b i l i t y of i t s management,, T h i s l e a d s t o a c o n s i d e r a t i o n 
o f t h e d u t i e s w h i c h a r e and s h o u l d be imposed on company d i r e c t o r s 
and t o e f f e c t i v e mechanisms of enforcement.. The f a l l i n g g r owth 
r a t e o f our economy and h i g h unemployment i n r e c e n t y e a r s have 
h i g h l i g h t e d t h e r o l e and r e s p o n s i b i l i t y o f t h e manager. 
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These t h r e e a r e a s , though d i s c r e t e t o p i c s , a re c o n v e n i e n t l y 
c o n s i d e r e d together,. I t i s o n l y by p r o v i d i n g e f f e c t i v e p r o t e c -
t i o n f o r i n v e s t o r s , a c h i e v i n g l e g i t i m a c y w i t h t h e w o r k f o r c e and 
s u b j e c t i n g management t o l e g a l d u t i e s which o p e r a t e on t h e l e v e l 
o f e nforcement r a t h e r than p r e c e p t t h a t company law w i l l have 
p l a y e d i t s f u l l p a r t i n e n s u r i n g t h a t t h e p r i v i l e g e o f l i m i t e d 
l i a b i l i t y i s c o n f e r r e d on terms a c c e p t a b l e t o i n f o r m e d p u b l i c 
o p i n i o n i n t h e l a t e 2 0 t h c e n t u r y . 
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CHAPTER 1 PROTECTION OF MINORITIES 
The problems fa c e d by m i n o r i t y s h a r e h o l d e r s , p a r t i c u l a r l y i n 
p r i v a t e companies, have l o n g been r e c o g n i s e d . Owing t o t h e f a c t 
t h a t under t he p a t t e r n o f c o r p o r a t e c o n t r o l , m a j o r i t y s h a r e h o l d e r s 
can d e p r i v e m i n o r i t y s h a r e h o l d e r s o f any e f f e c t i v e v o i c e i n t h e 
r u n n i n g o f the b u s i n e s s , t h e r e e x i s t s the danger t h a t m a j o r i t y 
s h a r e h o l d e r s w i l l use t h e i r power t o f u r t h e r t h e i r own i n t e r e s t s 
t o t h e d e t r i m e n t o f m i n o r i t y s h a r e h o l d e r s . 
Losses owing t o Shareholder Oppression 
The l o s s e s which a m i n o r i t y s h a r e h o l d e r i n a p r i v a t e company 
s u f f e r s i n s h a r e h o l d e r o p p r e s s i o n a re sometimes c a t a s t r o p h i c . 
F r e q u e n t l y , when a s h a r e h o l d e r i n v e s t s i n a p r i v a t e company, he 
exp e c t s t o work i n the company on a f u l l - t i m e b a s i s . He may put 
p r a c t i c a l l y e v e r y t h i n g he owns i n t o t h e company and expect t o 
s u p p o r t h i m s e l f and h i s f a m i l y from t h e s a l a r y he r e c e i v e s as an 
i m p o r t a n t employee o f the company. Whenever a s h a r e h o l d e r l o s e s 
h i s p o s t i n t h e company, he may be i n e f f e c t d e p r i v e d o f h i s c h i e f 
means o f income,. A s h a r e h o l d e r may a l s o f i n d t h a t h i s i n v e s t m e n t 
i n t h e company has become p r a c t i c a l l y v a l u e l e s s . One o f the most 
commonly used o p p r e s s i o n t e c h n i q u e s i s n ot t o d e c l a r e d i v i d e n d s 
o r d e c l a r e l i t t l e d i v i d e n d s . An a g g r i e v e d s h a r e h o l d e r cannot 
w i t h d r a w t h e money he has i n v e s t e d , and he w i l l f i n d i t d i f f i c u l t 
t o f i n d a purchaser f o r h i s shares i n the company, e s p e c i a l l y 
where t h e r e are b i t t e r d i s p u t e s between p r i n c i p a l s h a r e h o l d e r s . 
A m i n o r i t y s h a r e h o l d e r may have a l l o r a s u b s t a n t i a l p a r t o f h i s 
w e a l t h i n v e s t e d i n the company, and y e t he cannot g e t back h i s 
money i n v e s t e d w i t h o u t t he consent o f the v e r y people w i t h whom 
he i s d i s p u t i n g . 
I t i s d i f f i c u l t o r i m p o s s i b l e t o e s t i m a t e t h e e x t e n t o f t h e 
economic l o s s (1) a r i s i n g o u t o f d i s s e n s i o n and s h a r e h o l d e r 
o p p r e s s i o n . Many businesses are s e r i o u s l y damaged o r r u i n e d by 
b i t t e r s h a r e h o l d e r disputes., These d i s p u t e s cause q u a r r e l s and 
c o n f l i c t , l o s s o f a l o t o f w o r k i n g hours, d i s r u p t i o n o f management, 
d i m i n i s h e d c o n f i d e n c e i n the bu s i n e s s by t h i r d p a r t i e s , and c o s t l y 
l i t i g a t i o n , , 
D e r i v a t i v e a c t i o n s may be o n l y a p a r t o f a p r o l o n g e d s t r u g g l e 
between m a j o r i t y and m i n o r i t y s h a r e h o l d e r s o A f t e r a m i n o r i t y 
s h a r e h o l d e r d i s c o v e r s o r b e g i n s t o suspect t he f r a u d u l e n t behaviour 
o f t h e m a j o r i t y s h a r e h o l d e r , he p r o b a b l y w i l l f i r s t a t t e m p t t o get 
a d d i t i o n a l i n f o r m a t i o n from t he company and the m a j o r i t y s h a r e h o l d e r , 
There may f o l l o w argument, t h r e a t s , perhaps s e v e r a l l e g a l a c t i o n s 
and u l t i m a t e l y (which may be as l o n g as t e n years a f t e r w a r d s ( 2 ) ) a 
s o l u t i o n , p r o b a b l y n o t any f r u i t from a l e g a l a c t i o n f o r e i t h e r 
s i d e b u t more l i k e l y a s e t t l e m e n t o r compromise o u t o f c o u r t . Thus 
the law r e p o r t s j u s t do n o t t e l l t h e whole s t o r y and t h e judges and 
la w y e r s cannot f i n d i n t h e law r e p o r t s a l l they need t o know about 
s h a r e h o l d e r o p p r e s s i o n . So i t i s proposed t o s e t o u t below some o f 
causes o f s h a r e h o l d e r o p p r e s s i o n and some o f the t e c h n i q u e s used 
t h e r e f o r so as t o h e l p those concerned o r t h e c o u r t s know b e t t e r 
the problems o f s h a r e h o l d e r o p p r e s s i o n and perhaps h e l p them i n 
d i s t i n g u i s h i n g w i t h somewhat more c e r t a i n t y harsh and o p p r e s s i v e 
t r e a t m e n t o f m i n o r i t y s h a r e h o l d e r s from unfounded m i n o r i t y com-
p l a i n t s o r necessary e l i m i n a t i o n o f troublesome, unreasonable o r 
u n c o o p e r a t i v e m i n o r i t y s h a r e h o l d e r s . 
(1) See g e n e r a l l y F.H. O'Neal, Oppression o f M i n o r i t y Shareholders 
(1975) pp.6-7 
(2) I n W a l l e r s t e i n e r v. M o i r (No.2) [197$ 1 A l l E.R. 849; 
[19757 Q.Bo 373; £19757 2 W.L.R. 389; 119S.J. 97 t h e m i n o r i t y 
s h a r e h o l d e r had s t i l l t o proceed w i t h l e g a l proceedings even a f t e r 
10 years o f c o n f l i c t w i t h t he m a j o r i t y s h a r e h o l d e r . The case 
i n v o l v e d , o f course, a p u b l i c company. 
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U n d e r l y i n g Causes o f Shareholder Oppression 
There are many u n d e r l y i n g causes (3) o f s h a r e h o l d e r o p p r e s s i o n . 
I t seems t h a t some s h a r e h o l d e r s i n s m a l l l i m i t e d companies do 
n o t a p p r e c i a t e f u l l y the consequences o f f o r m i n g a p r i v a t e company ( 4 ) . 
They do not understand t h a t i n t h e absence o f s p e c i a l arrangement, 
h o l d e r s o f a m a j o r i t y o f a company's v o t i n g shares c o n t r o l i t . Some 
companies s t a r t as f i r m s which are l a t e r c o n v e r t e d i n t o l i m i t e d 
companies t o o b t a i n l i m i t e d l i a b i l i t y o r some t a x advantage ( 5 ) c 
A f t e r i n c o r p o r a t i o n , the s h a r e h o l d e r s assume t h a t no change i n t h e i r 
r e l a t i o n s h i p has o c c u r r e d and t h a t p a r t n e r s h i p r u l e s c o n t i n u e t o 
a p p l y . They s t i l l c o n s i d e r themselves as p a r t n e r s and a c t as such. 
However, i t i s company law, not p a r t n e r s h i p law, t h a t g e n e r a l l y 
governs the r e l a t i o n s h i p between s h a r e h o l d e r s ( 6 ) . T h i s tendency 
o f s h a r e h o l d e r s i n some s m a l l p r i v a t e companies t o r e g a r d themselves 
as p a r t n e e s q u i t e o f t e n leads t o s t r i f e . I n t h e f i r s t p l a c e , such 
m i n o r i t y s h a r e h o l d e r s , l a b o u r i n g under t h e m i s c o n c e p t i o n t h a t t h e y 
are s t i l l p a r t n e r s , are s u r p r i s e d and h u r t when m a j o r i t y share-
h o l d e r s d i s r e g a r d t h e wishes and o p i n i o n s o f the m i n o r i t y and 
e x e r c i s e the power under t h e p r i n c i p l e o f m a j o r i t y r u l e . Secondly 
they f a i l t o f o l l o w company procedures l e a v i n g many company t r a n -
s a c t i o n s and d e c i s i o n s w i t h shaky l e g a l f o u n d a t i o n s . I n many s m a l l 
f a m i l y companies, some o f the s h a r e h o l d e r s and o r some members o f 
t h e i r f a m i l i e s c o n s i d e r t h a t t h e b u s i n e s s belongs t o the f a m i l y as 
a whole r a t h e r than t o the s h a r e h o l d e r s . Sometimes a l l o f the 
(3) See g e n e r a l l y O'Neal, Chap.2 
(4) I n Re N o r t h End M o t e l s ( H u n t l y ) L t d . [191 Sj 1 NZLR 446 the 
p e t i t i o n e r was a r e t i r e d f armer and d i d not take a d v i c e b e f o r e the 
company was i n c o r p o r a t e d and was unaware t h a t under the a r t i c l e s 
o f a s s o c i a t i o n t h e d e c i s i o n s o f d i r e c t o r s c o u l d be reached by a 
m a j o r i t y i n t h e case o f d i s p u t e . 
(5) See, e.g., Re Westbourne G a l l e r i e s L t d . [\91lJ A.C. 360; 
[19727 2 W.L.R. 1289; [1972J 2 A l l E.R. 492; 116 S.J. 412; where 
t h e p e t i t i o n e r had been an equal p a r t n e r w i t h one o f the respondents 
b e f o r e the b u s i n e s s was i n c o r p o r a t e d i n 1958. 
(6) But see Re Westbourne G a l l e r i e s L t d . [l913j .A.C. 360. 
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s h a r e h o l d e r s are descendants o f the o r i g i n a l f o u n d e r , and the 
found e r may have d i r e c t e d by w i l l o r o t h e r w i s e t h a t t h e busines s 
be used f o r t h e c o n t i n u e d s u p p o r t o f the b i g f a m i l y . T h i s o u t l o o k 
leads t o the use o f company a s s e t s by s h a r e h o l d e r s o r t h e i r f a m i l i e s , 
l o a n s t o s h a r e h o l d e r s o r t h e i r f a m i l i e s w i t h o u t i n t e r e s t , m i x i n g up 
o f company and i n d i v i d u a l money and a s s e t s , payment o f compensation 
t o o f f i c e r s w i t h o u t f o r m a l board a u t h o r i z a t i o n , and a g e n e r a l f a i l u r e 
t o observe t h e sep a r a t e l e g a l e n t i t y o f the company and company 
f o r m a l i t i e s . T h i s l a x h a n d l i n g (7) o f the company's a f f a i r s sows 
the seeds o f l a t e r d i s s e n t i o n . 
Some c o n t r o l l i n g s h a r e h o l d e r s and company managers f e e l t h a t 
t h e company belongs t o those s h a r e h o l d e r s who work f o r i t ( 8 ) . T h e i r 
r e a s o n i n g i s t h a t as they do th e work and bear t he blame, i f any, 
and r e s p o n s i b i l i t y , i t i s they who should be e n t i t l e d t o a l l o r most 
o f t h e p r o f i t s o r g a i n s o f t h e b u s i n e s s . With t h i s view, they tend 
t o i g n o r e t h e r i g h t s o f those who o r i g i n a l l y i n v e s t e d i n the company 
or l a t e r a c q u i r e d ownership i n i t b u t who do not choose t o p a r t i c i -
p a te i n the r u n n i n g o f t h e b u s i n e s s . 
Next t h e r e are some persons who see and s e i z e o p p o r t u n i t i e s t o 
enhance t h e i r power and i n f l u e n c e and i n c r e a s e t h e i r w e a l t h . They 
f i n d ways i n the f i n a n i c a l , a d m i n i s t r a t i v e , and l e g a l i n t r i c a c i e s 
o f business e n t e r p r i s e s t o t a k e advantage o f t h e i r f e l l o w share-
h o l d e r s and c o l l e a g u e s , c a u s i n g d i s s e n s i o n (9)„ 
Some s h a r e h o l d e r s r e c e i v e t h e i r i n t e r e s t i n a s m a l l p r i v a t e 
company by i n h e r i t a n c e o r g i f t and do not have an o p p o r t u n i t y t o 
choose t h e i r f e l l o w s h a r e h o l d e r s ( 1 0 ) . P e r s o n a l i t y c l a s h e s between 
these s h a r e h o l d e r s sometimes o c c u r . 
(7) See e.g. Re Jermyn S t r e e t T u r k i s h Baths L t d . [1911] 1 W.L.R. 
1042 where e.g. even a f t e r the p e t i t i o n e r s were e n t e r e d on the 
r e g i s t e r o f members o f the company as a d m i n i s t r a t o r s o f a deceased 
member, no n o t i c e o f g e n e r a l meetings was ever g i v e n t o them. 
(8) See g e n e r a l l y O'Neal, 2.09. 
(9) See g e n e r a l l y O'Neal, p.12 
(10) See t h e r e l a t i o n s h i p between t h e aunt ( d e f e n d a n t ) and ni e c e 
( p l a i n t i f f ) i n Clemens v. Clemens Bros., L t d . [\91t>] 2 A l l E.R. 268. 
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Sometimes a m i n o r i t y s h a r e h o l d e r wants t o w i t h d r a w from t h e 
company i n o r d e r t o get cash, e.g. when he wants t o e n t e r a n o t h e r 
b u s i n e s s . But the d i f f i c u l t y o f v a l u i n g an i n t e r e s t i n bu s i n e s s can 
s t a r t o r c o n t r i b u t e t o d i s s e n s i o n because v a l u a t i o n o f an i n t e r e s t 
i n b u s i n e s s i s n o t an e x a c t s c i e n c e ; i t i n v o l v e s many s u b j e c t i v e and 
complex f a c t o r s and c o n s i d e r a t i o n . F u r t h e r , whereas t h e m i n o r i t y 
s h a r e h o l d e r n a t u r a l l y takes t h e view t h a t a l l shares i n t h e company 
are equal i n v a l u e so t h a t i f he h o l d s , say, twenty p e r c e n t , o f t h e 
s h a r e s , he expects t o r e c e i v e t w e n t y p e r c e n t , o f t h e t o t a l v a l u e o f 
th e b u s i n e s s , t h e m a j o r i t y s h a r e h o l d e r f e e l s t h a t s i n c e a m i n o r i t y 
i n t e r e s t cannot c o n t r o l t h e company, m i n o r i t y shares are w o r t h l e s s 
than m a j o r i t y shares. More o f t e n than n o t t h e o n l y p r o s p e c t i v e buyer 
o f a m i n o r i t y i n t e r e s t i n a p r i v a t e company i s t h e m a j o r i t y share-
h o l d e r , and a m i n o r i t y s h a r e h o l d e r who wants t o w i t h d r a w b u t i s unable 
t o d i s p o s e o f h i s shares may show h i s d i s s a t i s f a c t i o n by r e f u s i n g t o 
co o p e r a t e or even by a c t i v e l y o b s t r u c t i n g company o p e r a t i o n s . I n o r d e r 
t o escape an u n p l e a s a n t s i t u a t i o n t h e m a j o r i t y s h a r e h o l d e r may i n 
r e t u r n seek ways t o get r i d o f the m i n o r i t y s h a r e h o l d e r a t the p r i c e 
t h e f o r m e r t h i n k s i s f a i r o r even a t a p r i c e a l i t t l e l o w e r t o com-
pensate f o r t h e t r o u b l e caused, t h e former t h i n k s , by t h e l a t t e r . 
The outcome i s an a t t e m p t t o oppress a s h a r e h o l d e r who o r i g i n a l l y 
wanted t o l e a v e the company v o l u n t a r i l y . 
There are a l s o cases where a s h a r e h o l d e r who a l s o h o l d s a 
d i r e c t o r s h i p and the c h i e f e x e c u t i v e p o s i t i o n i n a company runs 
the b u s i n e s s i n a one-man, a u t o c r a t i c manner. He d i s r e s p e c t s t h e 
views o f h i s c o - d i r e c t o r s and c o m p l e t e l y d i s r e g a r d s u s u a l company 
procedures and c o u r t e s y , r e s u l t i n g i n q u a r r e l s w i t h o t h e r s t r o n g -
minded p e r s o n a l i t i e s among t h e s h a r e h o l d e r s ( l ) . When a company 
(1 ) I n Re H.R. Harmer L t d . /l959/ 1 W.L.R. 62; /l958/ 3 A l l E.R. 689; 
103 S.J. 73 a man and h i s two sons formed a company. A l l t h r e e were 
d i r e c t o r s b u t t h e f a t h e r was a p p o i n t e d chairman and l i f e d i r e c t o r . 
The f a t h e r d i s r e g a r d e d r e s o l u t i o n s o f t h e board o f d i r e c t o r s , assumed 
powers which he d i d n o t possess and e x e r c i s e d them a g a i n s t t he wishes of h i s sons. 
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has no p a r t i c u l a r need f o r an a s s e t , the o t h e r s h a r e h o l d e r s may 
acq u i e s c e , perhaps f o r a l o n g t i m e , i n i t s use by one s h a r e h o l d e r 
f o r h i s own use. C o n f l i c t d e v e l o p s , however, when t h e company 
needs the asset back b u t t h e s h a r e h o l d e r wants t o c o n t i n u e t o 
e n j o y t he p r i v i l e g e ( 2 ) . For example, one s h a r e h o l d e r i n a two-
man company occupies vacant r e a l p r o p e r t y owned by t h e company, 
pay i n g a r e n t which i s f a r below the market r e n t a l v a l u e o f the 
p r o p e r t y . The o t h e r s h a r e h o l d e r acquiesces i n t h i s p r i v i l e g e , 
b e l i e v i n g t h a t e v e n t u a l l y t he occupant w i l l pay a s u i t a b l e r e n t a l 
o r t h a t t he company w i l l d e v e l op the p r o p e r t y o r s e l l i t . As the 
years pass, i t becomes i n c r e a s i n g l y c l e a r t h a t the occupant i n t e n d s 
t o r e t a i n h i s advantage because he r e s i s t s any a t t e m p t t o i n c r e a s e 
t h e r e n t a l t o r e f l e c t the market v a l u e o r t o improve o r s e l l t h e 
p r o p e r t y . The r e l a t i o n s h i p between the s h a r e h o l d e r s d e t e r i o r a t e s 
so much t h a t each i s anxious t o get r i d o f t h e o t h e r ( 3 ) . 
The Memorandum and A r t i c l e s o f a company and o t h e r documents 
i n w r i t i n g f r e q u e n t l y do not cover a l l aspects o f t h e s h a r e h o l d e r s ' 
b u s i n e s s b a r g a i n . There are cases where i m p o r t a n t arrangements 
among s h a r e h o l d e r s i n some s m a l l p r i v a t e companies are o r a l ( 4 ) . 
They are sometimes n o t h i n g more than vague u n d e r s t a n d i n g s , never 
even d e f i n i t e l y s t a t e d o r a l l y . M i s u n d e r s t a n d i n g o f t h e terms o f 
(2) See, e.g. Re Westbourne G a l l e r i e s L t d . /19737 A.C. 360; 
/19727 2 W.L.R. 1289; (19727 2 A l l E.R. 492; 116 S.J. 412 where 
the premises occupied by t h e company, and f o r which i t p a i d the 
r e n t , were a l s o used f o r an a n t i q u e business c a r r i e d on p e r s o n a l l y 
by one o f the respondents. 
(3) I n Re Westbourne G a l l e r i e s L t d . /19737 A«C. 360 t h e p e t i t i o n e r 
made a number o f p r o t e s t s which were f o l l o w e d by a f u r t h e r d e t e r i o -
r a t i o n i n the r e l a t i o n s h i p between the p e t i t i o n e r and the two 
res p o n d e n t s . F i n a l l y , i n 1969, an o r d i n a r y r e s o l u t i o n a t an e x t r a -
o r d i n a r y g e n e r a l meeting was passed t o remove the p e t i t i o n e r from 
h i s o f f i c e as d i r e c t o r . 
(4) See the c r u c i a l b u t much d i s p u t e d agreement t h a t the share 
c a p i t a l should be h e l d c o n s t a n t l y i n the r a t i o o f 51:49 by the 
defendants and the p l a i n t i f f r e s p e c t i v e l y i n P e n n e l l and Others 
v. Venida I n v . L t d . & O t h e r s . The case has so f a r been u n r e p o r t e d . 
For t he f a d t s t h e r e o f , see S.J. B u r r i d g e (1981) 44 M.L.R. 40. 
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th e o r i g i n a l agreement o r o f subsequent agreements m o d i f y i n g i t 
can l e a d t o b i t t e r d i s p u t e r e s u l t i n g i n s h a r e h o l d e r o p p r e s s i o n . 
I t i s unsafe t o r e l y on o r a l assurances by t h e m a j o r i t y share-
h o l d e r because they may l a t e r be o p p o r t u n e l y f o r g o t t e n by the 
m a j o r i t y s h a r e h o l d e r o r because persons who s u b s e q u e n t l y a c q u i r e 
c o n t r o l o f the company may r e f u s e t o honour them. 
P r o v i s i o n o f i n s u f f i c i e n t funds t o the busine s s a t t h e 
b e g i n n i n g may l e a d t o events a t a l a t e r stage which cause o r 
a t t r i b u t e t o s h a r e h o l d e r o p p r e s s i o n . An example w i l l i l l u s t r a t e 
the p o i n t . Two s h a r e h o l d e r s each r e c e i v e 1,000 shares o f £10 
each. The business i s hard pressed when one s h a r e h o l d e r , A, d i e s . 
A's e s t a t e cannot o r i s u n w i l l i n g t o p r o v i d e any funds t o a l l e v i -
a t e t h e f i n a n c i a l p r e s s u r e and o n l y t h e o t h e r s h a r e h o l d e r , B, 
advances f u r t h e r funds t o t h e company, r e c e i v i n g i n r e t u r n another 
1,000 shares. The company su b s e q u e n t l y p r o s p e r s ; and B, now t h e 
m a j o r i t y s h a r e h o l d e r , r e c e i v e s s u b s t a n t i a l r e m u n e r a t i o n s from t he 
company. On the o t h e r hand, d i v i d e n d s are never d e c l a r e d , and A's 
e s t a t e r e c e i v e s no r e t u r n on i t s i n t e r e s t i n the company ( 5 ) . 
The widespread r e l u n c t a n c e o f the s m a l l businessman t o o b t a i n 
competent l e g a l a d v i c e a l s o c o n t r i b u t e s t o the number o f s h a r e h o l d e r 
o p p r e s s i o n . The atmosphere o f o p t i m i s m and g o o d w i l l which p r e v a i l s 
d u r i n g t he i n i t i a l stages f o r a business u s u a l l y obscures t h e pos-
s i b i l i t y o f f u t u r e d i s s e n s i o n and c o n f l i c t s among the s h a r e h o l d e r s . 
F u r t h e r m o r e , even i f the s h a r e h o l d e r s f o r e s e e the p o s s i b i l i t y o f 
f u t u r e disagreement, they are r e l u c t a n t t o seek l e g a l a d v i c e t o 
(5) I n Re Jermyn S t r e e t T u r k i s h Baths L t d . A1971/ 1 W.L.R. 1042; 
/19717 3 A l l E.R. 184; 115 S.J. 483; A and B were the o n l y share-
h o l d e r s and d i r e c t o r s o f a p r i v a t e company. B d i e d i n 1953, w i t h 
the company then h a v i n g l i a b i l i t i e s o f £20,000 and as s e t s o f o n l y 
£1 , 7 0 0 . I n 1954 A a p p o i n t e d C a d i r e c t o r and a t a board meeting 
they a l l o t t e d a f u r t h e r 100 £1 shares t o A, the e f f e c t o f which 
was t o g i v e A a 75 per c e n t . i n t e r e s t i n the Company, and B's 
e s t a t e a 25 per c e n t , i n t e r e s t . The business prospered under A's 
l e a d e r s h i p . S u b s t a n t i a l d i r e c t o r ' s and management fees were p a i d 
o u t t o A d u r i n g t h i s p e r i o d o f p r o s p e r t y . No d i v i d e n d s were ever 
p a i d . I n 1969, B's a d m i n i s t r a t o r s a p p l i e d t o c o u r t f o r a s s i s t a n c e . 
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p r o v i d e a g a i n s t t h e c o n t i n g e n c y because they are t o o busy o r f e e l 
embarrassed t o r a i s e such q u e s t i o n s i n a s i t u a t i o n which c a l l s f o r 
t h e b e s t mutual t r u s t and good w i l l . 
To these causes one may add t h a t u n f o r t u n a t e l y some lawyers 
do not f u l l y understand t h e s i t u a t i o n s which g i v e r i s e t o share-
h o l d e r o p p r e s s i o n and are not t h o r o u g h l y f a m i l i a r w i t h t h e r a t h e r 
complex and sometimes h i g h l y t e c h n i c a l p r e c a u t i o n s which are 
necessary t o p r o t e c t m i n o r i t y i n t e r e s t s , thus i n c r e a s i n g t h e number 
o f s h a r e h o l d e r o p p r e s s i o n by f a i l i n g t o g i v e competent l e g a l a d v i c e . 
Oppression Techniques 
Some o f the t e c h n i q u e s (6) which are most f r e q u e n t l y used by 
c o n t r o l l i n g s h a r e h o l d e r s i n a company t o oppress m i n o r i t y share-
h o l d e r s a r e : 
W i t h h o l d i n g o f d i v i d e n d s i s one o f the most f r e q u e n t l y used 
t e c h n i q u e s . By d e c l a r i n g no d i v i d e n d s a t a l l (7) o r l i t t l e d i -
v i d e n d s , m a j o r i t y s h a r e h o l d e r s may f o r c e a m i n o r i t y s h a r e h o l d e r t o 
s e l l h i s i n t e r e s t a t c o n s i d e r a b l y l e s s than i t s f a i r v a l u e . The 
e f f e c t o f d i v i d e n d w i t h h o l d i n g i s m o s t l y f e l t when a m i n o r i t y share-
h o l d e r i s i n f i n a n c i a l d i f f i c u l t y and i s h i g h l y dependent upon 
income from d i v i d e n d s . The m i n o r i t y s h a r e h o l d e r may be a former 
employee who has r e t i r e d , the widow o f a former employee o r a person 
who i s employed o u t s i d e t h e company who i s hard pressed by h i s 
c r e d i t o r s t o repay loans o r i s t r y i n g t o s e t up another b u s i n e s s . 
Even i f the m i n o r i t y s h a r e h o l d e r i s n o t i n f i n a n c i a l d i f f i c u l t y 
d u r i n g the p e r i o d o f d i v i d e n d w i t h h o l d i n g , he i s s t i l l d e p r i v e d o f 
any r e t u r n on h i s i n v e s t m e n t . To make m a t t e r s worse, i f c o r p o r a t e 
(6) See g e n e r a l l y O'Neal, Chap. 2 and T, Hadden, Company Law & 
C a p i t a l i s m (2nd edn.) p.240. 
(7) I n Re Westbourne G a l l e r i e s L t d . /1973] A.C. 360; Fl912] 2 W.L.R. 
1289; and i n Re Jermyn S t r e e t T u r k i s h Baths L t d . f\91l] 1 W.L.R. 
1042; [1911] 3 A l l E.R. 184; 115 S.J. 483; no d i v i d e n d s were ever 
p a i d . 
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e a r n i n g s are plowed back i n t o t he b u s i n e s s , t h e e f f e c t i s t o 
i n c r e a s e the s i z e o f h i s i n v e s t m e n t i n t h e company w i t h o u t h i s 
consent w h i l e h i s r e t u r n on the i n v e s t m e n t i s s t i l l n i l . Faced 
w i t h t h e p r o s p e c t o f g e t t i n g l i t t l e o r no r e t u r n f o r an i n d e f i n i t e 
p e r i o d on an e v e r - i n c r e a s i n g i n v e s t m e n t f o r which t h e r e i s no ready 
market, a m i n o r i t y s h a r e h o l d e r may r e l u n c t a n t l y s e l l o u t t o t h e 
m a j o r i t y s h a r e h o l d e r s a t whatever p r i c e they are w i l l i n g t o pay. 
Another t e c h n i q u e i s t o remove a m i n o r i t y s h a r e h o l d e r from 
p o s i t i o n s o f employment and management ( 8 ) . A m i n o r i t y s h a r e h o l d e r 
sometimes i n v e s t s a l a r g e share o f h i s w e a l t h t o o b t a i n h i s m i n o r i t y 
i n t e r e s t . He may j o i n t h e company e x p e c t i n g t o p a r t i c i p a t e a c t i v e l y 
i n the company's a f f a i r s as an i m p o r t a n t employee and perhaps as a 
d i r e c t o r . He may g i v e up o t h e r employment w i t h accumulated s e n i o r i t y 
and s e c u r i t y f e a t u r e s t o work f u l l time f o r the company. He may have 
no income o t h e r than h i s s a l a r y . I f a p r i v a t e company does not pay 
d i v i d e n d s o r pays o n l y s m a l l and i n f r e q u e n t d i v i d e n d s , a s h a r e h o l d e r -
employee o f i t who i s d i s m i s s e d from employment i s e f f e c t i v e l y denied 
a n y t h i n g more than a token r e t u r n on h i s i n v e s t m e n t even though t h e 
i n v e s t m e n t may be s u b s t a n t i a l ( 9 ) . F u r t h e r m o r e , l o s i n g the p r e s t i g e 
o f a d i r e c t o r s h i p may be o f c o n s i d e r a b l e consequence t o the share-
h o l d e r . A s h a r e h o l d e r i n t h i s s i t u a t i o n , hard pressed f o r money, 
may w e l l accept a m a j o r i t y ' s o f f e r t o buy h i s shares even though 
he t h i n k s the p r i c e o f f e r e d i s f a r l e s s than t h e v a l u e o f t h e shares. 
(8) See, e.g., Re Westbourne G a l l e r i e s L t d . /l973j A.C. 360; 
/1972J 2 W.L.R. 1289; [1912] 2 A l l E.R. 4 9 2 ; " l l 6 S.J. 412; where the 
p e t i t i o n e r was removed from h i s o f f i c e as d i r e c t o r by the o t h e r two 
d i r e c t o r s o f the company who t o g e t h e r h e l d m a j o r i t y shares. There-
a f t e r the p e t i t i o n e r ceased t o have any p a r t i n the management o f 
the company's a f f a i r s and, s i n c e no d i v i d e n d s were p a i d , he a l s o 
ceased t o p a r t i c i p a t e i n t h e p r o f i t s . I n E l d e r v. E l d e r & Watson 
1952 S.C. 49; 1952 S.L.T. 112 two s h a r e h o l d e r s i n a s m a l l f a m i l y 
company s u f f e r e d o p p r e s s i o n a t the hands o f o t h e r s h a r e h o l d e r s who 
had used t h e i r v o t i n g power t o remove the p e t i t i o n e r s from t h e i r 
o f f i c e s as d i r e c t o r s and from t h e i r employment as s e c r e t a r y and 
f a c t o r y manager r e s p e c t i v e l y . 
(9) See i m m e d i a t e l y above, n.(8) about Re Westbourne G a l l e r i e s L t d . 
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M a j o r i t y s h a r e h o l d e r s may cause a company t o pay them o r 
members o f t h e i r f a m i l i e s o r o t h e r r e l a t i v e s e x c e s s i v e l y h i g h 
s a l a r i e s o r fees f o r s e r v i c e s rendered as d i r e c t o r s , o f f i c e r s o r 
i m p o r t a n t employees. The payment o f e x c e s s i v e s a l a r i e s o r fees 
reduces the net assets v a l u e o f the company and so l e a d t o an 
under s t a t e m e n t o f the company's e a r n i n g power. T h i s apparent 
e a r n i n g power o f the company would a f f e c t t h e s e l l i n g p r i c e o f the 
m i n o r i t y i n t e r e s t . 
Sometimes m a j o r i t y s h a r e h o l d e r s d r a i n o f f c o r p o r a t e p r o f i t s 
by h a v i n g o t h e r c o r p o r a t i o n s t h e y own pe r f o r m s e r v i c e s f o r t h e 
company under management o r s e r v i c e c o n t r a c t s which s e t fees con-
s i d e r a b l y h i g h e r than t h e f a i r v a l u e o f the s e r v i c e s rendered ( 1 0 ) . 
Some c o n t r a c t s d e p r i v e a company o f c o n s i d e r a b l e p r o f i t s by d e l e -
g a t i n g t o another company performance o f an i m p o r t a n t b u s i n e s s 
f u n c t i o n which t h e former c o u l d p r o f i t a b l y handle i t s e l f ( D o 
I n p r a c t i c e m a j o r i t y s h a r e h o l d e r s u s u a l l y combine s e v e r a l 
t e c h n i q u e s t o oppress o r e l i m i n a t e m i n o r i t y s h a r e h o l d e r s . 
Legal Redress f o r M i n o r i t i e s 
Having seen some o f the causes and tec h n i q u e s o f s h a r e h o l d e r 
o p p r e s s i o n , l e t us examine the l e g a l r e d r e s s f o r m i n o r i t i e s , which 
i s b e s t c o n s i d e r e d under a number o f headings,, 
Redress a t Common Law and E q u i t y 
A t common law and e q u i t y one o f th e main impediments t o the 
o b t a i n i n g o f r e l i e f by m i n o r i t y s h a r e h o l d e r s i s t h e w e l l e s t a b l i s h e d 
p r i n c i p l e t h a t i n the absence o f f r a u d , u l t r a v i r e s o r i l l e g a l i t y 
t h e c o u r t s w i l l n o t i n t e r f e r e i n the i n t e r n a l management o f companies 
(10) See Re Jermyn S t r e e t T u r k i s h Baths /l97l7 1 w.L.R. 1042 where 
the c o n t r o l l i n g d i r e c t o r s a p p o i n t e d N e v i l l e s T u r k i s h Baths L t d . o f 
which they were s h a r e h o l d e r s t o be g e n e r a l managers o f some o f the 
businesses o f the company i n q u e s t i o n and where f o r 9 years N e v i l l e s 
r e c e i v e d p r o f i t s o f £13,524 f o r managing the company's T u r k i s h b a t h s . 
(1) See g e n e r a l l y H, Chesterman, Small Businesses (1977) p p . l 6 5 - 6 0 
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and w i l l a l l o w t he m a j o r i t y r u l e t o p r e v a i l . The c o u r t s w i l l not 
r e v i e w d i r e c t o r s ' d e c i s i o n s i n s e l e c t i n g o f f i c e r s and employees, 
f i x i n g s a l a r i e s , d e c l a r i n g o r w i t h h o l d i n g d i v i d e n d s , a u t h o r i z i n g 
c o n t r a c t s , o r o t h e r w i s e f i x i n g b usiness p o l i c i e s and d e t e r m i n i n g 
t h e course o f company a f f a i r s . The c o u r t s are not concerned w i t h 
the management o f the a f f a i r s o f the company. I t i s the busine s s 
o f t he s h a r e h o l d e r s and the d i r e c t o r s ( 2 ) . 
I n s o f a r as i t p r e c l u d e s the c o u r t s from i n v e s t i g a t i n g i n t o 
b u s i n e s s e f f i c a c y , the r u l e i s a s i n e gua non, because i t cannot 
be t h e c o u r t s ' f u n c t i o n t o t a k e management d e c i s i o n s and t o sub-
s t i t u t e t h e i r o p i n i o n s f o r those o f the d i r e c t o r s and t h e m a j o r i t y 
o f t he members. 
The r u l e i s a l s o r e f e r r e d t o as the r u l e i n Foss v. H a r b o t t l e 
which s t a t e s t h a t i f the d u t y t o be e n f o r c e d i s one owed t o a com-
pany, then t he p r i m a r y remedy f o r i t s enforcement i s an a c t i o n by 
the company a g a i n s t those i n d e f a u l t ( 4 ) . 
The m a j o r i t y r u l e was r e s t a t e d by J e n k i n s L.J. i n Edwards v. 
H a l l i w e l l (5) t o be as f o l l o w s : 
"The r u l e i n Foss v. H a r b o t t l e , as I understand i t , comes t o 
no more than t h i s . F i r s t , t h e proper p l a i n t i f f i n an a c t i o n 
i n r e s p e c t o f a wrong a l l e g e d t o be done t o a company or 
a s s o c i a t i o n o f persons i s prima f a c i e the company o r the 
a s s o c i a t i o n o f persons i t s e l f . Secondly, where t h e a l l e g e d 
wrong i s a t r a n s a c t i o n which might be made b i n d i n g on the 
company o r a s s o c i a t i o n and on a l l i t s members by a simple 
m a j o r i t y o f t h e members, no i n d i v i d u a l member o f the company 
(2) S h u t t l e w o r t h v. Cox Bros. & Co. (1927/ 2 K.B. 9; 96 L.J.K.B. 
104; 136 L.T. 337; 43 T.L.R. 83. 
(3) (1843) 2 Hare 461 
(4) See g e n e r a l l y K.W. Wedderburn (1957) C.L.J. 194; (1958) C.L.J. 
93; A. Boyle (1980) 1 Co. Law 3; A. Barak (1971) 20 I.C.L.Q. 22; 
S.M. Beck (1974) 52 Can. B. Rev. 159. 
(5) [l9S0] 2 A l l E.R. 1064, 1066. 
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i s a l l o w e d t o m a i n t a i n an a c t i o n i n r e s p e c t of t h a t m a t t e r 
f o r t he s i m p l e reason t h a t , i f a mere m a j o r i t y o f the members 
o f t h e company o r a s s o c i a t i o n i s i n f a v o u r o f what has been 
done, then c a d i t q u a e s t i o . " 
The r u l e has s i n c e been extended t o cover a l l cases where 
what i s complained o f i s some i n t e r n a l i r r e g u l a r i t y i n the 
o p e r a t i o n o f the company. Thus M e l l i s h L.J. s a i d i n Mac D o u q a l l 
v. G a r d i n e r ( 6 ) : 
" I f t h e t h i n g complained o f i s a t h i n g which i n substance 
the m a j o r i t y o f the company are e n t i t l e d t o do, o r i f some-
t h i n g has been done i r r e g u l a r l y which the m a j o r i t y o f the 
company are e n t i t l e d t o do r e g u l a r l y , o r i f something has 
been done i l l e g a l l y which t h e m a j o r i t y o f the company are 
e n t i t l e d t o do l e g a l l y , i t i s no use t o l i t i g a t e about i t , 
t h e outcome o f which i s o n l y t h a t a meeting has t o be c a l l e d , 
and then u l t i m a t e l y the m a j o r i t y g ets i t s wishes. I t would 
be b e t t e r i f the r u l e i s adhered t o t h a t i f i t i s a t h i n g 
which the m a j o r i t y are t h e masters o f , the m a j o r i t y i n sub-
stance s h a l l be e n t i t l e d t o have t h e i r w i l l f o l l o w e d . " 
Though the c o u r t s o f t e n t r e a t these cases as wrongs done t o 
the company, i t i s not c l e a r why the c o u r t s should not i n s t e a d 
r e g a r d t h e wrongs as breaches o f the r i g h t s o f each s h a r e h o l d e r 
under t h e c o n t r a c t e s t a b l i s h e d by the memorandum and a r t i c l e s by 
v i r t u e o f s e c t i o n 20 o f the Companies Act 1948. I t may be t h a t 
the c o u r t s have been i n f l u e n c e d by the p r a c t i c a l advantages o f the 
r u l e i n Foss v. H a r b o t t l e i n s t e a d of g i v i n g w e i g h t t o pure q u e s t i o n s 
o f p r i n c i p l e . The p r a c t i c a l advantages are; (a) I f every i n d i v i d u a l 
member were p e r m i t t e d t o sue anyone who had i n j u r e d t h e company 
thro u g h a breach o f d u t y , t h e r e c o u l d be as many a c t i o n s as t h e r e 
are shareholders» Legal proceedings would never cease, and t h e r e 
(6) (1875) 1 Ch. DQ 13; 45 L.J. Ch.27; 33 L.T. 521; 24 W.R. 118. 
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would be enormous wastage o f time and money. (b) I f an i n d i v i d u a l 
member c o u l d sue a person who caused l o s s t o the company, and the 
company then r a t i f i e d t h a t person's a c t a t a g e n e r a l meeting, the 
l e g a l proceedings would be q u i t e u s e l e s s , f o r a c o u r t w i l l n a t u r a l l y 
h o l d t h a t t he w i l l o f t h e m a j o r i t y p r e v a i l s . 
E x c e p t i o n s t o M a j o r i t y Rule 
The m a j o r i t y r u l e g r e a t l y s t r e n g t h e n s t he p o s i t i o n s o f the 
m a j o r i t y ; i ndeed, i f t h e r e were no e x c e p t i o n s t o i t , the m i n o r i t y 
would be c o m p l e t e l y i n t h e i r hands ( 7 ) . 
I t may be s t a t e d t h a t a s u i t by a s h a r e h o l d e r i n s t e a d o f by 
the company i s a l l o w e d i n the f o l l o w i n g f i v e c i r c u m s t a n c e s : 
( i ) Where t h e a c t complained o f i s u l t r a v i r e s t he company 
or i l l e g a l . 
( i i ) Where t h e a c t complained of can o n l y v a l i d l y be done by 
a s p e c i a l or e x t r a o r d i n a r y r e s o l u t i o n , b u t i n f a c t has been done 
by a s i m p l e m a j o r i t y . 
( i i i ) Where t h e p e r s o n a l r i g h t s o f the i n d i v i d u a l member have 
been i n f r i n g e d . 
( i v ) Where those who c o n t r o l the company are p e r p e t r a t i n g a 
f r a u d on the m i n o r i t y . 
( v ) Where the i n t e r e s t s o f j u s t i c e r e q u i r e the r u l e t o be 
dispensed w i t h . 
Except the f i f t h e x c e p t i o n , the o t h e r f o u r e x c e p t i o n s c o u l d 
be reduced t o one t h a t a s h a r e h o l d e r can sue, n o t w i t h s t a n d i n g t he 
m a j o r i t y r u l e , where what he complains o f c o u l d not be v a l i d l y 
r a t i f i e d or e f f e c t e d by an o r d i n a r y r e s o l u t i o n (8) 
Ex c e p t i o n s ( i i i ) , ( i v ) and ( v ) are o f more importance and 
r e q u i r e more d i s c u s s i o n . 
(7) L.C.B. Gower, P r i n c i p l e s o f Modern Company Law, ( 4 t h ed„) p.644. 
(8) See Gower, p.645. 
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1. Personal R i g h t s o f Members 
A member can sue f o r wrongs done t o h i m s e l f i n h i s c a p a c i t y 
as a member ( 9 ) . Some o f t h e i n d i v i d u a l r i g h t s o f a member a r i s e 
f r o m t h e c o n t r a c t between the company and h i m s e l f which i s i m p l i e d 
on h i s becoming a member (10) and some from t h e g e n e r a l law. 
Under the c o n t r a c t i m p l i e d from h i s membership, a member i s 
e n t i t l e d , f o r example, t o r e c e i v e d i v i d e n d s which have been d u l y 
d e c l a r e d o r which have become due under t h e a r t i c l e s ( 1 ) ; and t o 
have h i s c a p i t a l r e t u r n e d i n t h e proper o r d e r o f p r i o r i t y i n t h e 
w i n d i n g up o f the company o r on a d u l y a u t h o r i s e d r e d u c t i o n o f 
c a p i t a l ( 2) . 
Under the g e n e r a l law, he i s e n t i t l e d , f o r example, to have 
a reasonable o p p o r t u n i t y t o speak a t g e n e r a l meetings ( 3 ) ; and t o 
t r a n s f e r h i s shares ( 4 ) . 
I n a case about a p e r s o n a l r i g h t o f a member b e i n g i n f r i n g e d , 
S i r George J e s s e l M.R. remarked ( 5 ) : 
"He i s a member o f the company, and whether he v o t e s w i t h t h e 
m a j o r i t y or the m i n o r i t y he i s e n t i t l e d t o have h i s v o t e 
r e c o r d e d - an i n d i v i d u a l r i g h t i n r e s p e c t o f which he has a 
(9 ) Pender v. L u s h i n q t o n (1877) 6 Ch. D. 70; 46 L.J. Ch. 317; 
25 W.R.Dig. 64; Edwards v. H a l l i w e l l £l950] 2 A l l E.R. 1064; 
/"l9507 W.N. 537; 94 S.J. 803. 
(10) S e c t i o n 20 o f the Companies Act 1948 p r o v i d e s t h a t t he 
memorandum and a r t i c l e s s h a l l b i n d the company and the members 
t h e r e o f t o t h e same e x t e n t as i f they r e s p e c t i v e l y had been signed 
and s e a l e d by each member, and c o n t a i n e d covenants on t h e p a r t o f 
each member t o observe a l l t h e i r p r o v i s i o n s . 
(1) Wood v. Odessa Waterworks Co (1889) 42 Ch. D. 636; 58 L.J. 
Ch. 628; 5 T.L.R. 596; 1 Meg. 265; 37 W.R. 733. 
(2 ) G r i f f i t h v. Paget (1877) 5 Ch. D. 894; 46 L.J.Ch. 493; 25 W.R. 
523. See a l s o R a y f i e l d v. Hands [1960] Ch. 1; [19SQ] 2 W.L.R. 851; 
102 S.J. 348; [1958/ 2 A l l E.R. 194; Re B r i t i s h Sugar R e f i n i n g Co 
(1857) 3 K & J 408; 26 L.J.Ch. 369; 5 W.R. 379. 
(3) W a l l v. London and N o r t h e r n Assets C o r p o r a t i o n A898/ 2 Ch. 
469; 67 L.J.Ch. 596; 79 L.T. 249; 14 T.L.R. 547; 47"W.R. 219. 
(4 ) Re Smith K n i g h t & Co., Weston's Case (1868) 4 Ch. App. 20; 
38 L.J.Ch. 49; 19 L.T. 337; 17 W.R. 62. See a l s o H u t t o n v. West 
Cork R l y . Co. (1833) 23 Ch. D. 654; Henderson v. Bank o f A u s t r a l a s i a 
(1890) 45 Ch. D. 330; 59 L.J.Ch. 794; 63 L.T. 597; 6 T.L.R. 424; 
2 Meg. 301. 
(5) Pender v. L u s h i n g t o n (1877) 6 Ch.D. 70 a t 80. 
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r i g h t t o sue. That has n o t h i n g t o do w i t h the q u e s t i o n l i k e 
t h a t r a i s e d i n Foss v. H a r b o t t l e and t h a t l i n e o f cases. He 
has a r i g h t t o say, 'Whether I v o t e i n the m a j o r i t y o r m i n o r i t y , 
you s h a l l r e c o r d my v o t e , as t h a t i s a r i g h t o f p r o p e r t y 
b e l o n g i n g t o my i n t e r e s t i n t h i s company, and i f you r e f u s e 
t o r e c o r d my v o t e I w i l l i n s t i t u t e l e g a l proceedings a g a i n s t 
you t o compel you." 
2. Fraud on t h e M i n o r i t y 
There are two senses i n which t h e term ' f r a u d on t h e m i n o r i t y ' 
i s used. The f i r s t i s i n f a c t a f r a u d on the company where the 
wrongdoers are i n c o n t r o l of t h e company and r e f u s e t o i n s t i t u t e 
l e g a l p roceedings i n the company name and the m i n o r i t y i n d i r e c t l y 
bear t h e l o s s o f the unremedied wrong t o the company. I n such 
cases t h e m i n o r i t y are a l l o w e d t o b r i n g a d e r i v a t i v e a c t i o n (6) 
w i t h t h e wrongdoers j o i n e d as d efendants t o a s s e r t t h e company's 
r i g h t s a g a i n s t them and the company j o i n e d , u s u a l l y as nominal 
d e f e n d a n t , so t h a t i t may be bound by the judgement, and cannot 
have a l a r g e r c l a i m t o r e l i e f than t h e company would have i f i t 
were the p l a i n t i f f . The term ' f r a u d on the m i n o r i t y ' i s used i n 
t h e second sense where the m i n o r i t y , as i n d i v i d u a l s or c o l l e c t i v e l y , 
have been wronged d i r e c t l y by some a c t i o n o f m a j o r i t y . The f r a u d 
i n t h i s case i s i n f a c t , as w e l l as i n name, on the m i n o r i t y . The 
c l a i m a s s e r t e d i s thus a p e r s o n a l c l a i m and may, b u t need not be, 
b r o u g h t i n r e p r e s e n t a t i v e f o r m . 
J o i n d e r o f d e r i v a t i v e and p e r s o n a l Claims 
U n t i l r e c e n t l y the e x t e n t t o which d e r i v a t i v e and p e r s o n a l 
( 6 ) A l t h o u g h i t s form has l o n g been used, the term " d e r i v a t i v e 
a c t i o n " has o n l y r e c e n t l y r e c e i v e d j u d i c i a l r e c o g n i t i o n i n the 
U n i t e d Kingdom. See L o r d Denning M.R. i n W a l l e r s t e - i n e r v. Floir 
(No. 2) (1975.7 1 A l l E.R. 849, 857. I t seems t h a t t h e term i s now 
e s t a b l i s h e d ; see P r u d e n t i a l Assurance Go. L t d . v. Newman I n d u s t r i e s 
L t d . And Others (No.2) {19807 3 W.L.R. 543, 565. 
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c l a i m s c o u l d be j o i n e d i n one and the same a c t i o n was somewhat 
obscure ( 7 ) , b u t has now been c l a r i f i e d t o a g r e a t e x t e n t by the 
r e c e n t case o f P r u d e n t i a l Assurance Co. L t d . v. Newman I n d u s t r i e s 
L t d . And Others (No.2) ( 8 ) . I n t h a t case the p l a i n t i f f b r o u g h t 
t h r e e c l a i m s , one d i r e c t , one d e r i v a t i v e and one r e p r e s e n t a t i v e . 
V i n e l o t t J . was o f t h e o p i n i o n t h a t a g i v e n s e t o f f a c t s c o u l d 
g i v e r i s e t o b o t h d e r i v a t i v e and p e r s o n a l c l a i m s and r u l e d t h a t 
t h e r e was no o b j e c t i o n t o the t h r e e c l a i m s b e i n g j o i n e d i n one 
a c t i o n . 
U s u a l l y cases c o n c e r n i n g f r a u d on the m i n o r i t y are o n l y a l l o w e d 
where t h e r e i s f r a u d and where the wrongdoers are i n c o n t r o l . Two 
concepts are then i n v o l v e d , namely ' f r a u d ' and ' c o n t r o l ' and i t i s 
c o n v e n i e n t t o c o n s i d e r them s e p a r a t e l y . 
(a) Fraud 
From the decided cases i t i s not p o s s i b l e t o s t a t e w i t h any 
c e r t a i n t y what c o n s t i t u t e s ' f r a u d ' i n a f r a u d on the m i n o r i t y . 
The term i s used somewhat l o o s e l y . I t covers c e r t a i n a c t s o f a 
f r a u d u l e n t c h a r a c t e r i n the w i d e r sense ( 9 ) . I t i s c l e a r t h a t 
d i r e c t m i s a p p r o p r i a t i o n o f company a s s e t s i s f r a u d ( 1 0 ) , b u t mere 
n e g l i g e n c e by d i r e c t o r s i s not covered by the term. The m i n o r i t y 
need not prove the element o f d e c e i t i n the s t r i c t sense. And 
th e c o u r t s have not been guided by any c l e a r p r i n c i p l e , b u t have 
p r e f e r r e d t o c o n s i d e r the n a t u r e o f the t r a n s a c t i o n o r c o m p l a i n t 
i n each case. R e c e n t l y i t has been remarked by V i n e l o t t J. i n t h e 
P r u d e n t i a l case t h a t f r a u d l i e s i n the use by the m a j o r i t y o f t h e i r 
v o t i n g power not i n the c h a r a c t e r o f t h e a c t o r t r a n s a c t i o n g i v i n g 
r i s e t o the cause o f a c t i o n ( 1 ) . 
( 7 ) As t o the p o s i t i o n p r e v i o u s l y , see Gower, p.655, n.99 
(8 ) [ l 9 8 0 j 3 W.L.R. 543; /"1980/ 2 A l l E.R. 841. 
(9 ) Gower, p.616. 
(10) E.g. Menier v. Hoopers Telegraph (1874) L.R. 9 Ch. App. 350. 
(1) [1980] 2 A l l E.R.841,862See a l s o below, p . I l l 
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(b) C o n t r o l 
T r a d i t i o n a l l y t h e r u l e i s t h a t "a m i n o r i t y s h a r e h o l d e r i s not 
e n t i t l e d t o proceed i n a r e p r e s e n t a t i v e a c t i o n i f he i s unable t o 
show when c h a l l e n g e d t h a t he has exhausted every e f f o r t t o secure 
the j o i n d e r o f the company as p l a i n t i f f and has f a i l e d " . (2) How-
ever where the d i r e c t o r s a re t o be t h e d e f e n d a n t s , the c o u r t s have 
r e c o g n i s e d t h a t t h e r e i s no p o i n t i n f o r m a l l y a s k i n g t h e d i r e c t o r s 
t o i n s t i t u t e the proceedings ( 3 ) . As t o what c o n s t i t u t e s c o n t r o l , 
the t r a d i t i o n a l t e s t i s a m a j o r i t y o f the v o t i n g s t o c k ( 4 ) . Thus 
i n P a v l i d e s v« Jensen (5) where the d i r e c t o r s d i d n o t own shares i n 
the company i n q u e s t i o n b u t c o n t r o l l e d t h e board o f a company which 
owned shares i n the company i n q u e s t i o n , Danckwerts J . r u l e d t h a t 
he was not s a t i s f i e d i n these c i r c u m s t a n c e s t h a t t h e defendant 
d i r e c t o r s had such c o n t r o l as t o j u s t i f y a m i n o r i t y s h a r e h o l d e r s ' 
a c t i o n ( 6 ) . T h i s t r a d i t i o n a l t e s t o f c o n t r o l caused some d i f f i c u l t y 
i n t h e P r u d e n t i a l case because t h e wrongdoers t h e r e d i d n o t have 
v o t i n g c o n t r o l i n the t r a d i t i o n a l sense. But V i n e l o t t J . h e l d t h a t 
i t i s not necessary t o e s t a b l i s h v o t i n g c o n t r o l by the wrongdoers 
b e f o r e a m i n o r i t y s h a r e h o l d e r c o u l d be a l l o w e d to b r i n g a d e r i v a t i v e 
a c t i o n . He i s o f t h e o p i n i o n t h a t t h e c o n t r o l element would be 
s u f f i c i e n t l y e s t a b l i s h e d where " t h e persons a g a i n s t whom the a c t i o n 
i s sought t o be bro u g h t on b e h a l f o f the company are shown t o be 
ab l e by any means o f m a n i p u l a t i o n o f t h e i r p o s i t i o n i n t h e company 
t o ensure t h a t t h e a c t i o n i s n ot b r o u g h t by the company." ( 7) 
I n a s c e r t a i n i n g t h e view o f the m a j o r i t y whether i t i s i n t h e 
i n t e r e s t s o f the company t h a t t h e c l a i m be pursued, V i n e l o t t J. i s 
(2) Ferguson v. W a l l b r i d q e [193 57 3 D.L.R. 66, 83. 
(3) Gower, p.650. 
(4) Menier v. Hooper's Telegraph Works (1874) 9 Ch.App.350,353. 
(5) [1956/ Ch. 565. 
(6) [19561 Ch. 565, 577. 
(7) [1980/ 3 w.L.R. 543, 584. 
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o f t h e o p i n i o n t h a t the r u l e should be t h a t " t h e c o u r t w i l l d i s -
r e q a r d votes c a s t o r capable o f b e i n g c a s t by s h a r e h o l d e r s who 
have an i n t e r e s t which d i r e c t l y c o n f l i c t s w i t h the i n t e r e s t of t h e 
company „ „ „ . I f s h a r e h o l d e r s having a m a j o r i t y o f v o t e s i n 
g e n e r a l meeting are nominees, t h e c o u r t w i l l look behind t h e 
r e g i s t e r t o the b e n e f i c i a l owners t o see whether they are the 
persons a g a i n s t whom r e l i e f i s sought . . . „ There seems no good 
reason why t h e c o u r t should not have r e g a r d t o any o t h e r c i r c u m -
stances which show t h a t t h e m a j o r i t y cannot be r e l i e d upon t o 
d e t e r m i n e i n a d i s i n t e r e s t e d way whether i t i s t r u l y i n the 
i n t e r e s t s o f the company t h a t proceedings s h o u l d be b r o u g h t . " (8) 
I t i s s u b m i t t e d t h a t t h i s r e a l i s t i c approach o f V i n e l o t t J . 
i n a s c e r t a i n i n g the t r u e m a j o r i t y ' s view on 'the i n t e r e s t s o f the 
company' i s another advance f o r the p r o t e c t i o n o f m i n o r i t i e s and 
s u i t s t h e needs o f modern times (9) because e.g. nowadays few 
s h a r e h o l d e r s o f a p u b l i c company a t t e n d and v o t e i n person a t a 
g e n e r a l meeting and d i r e c t o r s i n d e f a u l t might use the proxy 
system t o f u r t h e r t h e i r w r o n g f u l aims ( 1 0 ) . 
Most o f the cases i n which the p r i n c i p l e o f f r a u d on the 
m i n o r i t y has been a p p l i e d appear t o f a l l ( l ) w i t h i n one o f the 
f o l l o w i n g two c l a s s e s (a) Fraud on the Company and (b) t r u e Fraud 
on the M i n o r i t y . 
(a) Fraud on the Company 
The l e a d i n g case o f t h i s t y p e i s Menier v. Hooper's Tele g r a p h 
Works (2) where the m a j o r i t y o f t h e members o f A Co. were a l s o 
members o f B Co., and a t a meeting of A Co. t h e y passed a r e s o l u t i o n 
(7) [19807 3 W.L.R. 543, 584. 
(8) I b i d , a t p.583. 
(9) But see K.W. Wedderburn (1981) 44 M.L.R. 202. 
(10) See a l s o Atwool v. Merryweather (1876) L.R. 5 Eq„ 464n; 37 
L.J.Ch. 35 where the defendant o f f e r e d an i n d e m n i t y t o some share-
h o l d e r s who v o t e d a g a i n s t t h e r e s o l u t i o n a u t h o r i s i n g p r o c e e d i n g s . 
(1) Cf. Gower, p.616. 
(2) TT874) 9 Ch.App. 350; 43 L.J.Ch. 330; 30 L.T. 209; 22 W.R. 396. 
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t o compromise an a c t i o n a g a i n s t B Co. i n a manner a l l e g e d t o be 
f a v o u r a b l e t o A Co. I t was h e l d t h a t a m i n o r i t y s h a r e h o l d e r o f 
A Company was e n t i t l e d t o have t h e compromise s e t a s i d e because 
th e p a s s i n g o f the r e s o l u t i o n by t h e m a j o r i t y was a f r a u d on the 
m i n o r i t y . The arrangement which had been made was one c o n c e r n i n g 
m a t t e r s a f f e c t i n g the whole company, the i n t e r e s t i n which belonged 
t o t h e m i n o r i t y as w e l l as t o the m a j o r i t y . S i r W.M. James L.J. 
remarked i n t h a t case ( 3 ) : 
"The d e f e n d a n t s , who have a m a j o r i t y o f shares i n the company, 
have made an arrangement by which they have d e a l t w i t h m a t t e r s 
a f f e c t i n g the whole company, th e i n t e r e s t i n which belongs t o 
t h e m i n o r i t y as w e l l as t o the m a j o r i t y . They have d e a l t w i t h 
them i n c o n s i d e r a t i o n o f t h e i r o b t a i n i n g f o r themselves c e r t a i n 
advantages. The m i n o r i t y o f t h e s h a r e h o l d e r s say i n e f f e c t t h a t 
the m a j o r i t y has d i v i d e d the a s s e t s o f the company, more o r l e s s , 
between themselves, t o the e x c l u s i o n o f the m i n o r i t y . I t h i n k 
i t would be a shocking t h i n g i f t h a t c o u l d be done, because i f 
so the m a j o r i t y might d i v i d e the whole assets o f t h e company, 
and pass a r e s o l u t i o n t h a t e v e r y t h i n g must be g i v e n t o them, 
and t h a t the m i n o r i t y s h o u l d have n o t h i n g t o do w i t h i t . Assuming 
th e case t o be as a l l e g e d i n the b i l l , then t h e m a j o r i t y have put 
something i n t o t h e i r pockets a t the expense o f t h e m i n o r i t y . I f 
so, i t appears t o me t h a t the m i n o r i t y have a r i g h t t o have t h e i r 
share o f the b e n e f i t s a s c e r t a i n e d f o r them i n the b e s t way i n 
which the c o u r t can do i t , and g i v e n t o them." 
The Menier case p r i n c i p l e was f o l l o w e d i n Cook v. Peeks ( 4 ) . 
I n t h a t case the d i r e c t o r s o f a r a i l w a y c o n s t r u c t i o n company 
o b t a i n e d a c o n t r a c t i n t h e i r own names t o c o n s t r u c t a r a i l w a y . 
( 3) /1874/ 9 Ch.App.350 a t 353. 
(4) [1916] 1 A.C. 554; 85 L.J.P.C. 161; 114 L.T. 636. 
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The c o n t r a c t was o b t a i n e d as a r e s u l t o f a breach o f t r u s t by the 
d i r e c t o r s , who then used t h e i r v o t i n g powers t o pass a r e s o l u t i o n 
o f the company d e c l a r i n g t h a t t he company had no i n t e r e s t i n the 
c o n t r a c t . I t was h e l d by the P r i v y C o u n c i l t h a t t h e b e n e f i t o f 
t h e c o n t r a c t belonged i n e q u i t y t o t h e company, and the d i r e c t o r s 
c o u l d n o t v a l i d l y use t h e i r v o t i n g power t o keep i t t o themselves. 
More r e c e n t l y i n D a n i e l s v. D a n i e l s ( 5) the m i n o r i t y share-
h o l d e r s o f a company b r o u g h t an a c t i o n a g a i n s t the two d i r e c t o r s 
and the company. T h e i r c o m p l a i n t was t h a t i n 1970 the company, on 
t h e i n s t r u c t i o n s o f the two d i r e c t o r s , who were t h e m a j o r i t y share-
h o l d e r s , s o l d t he company's l a n d t o one o f the d i r e c t o r s , who was 
the w i f e o f t h e o t h e r , f o r £4,250 and t h a t the d i r e c t o r s knew, or 
ought t o have known, t h a t t he s a l e was a t an u n d e r v a l u e . Four 
years l a t e r t h e w i f e s o l d t h e landed p r o p e r t y f o r £120,000. The 
d i r e c t o r s took o u t a summons t o s t r i k e o u t the st a t e m e n t o f c l a i m 
as d i s c l o s i n g no reasonable cause o f a c t i o n o r otherv/ise as an 
abuse o f the process o f the c o u r t . But the c o u r t d i s m i s s e d the 
summons and h e l d t h a t the e x c e p t i o n t o the r u l e i n Foss v. H a r b o t t l e , 
e n a b l i n g a m i n o r i t y s h a r e h o l d e r t o b r i n g an a c t i o n a g a i n s t a com-
pany f o r f r a u d where no o t h e r remedy was a v a i l a b l e , should i n c l u d e 
cases where, a l t h o u g h t h e r e was no f r a u d a l l e g e d , t h e r e was a 
breach o f d u t y o f d i r e c t o r s and m a j o r i t y s h a r e h o l d e r s t o the d e t r i -
ment o f t h e company. Ternpleman J . observed a t p.413: 
"The a u t h o r i t i e s which d e a l w i t h s i m p l e f r a u d on the one hand 
and gross n e g l i g e n c e on the o t h e r do not cover the s i t u a t i o n 
which a r i s e s where, w i t h o u t f r a u d , the d i r e c t o r s and m a j o r i t y 
s h a r e h o l d e r s are g u i l t y o f a breach o f d u t y which they owe t o 
the company, and t h a t breach o f d u t y n o t o n l y harms t h e company 
(5) [1978.7 1 Ch. 406; £.9 78.7 2 W.L.R. 73; /1978/ 2 A l l E.R. 89; 
(1977) 121 S.J. 605. See a l s o B.A.K. Ride r (1978) 37 C.L.J. 270; 
D.D. P r e n t i c e (1979) 43 Conv. 47. 
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b u t b e n e f i t s the d i r e c t o r s . I n t h a t case i t seems t o me t h a t 
d i f f e r e n t c o n s i d e r a t i o n s a p p l y . I f m i n o r i t y s h a r e h o l d e r s can 
sue i f t h e r e i s f r a u d , I see no reason why they cannot sue where 
the a c t i o n o f the m a j o r i t y and the d i r e c t o r s though w i t h o u t f r a u d , 
c o n f e r s some b e n e f i t on those d i r e c t o r s and m a j o r i t y s h a r e h o l d e r s 
themselves. I t would seem t o me q u i t e monstrous - p a r t i c u l a r l y 
as f r a u d i s so hard t o plead and d i f f i c u l t t o prove - i f the con-
f i n e s o f the e x c e p t i o n t o Foss v. H a r b o t t l e , 2 Hare 4 6 1 , were 
drawn so n a r r o w l y t h a t d i r e c t o r s c o u l d make a p r o f i t o u t o f t h e i r 
n e g l i g e n c e . L o r d H a t h e r l e y L.C. i n Turquand v. M a r s h a l l , L.R. 4 
Ch.App. 3 7 6 , opined t h a t s h a r e h o l d e r s must put up w i t h f o o l i s h o r 
unwise d i r e c t o r s . Banckwerts J. i n P a v l i d e s v. Jensen 1956 
1 Ch. 565 accepted t h a t t he f o r b e a r a n c e o f s h a r e h o l d e r s extends 
t o d i r e c t o r s who are "an amiable s e t o f l u n a t i c s . " Examples, 
a n c i e n t and modern, abound. To put up w i t h f o o l i s h d i r e c t o r s i s 
one t h i n g ; t o put up w i t h d i r e c t o r s who are so f o o l i s h t h a t they 
make a p r o f i t o f £ 1 1 5 , 0 0 0 odd a t the expense o f the company i s 
something e n t i r e l y d i f f e r e n t . The p r i n c i p l e which may be gleaned 
from Alexander v. A u t o m a t i c Telephone Co. [ 1 9 0 0 ] 2 Ch. 56 ( d i r e c t o r s 
b e n e f i t i n g t h e m s e l v e s ) , from Cook v. Peeks [ 1 9 1 6 J 1 A.C. 554 ( d i r e c -
t o r s d i v e r t i n g b u s i n e s s i n t h e i r own f a v o u r ) and from d i c t a i n 
P a v l i d e s v. Jensen ( [1956] 2 Ch. 565 ( d i r e c t o r s a p p r o p r i a t i n g assets 
o f t he company) i s t h a t a m i n o r i t y s h a r e h o l d e r who has no o t h e r 
remedy may sue where d i r e c t o r s use t h e i r powers, i n t e n t i o n a l l y o r 
u n i n t e n t i o n a l l y , f r a u d u l e n t l y o r n e g l i g e n t l y , i n a manner which 
b e n e f i t s themselves a t t h e expense o f the company." 
From the cases d i s c u s s e d above and i n t h i s f i e l d , i t seems t h a t 
the a u t h o r i t i e s show t h a t e x c e p t i o n t o Foss v. H a r b o t t l e a p p l i e s not 
o n l y where the a l l e g a t i o n i s t h a t the d i r e c t o r s who c o n t r o l a com-
pany have i m p r o p e r l y a p p r o p r i a t e d t o themselves money, p r o p e r t y o r 
advantages which b e l o n g t o the company o r , i n breach o f t h e i r d u t y 
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t o the company, have d i v e r t e d business t o themselves which ought 
t o have been g i v e n t o t h e company, b u t more g e n e r a l l y where the 
a l l e g a t i o n i s t h a t d i r e c t o r s , though b e l i e v i n g t h a t they were not 
do i n g a n y t h i n g wrong, are i n breach o f d u t y t o the company, i n -
c l u d i n g perhaps t h e i r d u t y t o e x e r c i s e proper c a r e , and as a r e s u l t 
o f t h a t breach o b t a i n some b e n e f i t . 
(b) True Fraud on the M i n o r i t y 
We are concerned here w i t h a t r u e f r a u d on t h e m i n o r i t y . The 
c l a s s i c i l l u s t r a t i o n s o f t h i s type o f cases are Brown v. B r i t i s h 
A b r a s i v e Wheel Co. (6) and Dafen T i n p l a t e Co. L t d . v. L l a n e l l y 
S t e e l Co. (7) 
I n t h e f i r s t o f t h e s e , a company r e q u i r e d more c a p i t a l . A 
m a j o r i t y o f s h a r e h o l d e r s h o l d i n g 98% were prepared t o p r o v i d e more 
c a p i t a l b u t would o n l y do so on c o n d i t i o n t h a t t h e m i n o r i t y h o l d i n g 
the r e m a i n i n g 2% would s e l l t h e i r shares t o the m a j o r i t y . Negoia-
t i o n s f o r a s a l e f a i l e d and an a l t e r a t i o n t o t h e a r t i c l e s was p r o -
posed t o a l l o w the m a j o r i t y t o buy o u t the m i n o r i t y . I t was h e l d 
t h a t t h e a l t e r a t i o n was designed t o a l l o w the m a j o r i t y t o do com-
p u l s o r i l y what they c o u l d n o t do by agreement and was not f o r the 
b e n e f i t o f the company as a whole. 
The Brown case was f o l l o w e d i n Dafen T i n p l a t e Co. L t d . v. 
L l a n e l l y s t e e l Co. i n t h a t case the p l a i n t i f f company was a share-
h o l d e r i n the defendant company and purchased i t s s t e e l from i t . 
When i t stopped buying i t s s t e e l from the defendant and s e t up i t s 
own s t e e l p l a n t , an a r t i c l e p r o v i d i n g f o r the compulsory a c q u i s i t i o n 
o f t h e shares o f any member was passed by the def e n d a n t company. 
(6) [19197 1 Ch. 290; 88 L.J.Ch. 143; 120 L.T. 529; 35 T.L.R. 268; 
63 S.'J. 3~73. 
(7) [1920/ 2 Ch. 124; 89 L.J.Ch. 346; 123 L.T. 225; 36 T.L.R. 428; 
64 S.J. 446 
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P e t e r s o n J . s e t a s i d e the a r t i c l e r e m a r k i n g t h a t i t was w i d e r than 
was necessary t o p r o t e c t the i n t e r e s t s o f the company because i t 
enabled the m a j o r i t y t o a c q u i r e t h e shares o f any shareholder., 
There a r e , however, cases g o i n g the o p p o s i t e d i r e c t i o n , one 
o f which i s Sidebottom v. Kershaw, Leese & Co. L t d , (3) I n t h a t 
case the a r t i c l e concerned p r o v i d e d f o r the compulsory a c q u i s i t i o n 
o f the shares o f any c o m p e t i t o r . The p l a i n t i f f was a c o m p e t i t o r -
s h a r e h o l d e r and b r o u g h t an a c t i o n , b u t i t was h e l d t h a t i t was 
bona f i d e f o r the b e n e f i t o f the company t o be p r o t e c t e d from 
c o m p e t i t o r s and the a r t i c l e was u p h e l d . The Brown case was d i s -
t i n g u i s h e d on the f i n d i n g o f f a c t t h a t the a r t i c l e t h e r e was o n l y 
f o r t h e b e n e f i t of the m a j o r i t y . 
I n S h u t t l e w o r t h v. Cox Bros. & Co. (Maidenhead), L t d . (9) the 
a r t i c l e s p r o v i d e d t h a t B and some o t h e r s were t o be permanent 
d i r e c t o r s who c o u l d o n l y be removed on one o f s e v e r a l s p e c i f i e d 
e v e n t s . On 22 o c c a s i o n s i n one year B f a i l e d t o account f o r the 
company's money r e c e i v e d by him. F a i l u r e t o account was n o t one 
o f t h e s p e c i f i e d grounds f o r removal o f a d i r e c t o r , and so the 
a r t i c l e s were a l t e r e d t o add one more ground f o r removal o f a 
d i r e c t o r , namely a w r i t t e n r e q u e s t signed by a l l the o t h e r d i r e c t o r s . 
The Court o f Appeal h e l d t h a t the a l t e r a t i o n was f o r t h e b e n e f i t o f 
the company as a whole and was v a l i d , and Bankes L.J. remarked t h a t 
i t was f o r the s h a r e h o l d e r s , not t h e c o u r t , to say what was i n the 
i n t e r e s t s of t h e company and t h e c o u r t should not i n t e r f e r e u n l e s s 
the a l t e r a t i o n was such t h a t on reasonable men c o u l d c o n s i d e r i t 
f o r the b e n e f i t o f the company ( 1 0 ) . 
( 8 ) f l 9 2 0 ] 1 Ch. 154; 89 L.J.Ch. 113; 122 L.T. 325; 36 T.L.R. 45; 
64 S.J. 114. 
(9) (1927/ 2 K.B. 9; 96 L.J.K.B. 104; 136 L.T. 337; 43 T.L.R. 83. 
(10) Cf. Dafen T j g p l a t e Co. v. L l a n e l l y S t e e l Co. (19207 2 Ch. 124 
where Peterson J . was o f the o p i n i o n t h a t the onus o f p r o o f l a y on 
those s u p p o r t i n g the r e s o l u t i o n and the t e s t was an o b j e c t i v e one 
and not what the s h a r e h o l d e r s h o n e s t l y b e l i e v e d . 
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I n A l l e n v. Gold Reefs o f West A f r i c a ( 1 ) , the m a j o r i t y were 
h e l d e n t i t l e d t o a l t e r t he a r t i c l e s so as t o g i v e t h e company a 
l i e n on f u l l y p a i d shares even f o r debts which had been i n c u r r e d 
p r i o r t o the p a s s i n g o f t h e r e s o l u t i o n , , 
F u r t h e r m o r e , i n Greenhalqh v. Arderne Cinemas L t d . (2) the 
a r t i c l e s o f a p r i v a t e company p r o h i b i t e d a t r a n s f e r o f shares t o 
an o u t s i d e r i f another member was w i l l i n g t o buy them a t a f a i r 
v a l u e . The m a j o r i t y s h a r e h o l d e r , w i t h a view t o t r a n s f e r r i n g h i s 
shares t o an o u t s i d e r , caused t h e a r t i c l e s t o be a l t e r e d so as t o 
p e r m i t a t r a n s f e r t o any person w i t h t he s a n c t i o n o f an o r d i n a r y 
r e s o l u t i o n . I t was h e l d by the C o u r t o f Appeal t h a t t he a l t e r a t i o n 
was bona f i d e and v a l i d a l t h o u g h as a r e s u l t t h e m i n o r i t y s hare-
h o l d e r s l o s t t h e i r r i g h t s o f p r e - e m p t i o n . 
I n t h e more r e c e n t case o f Clemens v. Clemens Bros. L t d . (3) 
however, the m i n o r i t y s h a r e h o l d e r met w i t h more l u c k . There p r o -
p o s a l s t o i n c r e a s e t h e share c a p i t a l o f the company which would 
r e s u l t i n the m i n o r i t y s h a r e h o l d e r ' s v o t i n g power b e i n g reduced 
were h e l d t o be o p p r e s s i v e . 
I t i s i n t e r e s t i n g t o note t h a t a l t h o u g h F o s t e r J . i n t h e 
Clemens case p u r p o r t e d t o a p p l y the same p r i n c i p l e s as those i n 
t h e Greenhalqh case, o p p o s i t e c o n c l u s i o n s were reached i n the two 
cases. But perhaps i t i s of importance t o note t h a t Evershed M.R. 
was much a f f e c t e d by t h e bona f i d e s o f the m a j o r i t y i n the Greenhalgh 
case because t h e purchaser was b i d d i n g f o r a l l t he shares o f the 
company a t a f a i r p r i c e ( 4 ) . Had t h i s f a c t been d i f f e r e n t , t h e 
d e c i s i o n might have been d i f f e r e n t . 0 n t h e c o n t r a r y i n t h e Clemens 
(1) [ l 9 0 0 j 1 Ch. 656; 69 L.J.Ch. 266; 82 L.T. 210; 16 T.L.R. 213; 
7 Mans. 417, 48 W.R. 452. 
(2) f l 9 5 l ) Ch. 286; [1950/ 2 A l l E.R. 1120; 94 S.J. 855. 
(3) T1976) 2 A l l E.R. 268. See a l s o below, pp.40-1; G.R. S u l l i v a n 
(1977) 41 Conv. (N.S.) 169. 
(4 ) /1950/ 2 A l l E.R. 1120, 1128. 
case t h e predominant m o t i v e o f the aunt was t o i n j u r e t h e n i e c e . 
Thus F o s t e r J . remarked: 
"But I cannot escape the c o n c l u s i o n t h a t the r e s o l u t i o n s have 
been framed so as t o put i n t o the hands of Miss Clemens and her 
f e l l o w d i r e c t o r s complete c o n t r o l o f the company and to d e p r i v e 
t h e p l a i n t i f f o f her e x i s t i n g r i g h t s as a s h a r e h o l d e r w i t h more 
than 25 per c e n t , o f the v o t e s and g r e a t l y reduce her r i g h t s 
under a r t . 6. They are s p e c i f i c a l l y and c a r e f u l l y designed t o 
ensure not o n l y t h a t the p l a i n t i f f can never get c o n t r o l o f the 
company b u t t o d e p r i v e her o f what has been c a l l e d her n e g a t i v e 
c o n t r o l . " 
From the cases d i s c u s s e d above and i n t h i s f i e l d , i t appears 
t h a t t h e c o u r t s w i l l not i n t e r f e r e w i t h m a j o r i t y d e c i s i o n s u n l e s s 
t h e conduct Gomplained of i s d e l i b e r a t e l y aimed i n a d i s c r i m i n a t o r y 
manner a t t h e m i n o r i t y , w i t h l i t t l e o r no b e n e f i t t o t h e company 
as a commercial e n t i t y . The d i f f i c u l t y i n t h i s area i s to r e c o n c i l e 
t h e p r i n c i p l e t h a t a s h a r e h o l d e r ' s v o t e i s a r i g h t o f p r o p e r t y t h a t 
may be e x e r c i s e d from m o t i v e s o r promptings of what he c o n s i d e r s h i s 
own i n d i v i d u a l i n t e r e s t s w i t h the p r i n c i p l e t h a t t h e power t o a l t e r 
t h e a r t i c l e s should be e x e r c i s e d bona f i d e f o r the b e n e f i t of the 
company as a whole. 
A g e n e r a l P r i n c i p l e ? 
I t i s d i f f i c u l t t o f o r m u l a t e a g e n e r a l f r a u d on the m i n o r i t y 
p r i n c i p l e . I t appears t h a t a number o f c o n s i d e r a t i o n s are r e l e v a n t 
i n d e t e r m i n i n g the q u e s t i o n o f what w i l l c o n s t i t u t e a f r a u d on the 
m i n o r i t y . These would i n c l u d e bona f i d e s , mala f i d e s , d i s c r i m i -
n a t i o n , o p p r e s s i o n , a p p r o p r i a t i o n o f company assets o r b e n e f i t s , 
advancement o f the i n t e r e s t s o f the company as a whole, and proper 
purposes; a l l these would be r e l e v a n t b u t not c o n c l u s i v e c o n s i -
d e r a t i o n s . Gower (5) has suggested t h a t t h e r e seems t o be a g e n e r a l 
(5) Gower, p.62 3. 
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p r i n c i p l e t h a t t h e m a j o r i t y must a l w a y s e x e r c i s e t h e i r p o wers 
"bona f i d e f o r t h e b e n e f i t o f t h e company as a w h o l e . " 
3. I n t e r e s t s o f J u s t i c e 
From t i m e t o t i m e t h e c o u r t s have s u g g e s t e d t h e e x c e p t i o n 
"where t h e i n t e r e s t s o f j u s t i c e r e q u i r e t h e r u l e t o be d i s p e n s e d 
w i t h . " I n Foss v . H a r b o t t l e i t s e l f V i c e - C h a n c e l l o r Wigram s u g -
g e s t e d such an e x c e p t i o n . R e c e n t l y i n P r u d e n t i a l A s s u r a n c e Co. 
L t d . v . Newman I n d u s t r i e s L t d . And O t h e r s (No.2) ( 6 ) V i n e l o t t J . 
e x p r e s s e d t h e o p i n i o n : 
"These two c a s e s a r e c o n s i s t e n t w i t h o b s e r v a t i o n s i n a n o t h e r 
s t r a n d o f a u t h o r i t y w h ere t h e r u l e i n Foss v . H a r b o t t l e , 2 Hare 
461 has been d e s c r i b e d as a f l e x i b l e r u l e . I n Foss v . H a r b o t t l e 
i t s e l f S i r James Wigram V.-C. s a i d , a t p.492: 
" I f a c a s e s h o u l d a r i s e o f i n j u r y t o a c o r p o r a t i o n by some o f 
i t s members, f o r w h i c h no a d e q u a t e remedy r e m a i n e d , e x c e p t 
t h a t o f s u i t by i n d i v i d u a l c o r p o r a t o r s i n t h e i r p r i v a t e c h a r -
a c t e r s , and a s k i n g i n such c h a r a c t e r t h e p r o t e c t i o n o f t h o s e 
r i g h t s t o w h i c h i n t h e i r c o r p o r a t e c h a r a c t e r t h e y w e r e e n t i t l e d , 
I c a n n o t b u t t h i n k t h a t t h e p r i n c i p l e so f o r c i b l y l a i d down by 
L o r d C o t t e n h a m (L.C.) i n W a l l w o r t h v . H o l t ( 1 8 4 0 ) 4 M y l . & C r . 
619, 635 and o t h e r c a s e s , w o u l d a p p l y , and t h e c l a i m s o f j u s t i c e 
w o u l d be f o u n d s u p e r i o r t o any d i f f i c u l t i e s a r i s i n g o u t o f t e c h -
n i c a l r u l e s r e s p e c t i n g t h e mode i n w h i c h c o r p o r a t i o n s a r e r e q u i r e d 
t o s u e . " 
I n Edwards V, H a l l i w e l l [ 1 9 5 0 ] 2 A l l E.R. 1064 J e n k i n s L . J . s a i d , 
a t p.1067, o f t h e e x c e p t i o n t h a t i s showed " t h a t t h e r u l e i s n o t 
an i n f l e x i b l e r u l e and t h a t i t w i l l be r e l a x e d w h e r e n e c e s s a r y i n 
t h e i n t e r e s t s o f j u s t i c e . " I n B u r l a n d v . E a r l e [1902] A.C. 83, 
93 L o r d Davey, i n s t a t i n g t h e " e l e m e n t a r y " r u l e , t h a t t h e c o u r t 
( 6 ) fl980.7 3 W.L.R. 543; / l 9 8 0 / 2 A l l E.R. 8 4 1 . 
w o u l d n o t i n t e r f e r e w i t h t h e management o f c o m p a n i e s a c t i n g 
w i t h i n t h e i r p o w e r s , added: "and i n f a c t has no j u r i s d i c t i o n t o 
do s o " ; b u t he s t a t e d t h e n a r r o w r u l e , t h a t i n an a c t i o n t o 
r e d r e s s a w r o n g t o a company t h e company must be t h e p l a i n t i f f , 
as a p r i m a f a c i a r u l e o n l y . " 
H i s l o r d s h i p V i n e l o t t w e n t on t o say a t p.582: 
". . . t h e r e l e v a n t o r " t r u e " e x c e p t i o n may a p p l y n o t o n l y w h e r e 
t h e w r o n g d o e r s a r e a m a j o r i t y b u t w h e r e some o t h e r r e a s o n can be 
shown f o r s a y i n g t h a t u n l e s s t h e m i n o r i t y a r e a l l o w e d t o sue on 
b e h a l f o f t h e company t h e i n t e r e s t s o f j u s t i c e w i l l be d e f e a t e d 
i n t h a t an a c t i o n w h i c h o u g h t t o be p u r s u e d on b e h a l f o f t h e 
company w i l l n o t be p u r s u e d . " 
B u t i n P a v l i d e s v . J e n s e n ( 7 ) D a n c k w e r t s J«, a f t e r c a r e f u l l y 
e x a m i n i n g p r e v i o u s c a s e s , r e j e c t e d t h i s e x c e p t i o n as n o t b e i n g 
b o r n e o u t by t h e a u t h o r i t i e s . . I n t h a t c a s e t h e w r o n g t o t h e com-
pany was a l l e g e d l y done n e g l i g e n t l y , and n o t f r a u d u l e n t l y . 
I t s h o u l d be n o t e d t h a t t h e e x c e p t i o n o f f r a u d on t h e m i n o r i t y 
i s f a i r l y g e n e r a l , w h i c h t o g e t h e r w i t h t h e p e r s o n a l r i g h t s e x c e p t i o n 
and s t a t u t o r y r e l i e f p r o v i d e s some d e g r e e o f p r o t e c t i o n f o r t h e 
m i n o r i t y . N e v e r t h e l e s s , c a s e s m i g h t a r i s e where t h e a c t c o m p l a i n e d 
o f can n e i t h e r be c l a s s i f i e d as f r a u d on t h e m i n o r i t y n o r p e r s o n a l 
r i g h t s ; n o r can t h e s t a t u t o r y p r o t e c t i o n o f t h e m i n o r i t y be i n v o k e d . 
I n t h e s e c a s e s , i t i s s u b m i t t e d , t h a t t h e c o u r t s s h o u l d be a b l e t o 
a d m i t t h i s e x c e p t i o n t o t h e r u l e i n Foss v . H a r b o t t l e . Thus w h i l e , 
on p r i n c i p l e , t h e c o u r t s have j u r i s d i c t i o n t o a d m i t t h i s e x c e p t i o n 
t o t h e m a j o r i t y r u l e , i n p r a c t i c e i t i s d i f f i c u l t t o e s t a b l i s h a 
c a s e f o r t h e a d m i s s i o n o f t h i s r e m e d i a l j u r i s d i c t i o n . 
( 7 ) /"19 5 67 Ch. 565; ^1956] 3 W.L.R. 224; 2 A l l E.R. 518; 
100 S.J. 452. 
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M i n o r i t y R e d r e s s and R a t i f i c a t i o n 
M o s t o f t h e c a s e s i n v o l v i n g t h e M e n i e r c a s e p r i n c i p l e c o n c e r n 
a b r e a c h o f d u t y o f good f a i t h o f some d i r e c t o r s who u s u a l l y f o r m 
t h e m a j o r i t y and r a t i f i c a t i o n o f t h a t b r e a c h by t h e m a j o r i t y . 
The power o f r a t i f i c a t i o n by t h e m a j o r i t y may be abused by 
t h e m a j o r i t y . And t h e r e seems t o be no c l e a r p r i n c i p l e g o v e r n i n g 
w h a t b r e a c h e s o f d u t i e s may be r a t i f i e d and w h a t may n o t ( 8 ) , I t 
a p p e a r s t h a t t h e c o u r t s p r e f e r t o e x a m i n e each case on i t s own 
f a c t s and t r y t o r e c o n c i l e t h e v o t i n g r i g h t and m a j o r i t y r u l e w i t h 
t h e p r i n c i p l e o f bona f i d e s f o r t h e b e n e f i t o f t h e company as a 
w h o l e , 
Gower ( 9 ) a r g u e s t h a t where t h e d i r e c t o r s a p p r o p r i a t e t h e 
company's p r o p e r t y , t h e i r a c t i o n c an be r a t i f i e d by t h e m a j o r i t y 
i f i t can be shown p o s i t i v e l y t h a t t h i s was p a s s e d bona f i d e i n 
t h e i n t e r e s t s o f t h e company. Where, h o w e v e r , t h e d i r e c t o r s do 
n o t a c t bona f i d e i n t h e i n t e r e s t s o f t h e company, t h e i r b r e a c h e s 
c a n n o t be r a t i f i e d ( 1 0 ) , F u r t h e r , Gower a r g u e s t h a t a r e s o l u t i o n 
o f a g e n e r a l m e e t i n g c a n n o t , e i t h e r p r o s p e c t i v e l y o r r e t r o s p e c t i v e l y , 
a u t h o r i s e t h e d i r e c t o r s t o a c t i n f r a u d o f t h e company, ' f r a u d ' 
b e i n g u s e d i n a w i d e r sense t h a n d e c e i t o r d i s h o n e s t y ( 1 ) . 
I t i s s u b m i t t e d t h a t G o w e r 1 s a r g u m e n t s a b o u t r a t i f i c a t i o n o f 
f r a u d on t h e company as s t a t e d i m m e d i a t e l y above a l s o a p p l y t o 
r a t i f i c a t i o n by t h e m a j o r i t y a t g e n e r a l m e e t i n g o f t r u e f r a u d on 
t h e m i n o r i t y p r o v i d e d t h a t i f t h e r e i s a p r i m a f a c i e c a s e o f d i s -
c r i m i n a t i o n by t h e m a j o r i t y a g a i n s t t h e m i n o r i t y , i n p r a c t i c e t h e 
onus on t h e m a j o r i t y t o p r o v e bona f i d e s i n t h e i n t e r e s t s o f t h e 
company w o u l d be h e a v i e r , 
( 8 ) See b e l o w , pp,110-5 
( 9 ) Gower, p.619 
( 1 0 ) I b i d . , p.619 
( 1 ) I b i d , , p.619 
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I t has been commonly ( 2 ) c o n s i d e r e d t h a t N o r t h - W e s t T r a n s -
p o r t a t i o n Co. v . B e a t t y ( 3 ) i s a u t h o r i t y f o r t h e p r o p o s i t i o n t h a t 
a m a j o r i t y s h a r e h o l d e r who i s a l s o a d i r e c t o r c a n use h i s v o t e s 
i n g e n e r a l m e e t i n g t o c o n f i r m o r r a t i f y an a c t o r t r a n s a c t i o n 
w h i c h was n o t f r a u d u l e n t o r u l t r a v i r e s , b u t was a b r e a c h o f h i s 
d u t y as a d i r e c t o r , i n o r d e r t o p r e v e n t a m i n o r i t y s h a r e h o l d e r 
f r o m b r i n g i n g a d e r i v a t i v e a c t i o n . B u t V i n e l o t t J . has a d i f f e r e n t 
v i e w b e c a u s e he r e m a r k e d i n t h e r e c e n t c a se o f P r u d e n t i a l A s s u r a n c e 
Co. L t d . v . Newman I n d u s t r i e s L t d . & O t h e r s (No.2) ( 4 ) : 
"As I see i t a l l t h a t 3 e a t t y ' s c a se shows i s t h a t a c o n t r a c t 
b e t w e e n a company and a m a j o r i t y s h a r e h o l d e r w h i c h i s a u t h o r i s e d 
o r r a t i f i e d i n g e n e r a l m e e t i n g , t h e r e s o l u t i o n b e i n g p a s s e d by 
t h e use o f t h e c o n t r o l l i n g s h a r e h o l d e r ' s v o t e s , w i l l n o t be s e t 
a s i d e u n l e s s i t i s shown t o have been an i m p r o p e r one. T h a t 
p r o p o s i t i o n f o l l o w s f r o m t h e p r i n c i p l e t h a t a m a j o r i t y s h a r e -
h o l d e r i n e x e r c i s i n g h i s v o t e s i n g e n e r a l m e e t i n g i n r e l a t i o n t o 
a t r a n s a c t i o n i n w h i c h he i s i n v o l v e d does n o t owe any f i d u c i a r y 
d u t y t o t h e company o r t o t h e o t h e r s h a r e h o l d e r s . " 
The P r u d e n t i a l c a s e has a l s o c a s t d o u b t on t h e v i e w ( 5 ) h e l d 
by some t h a t i n R e g a l ( H a s t i n g s ) L t d . v . G u l l i v e r ( 6 ) t h e House o f 
L o r d s r u l e d t h a t t h e d i r e c t o r s w o u l d n o t have been l i a b l e t o a c c o u n t 
had t h e t r a n s a c t i o n been r a t i f i e d . Thus V i n e l o t t J . commented ( 7 ) : 
" I n R e g a l ( H a s t i n g s ) L t d . v . G u l l i v e r [\96lJ 2 A.C. 134 . . . L o r d 
R u s s e l l o f K i l l o w e n s a i d , a t p.150, t h a t t h e d i r e c t o r s " c o u l d , had 
t h e y w i s h e d , have p r o t e c t e d t h e m s e l v e s by a r e s o l u t i o n ( e i t h e r 
( 2 ) See K.W. Wedderburn ( 1 9 8 1 ) 44 M.L.R. 202, 209. 
( 3 ) ( 1 8 8 7 ) 12 App. Case. 589; 56 L.J.P.C. 102; 57 L.T. 426; 3 T.L.R. 
789; 36 W.R. 647. See a l s o b e l o w , pp.110-5 
( 4 ) Ll9Q0] 3 W.L.R. 543, 570. See a l s o b e l o w p . I l l 
( 5 ) F o r e x a m p l e , See Gower, p.617. 
( 6 ) [ 1 9 4 2 ] 1 A l l E.R. 3 78; £.96 77 2 A.C. 134n. 
( 7 ) £19807 3 W.L.R. 543, 568. 
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a n t e c e d e n t o r s u b s e q u e n t ) o f t h e R e g a l s h a r e h o l d e r s i n g e n e r a l 
m e e t i n g . " I t i s s u g g e s t e d i n t h e e d i t o r ' s n o t e i n t h e r e p o r t 
a t [ 1 9 4 2 ] 1 A l l E.R. 378, 379, t h a t t h e r e s o l u t i o n " w o u l d have 
been a mere m a t t e r o f f o r m , s i n c e ( t h e d e f e n d a n t d i r e c t o r s ) 
d o u b t l e s s c o n t r o l l e d t h e v o t i n g , , " I can see n o t h i n g i n t h e 
r e p o r t w h i c h i n d i c a t e s t h a t t h e d e f e n d a n t d i r e c t o r s c o n t r o l l e d 
t h e v o t i n g and, as I u n d e r s t a n d t h i s passage i n t h e speech o f 
L o r d R u s s e l l o f K i l l o w e n , he c o n t e m p l a t e d t h a t t h e d e f e n d a n t 
d i r e c t o r s m i g h t have p r o t e c t e d t h e m s e l v e s by a r e s o l u t i o n i n 
g e n e r a l m e e t i n g p r e c i s e l y b e c a u s e t h e y had n o t c o n t r o l o f t h e 
m a j o r i t y o f t h e v o t e s . " 
I f V i n e l o t t J . i s r i g h t i n h i s v i e w on t h e R e g a l c a s e , R e g a l 
( H a s t i n g s ) L t d . v. G u l l i v e r w o u l d n o t be i n c o n s i s t e n t w i t h t h e 
d e c i s i o n o f t h e P r i v y C o u n c i l i n Cook v . Peeks ( 8 ) a b o u t t h e 
e f f e c t o f r a t i f i c a t i o n o f d i r e c t o r s ' b r e a c h e s o f d u t y as t h o u g h t 
by some ( 9 ) . 
A l t h o u g h V i n e l o t t J's i l l u m i n a t i n g j u d g e m e n t i n t h e P r u d e n t i a l 
c a s e i s t o be welcomed, i t i s p e r h a p s i m p o r t a n t t o n o t e t h a t h i s 
d e c i s i o n i s one o f f i r s t i n s t a n c e o n l y and many o f h i s s t a t e m e n t s 
c o n c e r n i n g r a t i f i c a t i o n by m a j o r i t y s h a r e h o l d e r s o f d i r e c t o r s ' 
b r e a c h e s o f d u t y and f r a u d on t h e m i n o r i t y a r e m e r e l y o b i t e r d i c t a . 
S t a t u t o r y R e l i e f 
To s u p p l e m e n t t h e p r o t e c t i o n o f m i n o r i t i e s p r o v i d e d by common 
law and e q u i t y , t h e Companies A c t s have p r o v i d e d some a d d i t i o n a l 
p r o t e c t i o n (10)„ 
The A l t e r n a t i v e Remedy 
Under s e c t i o n 75 o f t h e Companies A c t 1980 r e p l a c i n g s.210 o f 
( 8 ) [1916] 1 A.C. 554; 85 L.J.P.C. 1 6 1 ; 114 L.T. 636. 
( 9 ) E.g. see Gower, p„617„ 
( 1 0 ) F o r D e p a r t m e n t o f T r a d e I n v e s t i g a t i o n s , see b e l o w , pp.132-7 
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t h e Companies A c t 1948 a member can p e t i t i o n t h e c o u r t f o r r e l i e f 
o t h e r t h a n a w i n d i n g - u p o r d e r u n d e r c e r t a i n c i r c u m s t a n c e s t o be 
d i s c u s s e d l a t e r i n t h i s C h a p t e r (1)„ 
S e c t i o n 210 o f t h e Companies A c t 1948 p r o v i d e d t h a t a member 
c o u l d p e t i t i o n t h e c o u r t f o r r e l i e f o t h e r t h a n a w i n d i n g - u p o r d e r 
w h e re any member c o m p l a i n e d t h a t t h e a f f a i r s o f t h e comapny were 
b e i n g c o n d u c t e d i n a manner o p p r e s s i v e t o some p a r t o f t h e members 
( i n c l u d i n g h i m s e l f ) . The s e c t i o n was i n t r o d u c e d t o s t r e n g t h t h e 
p o s i t i o n o f t h e m i n o r i t y s h a r e h o l d e r s i n p r i v a t e c o m p a n i e s , b u t 
s u b s e q u e n t j u d i c i a l d e c i s i o n s t e n d e d t o l i m i t i t s u s e f u l n e s s and 
scope ( 2 ) . 
As i n t e r p r e t e d by t h e c o u r t s s e c t i o n 210 had t h e f o l l o w i n g 
w eaknesses . 
I n a s.210 p e t i t i o n , t h e a l l e g e d c o n d u c t c o m p l a i n e d o f must 
be " o p p r e s s i v e " . V a r i o u s d e f i n i t i o n s o f t h i s t e r m were a d v a n c e d , 
" t h e d i c t i o n a r y d e f i n i t i o n o f burdensome, h a r s h and w r o n g f u l " ( 3 ) , 
"a v i s i b l e d e p a r t u r e f r o m t h e s t a n d a r d s o f f a i r d e a l i n g and a 
v i o l a t i o n o f t h e c o n d i t i o n o f f a i r p l a y " ( 4 ) , and "an e l e m e n t o f 
l a c k o f p r o b i t y and f a i r d e a l i n g " ( 5 ) . 
An i s o l a t e d a c t was n o t s u f f i c i e n t f o r s e c t i o n 210 t o be 
i n v o k e d . T h u s , i f a d i r e c t o r were t o t a k e e x c e s s i v e r e m u n e r a t i o n , 
t h i s w o u l d n o t amount t o o p p r e s s i v e c o n d u c t u n l e s s he used h i s 
p o s i t i o n as a m a j o r i t y s h a r e h o l d e r t o r e t a i n t h a t r e m u n e r a t i o n ( 6 ) 
F u r t h e r a s e r i e s o f o p p r e s s i v e a c t s w o u l d n o t be s u f f i c i e n t u n l e s s 
t h e y amounted t o a c h a i n o f e v e n t s w h i c h c o n t i n u e d r i g h t up t o t h e 
( 1 ) See a l s o s e c t i o n s 5, 72, 164 and 172 o f Companies A c t 1948; 
T.E. C a i n , C h a r l e s w o r t h & C a i n ' s Company Law ( 1 1 t h ed.) p.382. 
( 2 ) See g e n e r a l l y H. R a j a k ( 1 9 7 2 ) 35 M.L.R. 156„ 
( 3 ) p e r V i s c o u n t Simonds i n S.C.W.S. v . Meyer [ l 9 5 9 j A.C. 324, 342 
( 4 ) L o r d Cooper i n E l d e r v . E l d e r & Watson L t d . , 1952 S.C. 49, 55. 
( 5 ) L o r d K e i t h i n E l e e r v . E l e e r & Watson L t d . , 1952 S.C. 49, 60. 
( 6 ) Re Jerm y n S t r e e t T u r k i s h B a t h s L t d . 1971 1 W.L.R. 1042. 
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p r e s e n t a t i o n o f t h e p e t i t i o n ( 7 ) . 
The s e c t i o n was n o t a v a i l a b l e w h e r e t h e a l l e g a t i o n s w e r e a b o u t 
m e r e l y bad management and i n e f f i c i e n c y . I n Re F i v e M i n u t e Car Wash 
S e r v i c e L i m i t e d ( 8 ) , some 15 a l l e g a t i o n s as t o t h e c o n t i n u o u s bad 
management o f t h e managing d i r e c t o r w e r e i n s u f f i c i e n t t o c o n s t i t u t e 
o p p r e s s i o n . T h e r e B u c k l e y J . s a i d a t p.751: 
"The mere f a c t t h a t a member o f a company has l o s t c o n f i d e n c e i n 
manner i n w h i c h t h e company's a f f a i r s a r e c o n d u c t e d does n o t l e a d 
t o t h e c o n c l u s i o n t h a t he i s o p p r e s s e d ; n o r can r e s e n t m e n t a t 
b e i n g o u t - v o t e d ; n o r mere d i s s a t i s f a c t i o n w i t h o r d i s a p p r o v a l o f 
t h e c o n d u c t o f t h e company's a f f a i r s w h e t h e r on g r o u n d s r e l a t i n g 
t o p o l i c y o r t o e f f i c i e n c y , h owever w e l l f o u n d e d . " 
I t was d o u b t f u l w h e t h e r o r n o t a p e r s o n a l r e p r e s e n t a t i v e o r 
t r u s t e e i n b a n k r u p t c y o f a member o f a company c o u l d b r i n g a p e t i -
t i o n u n d e r s e c t i o n 210 where he had n o t been r e g i s t e r e d as a 
member ( 9 ) . 
The p e t i t i o n e r had t o show a l s o t h a t t h e a f f a i r s o f t h e com-
pany were b e i n g c o n d u c t e d i n a manner o p p r e s s i v e t o some p a r t o f 
t h e members, i n c l u d i n g h i m s e l f ( 1 0 ) . The o p p r e s s i o n must be s u f -
f e r e d by t h e p e t i t i o n e r s as members, and n o t , e.g. by them as 
d i r e c t o r s . T h e r e f o r e s.210 c o u l d n o t be i n v o k e d t o d e a l w i t h one 
i m p o r t a n t k i n d o f o p p r e s s i o n , e.g. w h e r e t h e m i n o r i t y s h a r e h o l d e r 
i n a s m a l l p r i v a t e company had been removed f r o m t h e b o a r d o f 
d i r e c t o r s u n l e s s t h e r e was a l s o p r e s e n t o p p r e s s i o n o f h i m i n h i s 
c a p a c i t y as a member. A l t h o u g h t h i s was n o t e x p l i c i t i n t h e s e c t i o n 
( 7 ) See abo v e , p.31, n.(6)» 
(8) £1966] 1 A l l E.R. 242; [1966J 1 W.L.R. 745; 110 S.J. 347. 
(9 ) See Re Je r m y n S t r e e t T u r k i s h B a t h s L t d . (1970] 1 W.L.R. 1194. 
B u t .cf_. Re Meyer D o u g l a s P t y L t d . [1965] V.R. 638. 
(10) E l d e r v . E l d e r & Watson 1952 S.C. 49; Re L u n d l e B r o s . L t d . 
Cl965] 2 A l l E.R. 692; and Re W e s t b o u r n e G a l l e r i e s L t d . [1910] 
3 A l l E.R. 3 74. 
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i t s e l f , t h i s a d d i t i o n a l r e q u i r e m e n t had b een w i d e l y a c c e p t e d . 
Under s e c t i o n 210 t h e p e t i t i o n e r must n o t o n l y show t h a t t h e r e 
had been o p p r e s s i v e c o n d u c t b u t a l s o t h a t t h e f a c t s w o u l d j u s t i f y 
t h e m a k i n g o f a w i n d i n g - u p o r d e r on t h e g r o u n d t h a t i t was j u s t 
and e q u i t a b l e ( 1 ) . 
Sometimes i t i s t e m p t i n g t o f o r m t h e v i e w t h a t t h e j u d g e s have 
n o t a p p r e c i a t e d t h e d i f f i c u l t y w h i c h t h e a v e r a g e s h a r e h o l d e r e x p e r -
e n c e s i n f i n d i n g o u t w h a t i s r e a l l y h a p p e n i n g t o t h e company's 
b u s i n e s s and t h a t t h e p r o p e r m o t i v e o f d i r e c t o r s a g a i n s t f r i v o l o u s 
e n q u i r i e s and a c t i o n s i s t o o o f t e n o p e r a t e d t o t h e s h a r e h o l d e r ' s 
d e t r i m e n t . The c o u r t s o u g h t , i t i s s u b m i t t e d , t o be p r e p a r e d t o 
o r d e r t h e company t o r a i s e money so as t o e n a b l e i t t o pay d i v i d e n d s 
w i t h i t s p r o f i t s and t o o r d e r t h e p e r s o n a l a t t e n d a n c e a t c o u r t o f 
d i r e c t o r s t o a s s i s t t h e c o u r t i n i t s i n v e s t i g a t i o n . I t i s most 
u n l i k e l y t h a t t h e c o u r t s w o u l d t a k e so a c t i v e a p a r t i n company's 
a f f a i r s . T h i s r a i s e s t h e q u e s t i o n w h e t h e r i t i s a d v i s a b l e t h a t 
c o n f l i c t s b e t w e e n m a j o r i t y and m i n o r i t y s h a r e h o l d e r s s h o u l d be 
r e s o l v e d by t h e c o u r t s , w h i c h l a c k t h e n e c e s s a r y e x p e r t i s e and 
m a c h i n e r y f o r e n s u r i n g a j u s t c o m m e r c i a l s e t t l e m e n t . I n d e e d 
S c r u t t o n L . J . s a i d i n S h u t t l e w o r t h v 0 Cox B r o t h e r s & Co. L t d . ( 2 ) : 
" I t i s n o t t h e b u s i n e s s o f t h e c o u r t t o manage t h e a f f a i r s o f 
t h e company. T h a t i s f o r s h a r e h o l d e r s and d i r e c t o r s . . . I 
s h o u l d be s o r r y t o see t h e c o u r t s go b e y o n d t h i s and t a k e upon 
i t s e l f t h e management o f c o n c e r n s w h i c h o t h e r s may u n d e r s t a n d 
f a r b e t t e r t h a n t h e c o u r t d o e s . " 
( 1 ) Re B e l l a d o r S i l k L i m i t e d [1965J 1 A l l E.R. 667. See a l s o Re 
R i c a G o l d Washing Co„ (1879) 11 Ch. D. 43; Re O t h e r y C o n s t r u c t i o n 
L t d . T1966J 1 A l l E.R. 145; Re Expanded P l u g s L t d . £19667 1 A l l 
E.R. 887. 
( 2 ) [19277 2 K.B. 9 a t 23-4„ B u t t h e r e i s some i n d i c a t i o n t h a t t h e 
c o u r t s have now t a k e n a more p r o t e c t i v e a t t i t u d e i n f a v o u r o f t h e 
m i n o r i t y . See e.g. E b r a h i m i v . W e s t b o u r n e G a l l e r i e s L i m i t e d [1912] 
2 A l l E.R. 492; [1973J A.C. 360; P r u d e n t i a l A s s u r a n c e Co. °Ltd. v . 
Newman I n d u s t r i e s L t d . & O t h e r s (No.2) £19807 3 W.L.R. 543. 
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T h e r e w e r e few i n s t a n c e s i n w h i c h s e c t i o n 210 was s u c c e s s f u l l y 
i n v o k e d , i n d i c a t i n g t h a t t h e r e s h o u l d be r e f o r m ( 3 ) . A c c o r d i n g l y 
s e c t i o n 75 o f t h e Companies A c t 1980 was e n a c t e d t o remove some o f 
t h e w e aknesses o f s e c t i o n 210 (4)„ 
S e c t i o n 75 o f t h e 1980 A c t p r o v i d e s t h a t any member o f a com-
pany may a p p l y t o t h e c o u r t by p e t i t i o n f o r an o r d e r u n d e r t h e 
s e c t i o n on t h e g r o u n d t h a t t h e a f f a i r s o f t h e company a r e b e i n g o r 
have been c o n d u c t e d i n a manner w h i c h i s u n f a i r l y p r e j u d i c i a l t o 
t h e i n t e r e s t s o f some p a r t o f t h e members ( i n c l u d i n g a t l e a s t h i m -
s e l f ) o r t h a t any a c t u a l o r p r o p o s e d a c t o r o m i s s i o n o f t h e company ( 
i n c l u d i n g an a c t o r o m i s s i o n on i t s b e h a l f ) i s o r w o u l d be so p r e -
j u d i c i a l o A c c o r d i n g l y i t i s no l o n g e r n e c e s s a r y f o r t h e p e t i t i o n e r 
t o show t h a t t h e f a c t s w o u l d j u s t i f y t h e w i n d i n g up o f t h e company 
as a c o n d i t i o n o f i n t e r v e n t i o n . F u r t h e r m o r e , t h e p e t i t i o n e r has 
now t o show o n l y t h a t t h e a f f a i r s o f t h e company a r e b e i n g , o r have 
b e e n , c o n d u c t e d i n a manner w h i c h i s " u n f a i r l y p r e j u d i c i a l " as o p -
posed t o " o p p r e s s i v e " t o h i m . Thus t h e p e t i t i o n e r has n o t t o show 
a c t u a l i l l e g a l i t y o r i n v a s i o n o f l e g a l r i g h t s . T h i r d l y t h e p e t i -
t i o n e r can now c o m p l a i n a s i n g l e a c t u a l o r p r o p o s e d p r e j u d i c i a l 
a c t o r o m i s s i o n as w e l l as a c o n t i n u i n g c o u r s e o f c o n d u c t . F o u r t h l y , 
i t i s now made c l e a r t h a t p e r s o n a l r e p r e s e n t a t i v e s and t r u s t e e s i n 
( 3 ) P e t i t i o n e r s s u c c e e d e d i n S c o t t i s h C o o p e r a t i v e W h o l e s a l e S o c i e t y 
v . Meyer [1959J A.C. 324; [1958] 3 W.L.R. 404; 102 S.J. 617; £1958/ 
3 A l l E.R. 66 and Re H.R. Harmer L t d . [19597 1 W.L.R. 62; [19587 3 
A l l E.R. 689; 103 S.J. 73. 
(4 ) W i t h t h e e n a c t m e n t o f s.75 t h e ' f r a u d on t h e m i n o r i t y ' remedy 
may be much l e s s used i n f u t u r e by m i n o r i t y s h a r e h o l d e r s . 
( 5 ) I t i s p e r h a p s i m p o r t a n t t o t a k e n o t e o f c e r t a i n r e m a r k s made by 
Wa1 t o n J . i n N o r t h e r n C o u n t i e s S e c u r i t i e s L t d . v . J a c k s o n & S t e e p l e 
L t d . f l 9 7 4 j 1 W.L.R. 1133, 1144: " . . . a l t h o u g h i t i s p e r f e c t l y 
t r u e t h a t t h e a c t o f t h e members, i n p a s s i n g c e r t a i n s p e c i a l t y p e s 
o f r e s o l u t i o n s , b i n d s t h e company, t h e i r a c t s a r e n o t t h e a c t s o f 
t h e company . . . t h e d e c i s i o n s t a k e n a t such m e e t i n g s and r e s o -
l u t i o n s p a s s e d t h e r e a t a r e d e c i s i o n s t a k e n b y and r e s o l u t i o n s 
p a s s e d by t h e members o f t h e company and n o t by t h e company i t s e l f 
. „ . The f a c t t h a t t h e r e s u l t o f t h e v o t i n g a t t h e m e e t i n g ( o r a t 
a s u b s e q u e n t p o l l ) w i l l b i n d t h e company c a n n o t a f f e c t t h e p o s i t i o n 
t h a t i n v o t i n g ( t h e s h a r e h o l d e r ) i s v o t i n g s i m p l y i n e x e r c i s e o f h i s 
own p r o p e r t y r i g h t s . " A l t h o u g h i n many s i t u a t i o n s t h e members' r e -
s o l u t i o n s w i l l c a u s e t h e company t o a c t , o r o m i t t o a c t . t h e r e may 
be r e s o l u t i o n s w h i c h do n o t r e s u l t i n any a c t i o n b e i n g t a k e n by o r 
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b a n k r u p t c y who have n o t y e t been r e g i s t e r e d as members o f t h e 
company b u t t o whom s h a r e s have been t r a n s f e r r e d o r t r a n s m i t t e d 
by o p e r a t i o n o f l a w may p e t i t i o n u n d e r t h e new s e c t i o n 75 o f t h e 
1980 A c t . F i f t h l y , w i t h o u t p r e j u d i c e t o t h e c o u r t ' s g e n e r a l power 
t o g r a n t r e l i e f , and i n a d d i t i o n t o i t s c o n t i n u e d powers t o make 
o r d e r s r e g u l a t i n g t h e f u t u r e c o n d u c t o f t h e company's a f f a i r s and 
r e q u i r i n g t h e p u r c h a s e o f t h e company's s h a r e s , t h e c o u r t may 
o r d e r t h e company t o r e f r a i n f r o m t h e a c t , o r r e c t i f y t h e o m i s s i o n , 
c o m p l a i n e d o f , and may a u t h o r i s e c i v i l p r o c e e d i n g s t o be b r o u g h t 
i n t h e name o f t h e company a g a i n s t a t h i r d p a r t y . T h i s p r o v i s i o n 
e n a b l e s a m i n o r i t y , u n a b l e t o c o m p l y w i t h a l l t h e c o n d i t i o n s f o r 
b r i n g i n g a d e r i v a t i v e a c t i o n , i n s t e a d t o p e t i t i o n f i r s t u n d e r 
s e c t i o n 75 o f t h e 1980 A c t and t o ask f o r an o r d e r a u t h o r i s i n g 
t h e m i n o r i t y t o i n s t i t u t e p r o c e e d i n g s i n t h e name and on b e h a l f 
o f t h e company „ I n t h i s way, l i a b i l i t y f o r c o s t s o f t h e s u b s e -
q u e n t a c t i o n w i l l f a l l on t h e company r a t h e r t h a n o n t h e m i n o r i t y . 
I t w i l l be i n t e r e s t i n g t o see t h e e x t e n t t o w h i c h t h e c o u r t w i l l 
a l l o w a m i n o r i t y s h a r e h o l d e r t o b r i n g c i v i l p r o c e e d i n g s i n t h e 
name and on b e h a l f o f t h e company and how t h e c o u r t w o u l d i n t e r -
p r e t t h e meaning o f " u n f a i r l y p r e j u d i c i a l " . When a l l o w i n g a 
m i n o r i t y s h a r e h o l d e r t o b r i n g l e g a l p r o c e e d i n g s u n d e r t h e s e c t i o n , 
i t i s s u b m i t t e d t h a t t h e c o u r t s h o u l d see t o i t t h a t i t s h o u l d n o t 
o m i t an o r d e r t h a t t h e s h a r e h o l d e r b r i n g i n g t h e l e g a l p r e c e e d i n g s 
be a t l i b e r t y t o d i s c o n t i n u e o r s e t t l e t h e same. 
I t seems t h a t t h e s e c t i o n does n o t h e l p where i t i s a l l e g e d 
t h a t t h e d i r e c t o r s o f a company have g r o s s l y n e g l i g e n t l y s o l d t h e 
company's p r o p e r t y a t a w h o l l y i n a d e q u a t e p r i c e ( 6 ) s i n c e t h e 
a l l e g e d c o n d u c t i s p r e j u d i c i a l t o a l l t h e members, n o t some p a r t 
( 6 ) E„g. i n a c a s e l i k e P a v l i d e s v . J e n s e n [1956] Ch. 565 ; / l 9 5 6 j 
3 W.L.R. 224; D-956] 2 A l l E.R. 518; 100 S.J. 452 
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o f t h e members. To i n v o k e t h e s e c t i o n , t h e w r o n g has t o be p r e -
j u d i c i a l t o some p a r t o f t h e members ( 7 ) . 
I t i s r e g r e t a b l e t h a t t h e r e i s no e x p r e s s p r o v i s i o n i n s e c t i o n 
75 o f t h e 1930 A c t t o make r e l i e f a v a i l a b l e t o a member a g a i n s t 
u n f a i r l y p r e j u d i c i a l c o n d u c t i r r e s p e c t i v e o f t h e c a p a c i t y as member, 
d i r e c t o r , o f f i c e r o r c r e d i t o r i n w h i c h t h e member s u f f e r e d f r o m t h e 
c o n d u c t . I n many f a m i l y c o m p a n i e s o r s m a l l p r i v a t e c o m p a n i e s , t h e 
s h a r e h o l d e r s l o o k f o r w a r d t o r e m u n e r a t i v e e m ployment r a t h e r t h a n 
d i v i d e n d p a y m e n t s . I n t h o s e c o m p a n i e s i t i s u n r e a l i s t i c t o draw a 
d i s t i n c t i o n b e t w e e n t h e r o l e s o f members i n t h e i r c a p a c i t i e s as 
members, d i r e c t o r s , and o f f i c e r s . The members o r some o f them a r e 
u s u a l l y a l s o d i r e c t o r s and o f f i c e r s , and t h e y t h e m s e l v e s o f t e n a c t 
i n s e v e r a l and o v e r l a p p i n g c a p a c i t i e s . F u r t h e r , a member i n a 
p r i v a t e company i s u s u a l l y more o r l e s s d e p e n d e n t f o r h i s l i v i n g 
on h i s emoluments o r f e e s as an o f f i c e r o r d i r e c t o r . T y p i c a l l y , 
s u c h a company pays no d i v i d e n d s ; t h e members g e t t h e i r s h a r e s o f 
p r o f i t s i n t h e f o r m o f s a l a r y . So i f a s h a r e h o l d e r i s d e p r i v e d o f 
h i s s a l a r y , h i s i n v e s t m e n t i n t h e company y i e l d s no r e t u r n and he 
becomes v u l n e r a b l e t o e x p l o i t a t i o n . 
I t i s t o be hoped t h a t t h e r e w i l l n o t be j u d i c i a l t i m i d i t i e s 
o v e r s e c t i o n 75 o f t h e 1980 A c t s i m i l a r t o t h o s e o v e r s e c t i o n 210 
o f t h e 1948 A c t . The c o u r t s r e t r e a t e d i n t o a s t a t e o f n e r v o u s 
i m m o b i l i t y on b e i n g c o n f r o n t e d w i t h d i s c r e t i o n u n d e r s.210 o f t h e 
1948 A c t . a n d t h e new s e c t i o n s h o u l d be a b l e t o make c l e a r t o t h e 
( 7 ) A p a r t f r o m c a s e s suchas P a v l i d e s v . J e n s e n [1956] Ch. 565; 
£956j 3 W.L.R. 224; (1956J 2 A l l S.R. 518; 100 S.J. 452; i t seems 
t h a t t h e a r g u m e n t t h a t a w r o n g harms n o t o n l y 'some p a r t 1 o f t h e 
members b u t a l l members w o u l d n o t h e l p t h e d e f e n d a n t . Such an 
a r g u m e n t d i d n o t h e l p t h e d e f e n d a n t s i n S c o t t i s h C o - o p e r a t i v e 
W h o l e s a l e S o c i e t y v . Meyer (19597 A.C. 324; £1958/ 3 W.L.R. 404; 
102 S.J. 617; [ 1 9 5 8 J 3 A l l E.R. 66 and i n Re Harmer (H.R.) L t d . 
(1959J 1 W.L.R. 62; /1958/ 3 A l l E.R, 689. w h e r e a l l members, 
qua members, s u f f e r e d ( t h o u g h t h e w r o n g d o e r s b e n e f i t e d i n a n o t h e r 
c a p a c i t y ) . See Gower, S u p p l e m e n t t o 4 t h e d . , p a r a g r a p h 670. 
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c o u r t s t h a t t h e y may be l e s s t i m o r o u s . 
I t i s p r o p o s e d f o r r e f o r m t h a t : 
1 . As i t i s d i f f i c u l t t o d i s t i n g u i s h b e t w e e n t h e r i g h t s o f a 
member as a s h a r e h o l d e r and as a d i r e c t o r , t h e c o u r t s h o u l d be 
a l l o w e d t o d e a l u n d e r t h e new s e c t i o n w i t h u n f a i r l y p r e j u d i c i a l 
c o n d u c t s u f f e r e d by a member i n a c a p a c i t y o t h e r t h a n t h a t o f a 
member. O t h e r w i s e c o m m e r c i a l r e a l i t y i n many c a s e s w o u l d be 
o v e r l o o k e d . The new s e c t i o n s h o u l d a l s o be amended i n such a 
way as t o e n a b l e t h e c o u r t t o have r e g a r d t o a l l t h e c i r c u m s t a n c e s 
o f t h e p a r t i c u l a r c a s e i n t h e same way as t h e c o u r t i s p r e p a r e d 
t o do u n d e r s . 2 2 2 ( f ) o f t h e Companies A c t 1948. T h u s , i n an 
a p p r o p r i a t e c a s e , where a d i r e c t o r - s h a r e h o l d e r i s removed f r o m 
t h e b o a r d o f d i r e c t o r s , t h e c o u r t w o u l d be a b l e t o i mpose a j u s t 
s e t t l e m e n t on t h e p a r t i e s t o t h e a c t i o n w i t h o u t p u t t i n g t h e com-
pany i n t o l i q u i d a t i o n . The c o u r t s h o u l d have u n f e t t e r e d d i s c r e t i o n . 
2. P e r h a p s t h e new s e c t i o n s h o u l d be amended t o p e r m i t a p e t i t i o n 
t o be b r o u g h t by d e b e n t u r e h o l d e r s w h i c h d e b e n t u r e s a r e c o n v e r t i b l e 
i n t o s h a r e s . 
3. C o n s i d e r a t i o n s h o u l d be g i v e n t o t h e p r o p o s i t i o n t h a t d i s p u t e s 
among s h a r e h o l d e r s i n a s m a l l p r i v a t e company be s u b j e c t e d t o com-
p u l s o r y a r b i t r a t i o n . 
w i n d i n g - u p Remedy u n d e r S e c t i o n 2 2 2 ( f ) 
An a g g r i e v e d m i n o r i t y s h a r e h o l d e r may a l s o have r e c o u r s e t o 
s e c t i o n 2 2 2 ( f ) o f t h e Companies A c t 1948. ( 8 ) Under s e c t i o n 2 2 2 ( f ) 
t h e c o u r t s may o r d e r t h e w i n d i n g - u p o f a company w h e r e , i n t h e 
o p i n i o n o f t h e c o u r t , i t i s j u s t and e q u i t a b l e t h a t t h e company 
s h o u l d be wound up. One l i n e o f c a s e s where t h i s has o c c u r r e d 
a r e t h e s o - c a l l e d ' q u a s i - p a r t n e r s h i p ' c a s e s i n w h i c h t h e c o u r t s 
have shown t h e m s e l v e s r e a d y t o r e c o g n i s e t h a t b e h i n d t h e company 
( 8 ) See g e n e r a l l y M.R. C h e s t e r m a n ( 1 9 7 3 ) 36 M.L.R. 129; J . B i r d s 
( 1 9 7 5 ) 125 M.L.J. 786. 
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s t r u c t u r e t h e r e e x i s t s w h a t i s , i n s u b s t a n c e , a p a r t n e r s h i p and have 
a p p l i e d p a r t n e r s h i p p r i n c i p l e s i n o r d e r i n g t h e i r w i n d i n g - u p ( 9 ) . 
Thus t h e e x c l u s i o n o f a member f r o m p a r t i c i p a t i o n i n t h e management 
o f t h e b u s i n e s s has been h e l d s u f f i c i e n t t o j u s t i f y t h e m a k i n g o f 
an o r d e r u n d e r s . 2 2 2 ( f ) o f t h e 1948 A c t . The l e a d i n g a u t h o r i t y i s 
t h e House o f L o r d s d e c i s i o n i n E b r a h i m i v . W e s t b o u r n e G a l l e r i e s 
L i m i t e d ( 1 0 ) . I f t h e p e t i t i o n e r can s u b s t a n t i a t e t h e e x i s t e n c e o f 
an a g r e e m e n t o r u n d e r s t a n d i n g t h a t he s h a l l p a r t i c i p a t e i n t h e 
c o n d u c t o f t h e b u s i n e s s , t h e c o u r t s w o u l d make an o r d e r f o r t h e 
w i n d i n g - u p o f t h e company. An a g r e e m e n t o r u n d e r s t a n d i n g can a r i s e 
b e c a u s e t h e p a r t i e s had c a r r i e d on b u s i n e s s , b e f o r e t h e company was 
i n c o r p o r a t e d , as p a r t n e r s w i t h an. e q u a l s h a r e i n management o r i t 
can be deduced f r o m t h e c o n d u c t o f t h e p a r t i e s a f t e r t h e i n c o r p o r -
a t i o n o f t h e company. I f such an a g r e e m e n t o r u n d e r s t a n d i n g i s 
f o u n d t o e x i s t , t h e n t h e r e m o v a l o f t h e p e t i t i o n e r f r o m t h e b o a r d 
o f d i r e c t o r s by t h e l e g a l l y e f f e c t i v e use o f a power c o n f e r r e d by 
t h e a r t i c l e s o f a s s o c i a t i o n o r t h e Companies A c t 1948 may j u s t i f y 
t h e m a k i n g o f a w i n d i n g - u p o r d e r because t h e c o u r t s w i l l s u b j e c t 
t h e e x e r c i s e o f l e g a l r i g h t s t o e q u i t a b l e c o n s i d e r a t i o n s ; c o n s i d e -
r a t i o n s , t h a t i s , o f a p e r s o n a l c h a r a c t e r a r i s i n g b e t w e e n one 
i n d i v i d u a l and a n o t h e r , w h i c h may make i t u n j u s t , o r i n e q u i t a b l e , 
t o i n s i s t on l e g a l r i g h t s o r e x e r c i s e them i n a p a r t i c u l a r way. 
I t i s n o t j u s t l e g a l r i g h t s t o e x c l u d e a member f r o m t h e r u n n i n g 
o f t h e b u s i n e s s t h a t can be s u b j e c t e d t o e q u i t a b l e c o n s i d e r a t i o n s . 
I t may be done i n r e s p e c t o f o t h e r r i g h t s , , Thus, i f i n a f a m i l y 
( 9 ) See e.g. Y e n i d j e T o b a c c o Co. L t d . /"l916]2 Ch. 426; 86 L . J . 
Ch. 1 ; 115 L.T. 530; 32 T.L.R. 709; 60~S.J. 674 
( 1 0 ) L1972J 2 A l l E.R. 492; [ 1 9 7 3 J A.C. 360; ]\912] 2 W.L.R. 1289; 
116 S.J. 412. See a l s o Re L u n d i e B r o s . L t d . [1965] 2 A l l E.R. 692 
w h e re i t was h e l d i n r e l a t i o n t o a t h r e e - m a n company t h a t t h e 
u n j u s t i f i e d e x c l u s i o n o f a m e m b e r - d i r e c t o r f r o m management d i d n o t 
amount t o o p p r e s s i o n u n d e r s e c t i o n 210, b u t j u s t i f i e d t h e m a k i n g 
o f an o r d e r u n d e r s e c t i o n 2 2 2 ( f ) . 
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company, t h e d i r e c t o r s , a c t i n g i n a c c o r d a n c e w i t h a p a r t i c u l a r 
p r o v i s i o n i n t h e a r t i c l e s , r e f u s e t o r e g i s t e r as members t h o s e 
p e r s o n s t o whom t h e s h a r e s o f a d e c e a s e d member have been b e q u e a t h e d 
and t h e c i r c u m s t a n c e s s u g g e s t t h a t t h e i r m o t i v e i s t o g e t t h o s e 
s h a r e s f o r t h e m s e l v e s a t a l o w p r i c e , a p e t i t i o n b y t h e e x e c u t o r s 
f o r a w i n d i n g - u p o r d e r may be s u c c e s s f u l ( 1 ) . . 
S e c t i o n 2 2 2 ( f ) o f t h e Companies A c t 1948 has some p r a c t i c a l 
i m p o r t a n c e as a s h a r e h o l d e r ' s remedy n o t b ecause i t s use w i l l 
i n e v i t a b l y b r i n g t h e company i n t o w i n d i n g - u p , w h i c h i n d e e d i s 
u s u a l l y t h e l a s t t h i n g t h a t t h e p e t i t i o n e r w a n t s , b e c a u s e w i n d i n g -
up w o u l d r e s u l t i n s u b s t a n t i a l l o s s e s f o r a l l i n c l u d i n g t h e p e t i -
t i o n e r ; i n s t e a d i t i s t h e t h r e a t o f r u i n f o r a l l t h a t w i l l o f t e n 
be e f f e c t i v e i n o b t a i n i n g r e d r e s s f o r an a g g r i e v e d s h a r e h o l d e r , . 
More o f t e n t h a n n o t , t h e o u t c o m e as e x p e c t e d i s s i m p l y a good p r i c e 
f o r t h e s h a r e s o f t h e a g g r i e v e d s h a r e h o l d e r - o r e l s e e v e r y o n e , 
i n c l u d i n g t h e a g g r i e v e d s h a r e h o l d e r h i m s e l f , s t a n d s t o l o s e a f o r -
t u n e i n t h e n e a r f u t u r e . 
E b r a h i m i v . w e s t b o u r n e G a l l e r i e s L t d . i s n o t o n l y i m p o r t a n t as 
a t h r e a t , a l i b e r a l i n t e r p r e t a t i o n o f W e s t b o u r n e G a l l e r i e s p r i n c i p l e s 
w o u l d p r o v e v e r y u s e f u l i n f a v o u r o f m i n o r i t i e s . 
However, as r i g h t l y p o i n t e d o u t by S u l l i v a n ( 2 ) , W e s t b o u r n e 
G a l l e r i e s d e a l t w i t h a p e t i t i o n t o w i n d up a company on j u s t and 
e q u i t a b l e g r o u n d s u n d e r s . 2 2 2 ( f ) o f t h e 1948 A c t , so t h e r e i s good 
r e a s o n t o t h i n k t h a t i t s r a t i o i s n o t o f g e n e r a l a p p l i c a t i o n . I n d e e d 
i n B e n t l e y - S t e v e n s v . J o n e s ( 3 ) Plowman J . r e f u s e d t o e x t e n d 
( 1 ) I n Re C u t h b e r t Cooper & Sons L t d . [1931] Ch. 392; £L937/ 2 
A l l E.R. 466; 106 L.J.Ch. 249; 157 L.T. 545, 53 T.L.R. 548 t h e 
c o u r t r e f u s e d t o g r a n t a w i n d i n g - u p o r d e r i n s i m i l a r s i t u a t i o n , b u t 
t h e d e c i s i o n was d i s a p p r o v e d by E b r a h i m i v. W e s t b o u r n e G a l l e r i e s L t d . 
( 2 ) See G.R. S u l l i v a n ( 1 9 7 7 ) 41 Conv. (N.S.) 169 a t 176. 
( 3 ) [1974J 1 W.L.R. 638; f l 9 7 4 j 2 A l l E.R. 653; 118 S.J. 345. See 
a l s o D.D. P r e n t i c e ( 1 9 7 6 ) 92 L.Q.R. 502. 
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W e s t b o u r n e G a l l e r i e s p r i n c i p l e s t o a q u a s i - p a r t n e r s h i p company 
w h i l e t h e company was s t i l l a g o i n g c o n c e r n w i t h no p e t i t i o n f o r 
w i n d i n g i t up h a v i n g been f i l e d . Plowman J . s e n t away t h e p l a i n -
t i f f w i t h such a s t a t e m e n t : 
"However, t h a t s t i l l l e a v e s t h e W e s t b o u r n e G a l l e r i e s p o i n t . B ut 
i n my j u d g e m e n t t h e r e i s n o t h i n g i n t h a t case w h i c h s u g g e s t s t h a t 
t h e p l a i n t i f f i s e n t i t l e d t o an i n j u n c t i o n t o i n t e r f e r e w i t h t h e 
d e f e n d a n t company's s t a t u t o r y r i g h t t o remove t h e p l a i n t i f f f r o m 
i t s b o a r d . w h a t i t does d e c i d e i s t h a t i f t h e p l a i n t i f f i s 
removed u n d e r a power v a l i d i n l a w , t h e n he may, i n a p p r o p r i a t e 
c i r c u m s t a n c e s , be e n t i t l e d t o a w i n d i n g up o r d e r on t h e j u s t and 
e q u i t a b l e g r o u n d . " ( 4 ) 
A l t h o u g h t h e p l a i n t i f f i n B e n t l e y - S t e v e n s v . J o n e s f a i l e d t o 
g e t an i n t e r l o c u t o r y i n j u n c t i o n b e f o r e Plowman J . , e l s e w h e r e t h e 
p l a i n t i f f s met w i t h more l u c k . 
I n P e n n e l l , S u t t o n and M o r a y b e l l S e c u r i t i e s L t d . v . V e n i d a 
I n v e s t m e n t s L t d . , B e r r y , F a r r , M c L e l l a n d , M a c p h a i l and N a t i o n w i d e 
Homes L t d . ( 5 ) , Templeman J . ( a s he t h e n was) a p p l i e d t h e 'Westbourne 
G a l l e r i e s p r i n c i p l e s t o a company w h i c h was s t i l l a g o i n g c o n c e r n , 
and n o t f a c e d w i t h a p e t i t i o n f o r w i n d i n g up t h e company u n d e r 
s . 2 2 2 ( f ) o f t h e Companies A c t 1948 and g r a n t e d i n t e r l o c u t o r y 
i n j u n c t i o n s ( 6 ) . 
F u r t h e r m o r e , i n Clemens v . Clemens B r o s . L t d . ( 7 ) F o s t e r J . 
f o l l o w e d s u i t and e x t e n d e d W e s t b o u r n e G a l l e r i e s p r i n c i p l e s t o a n o t h e r 
company w h i c h was s t i l l a g o i n g c o n c e r n . I n t h a t c a s e t h e p l a i n t i f f 
( 4 ) /.'1974] 1 W.L.R. 638. a t p . 6 4 1 . 
( 5 ) J u l y 25, 1974,so f a r u n r e p o r t e d . F o r t h e f a c t s t h e r e o f , see 
S.J. B u r r i d g e ( 1 9 8 1 ) 44 M.L.R. 40. 
( 6 ) U n f o r t u n a t e l y B e n t l e y - S t e v e n s v . J o n e s was n o t r e f e r r e d t o 
Templeman J . S i r Sydney Templeman i s now a L o r d J u s t i c e o f A p o e a l 
and a c c o r d i n g l y t h e P e n n e l l c a s e may c a r r y some w e i g h t . 
( 7 ) [ 1 9 7 6 ] 2 A l l E.R. 268. See a l s o V. J o f f e ( 1 9 7 7 ) 40 M.L.R. 7 1 . 
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and h e r a u n t w e re t h e s o l e s h a r e h o l d e r s h o l d i n g s h a r e s i n t h e r a t i o 
o f 45 t o 55 p e r c e n t . The p l a i n t i f f had r e s i g n e d f r o m h e r p o s t as 
a d i r e c t o r . A l t h o u g h t h e a u n t was s t i l l a d i r e c t o r , she l e f t t h e 
management t o f o u r n o n - s h a r e h o l d i n g d i r e c t o r s . A t an e x t r a o r d i n a r y 
g e n e r a l m e e t i n g , t h e b o a r d p u t f o r w a r d p r o p o s a l s t o i n c r e a s e t h e 
s h a r e c a p i t a l by i s s u i n g 200 s h a r e s t o each o f t h e f o u r n o n - s h a r e -
h o l d i n g d i r e c t o r s and 850 s h a r e s t o a t r u s t f o r t h e company's 
e m p l o y e e s and t h r e e r e s o l u t i o n s were p a s s e d . Under t h e company's 
a r t i c l e ( A r t i c l e 6 ) , members o f t h e company had a r i g h t o f p r e -
e m p t i o n i f a n o t h e r member w i s h e d t o t r a n s f e r h i s s h a r e s , and t h e 
p r o p o s a l s w o u l d r e s u l t i n t h e p l a i n t i f f l o s i n g h e r r i g h t t o v e t o 
a s p e c i a l o r e x t r a o r d i n a r y r e s o l u t i o n and a f f e c t h e r e x i s t i n g r i g h t 
t o p u r c h a s e t h e a u n t ' s s h a r e s u n d e r A r t i c l e 6. The p l a i n t i f f sued 
f o r an o r d e r s e t t i n g t h e t h r e e r e s o l u t i o n s a s i d e . I n g r a n t i n g 
t h e o r d e r , F o s t e r J . s a i d a f t e r r e f e r r i n g t o E b r a h i m i v . W e s t b o u r n e 
G a l l e r i e s L t d . : 
" I t h i n k t h a t one t h i n g w h i c h emerges f r o m t h e c a s e s t o w h i c h I 
have r e f e r r e d i s t h a t i n such a c ase as t h e p r e s e n t M i s s Clemens 
i s n o t e n t i t l e d t o e x e r c i s e h e r m a j o r i t y v o t e i n w h a t e v e r way 
she p l e a s e s . " ( 8 ) 
W i t h Tempieman J's and F o s t e r J's j u d g e m e n t s a g a i n s t Plowman J's 
j u d g e m e n t ( 9 ) , i t seems t h a t t h e w e i g h t o f j u d i c i a l o p i n i o n s u p p o r t s 
t h e p o s s i b i l i t y o f e x t e n d i n g W e s t b o u r n e G a l l e r i e s p r i n c i p l e s t o 
c o m p a n i e s where no p e t i t i o n has been p r e s e n t e d u n d e r s . 2 2 2 ( f ) o f 
t h e 1948 A c t . I t r e m a i n s t o be seen how w i d e t h e a p p l i c a t i o n w i l l 
be ( 1 0 ) . 
( 8 ) B e n t i e y - S t e v e n s v . J o n e s was n o t r e f e r r e d t o F o s t e r , J . 
( 9 ) E b r a h i m i v . W e s t b o u r n e G a l l e r i e s L t d . was a l s o a p p l i e d i n 
Re A & BC Chewing Gum L t d . [1915] 1 A l l E.R. 1017; [1915] 1 W.L.R. 
579; ( 1 9 7 4 ) 119 S.J. 233. 
( 1 0 ) See a l s o B.A.K. R i d e r ( 1 9 7 9 ) 38 C.L.J. 148. 
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C o s t s and t h e M i n o r i t y S h a r e h o l d e r 
I n a n o t h e r d i r e c t i o n , t h e C o u r t o f A p p e a l d e c i s i o n i n 
W a l l e r s t e i n e r v . M o i r (No.2) ( 1 ) may e n c o u r a g e more l i t i g a t i o n by 
m i n o r i t y s h a r e h o l d e r s b ecause o f i t s r u l i n g on c o s t s . I n t h a t 
c a s e t h e c o u r t r u l e d t h a t i t i s open t o t h e c o u r t i n a m i n o r i t y 
s h a r e h o l d e r ' s a c t i o n t o o r d e r t h a t t h e company c o n c e r n e d s h o u l d 
i n d e m n i f y t h e p l a i n t i f f a g a i n s t t h e c o s t s i n c u r r e d i n t h e a c t i o n 
i f i t i s r e a s o n a b l e and p r u d e n t i n t h e company's i n t e r e s t f o r t h e 
p l a i n t i f f t o b r i n g t h e a c t i o n and i t i s b r o u g h t by h i m i n good 
f a i t h . 
C o n t i n g e n c y Fees 
I n W a l l e r s t e i n e r v. M o i r (No.2) t h e p l a i n t i f f , who was a 
m i n o r i t y s h a r e h o l d e r , had e x h a u s t e d h i s f u n d s and t h e c o n t r i b u t i o n s 
made by o t h e r m i n o r i t y s h a r e h o l d e r s and y e t t h e l i t i g a t i o n seemed 
f a r f r o m n e a r t h e end. S e e i n g t h i s , L o r d D e n n i n g a g r e e d t h a t an 
e x c e p t i o n i n t h e c a se o f m i n o r i t y s h a r e h o l d e r s had been made o u t ( 2 ) 
a l t h o u g h he was s t i l l o f t h e o p i n i o n t h a t g e n e r a l l y c o n t i n g e n c y 
f e e s s h o u l d s t i l l be p r o h i b i t e d as a g a i n s t p u b l i c p o l i c y e 
On t h e d i s a d v a n t a g e s o f c o n t i n g e n c y f e e s , L o r d D e n n i n g p o i n t e d 
o u t t h a t t h e s y s t e m 'may s t i m u l a t e l a w y e r s t o t a k e on u n w o r t h y 
c l a i m s , o r t o use u n f a i r means t o a c h i e v e s u c c e s s , 1 ( 3 ) 
B u t L o r d D e n n i n g f e l t t h a t ' t h e s e d i s a d v a n t a g e s a r e b e l i e v e d 
t o be o u t w e i g h e d by t h e a d v a n t a g e t h a t l e g i t i m a t e c l a i m s a r e e n -
f o r c e d w h i c h w o u l d o t h e r w i s e have t o be abandoned by r e a s o n o f t h e 
( 1 ) [ 1 9 7 5 ] 1 A l l E. R. 849; [197 5] Q.B. 373 ; £19757 2 W.L.R. 389; 
119 S.J. 97. See a l s o H„ R a j a k ( 1 9 7 5 ) 125 N.L.J. 1109; A.J. B o y l e 
( 1 9 7 6 ) J.B.L. 18. 
( 2 ) L o r d D e n n i n g was i n a m i n o r i t y w i t h B u c k l e y and Scarman L J J 
d i s s e n t i n g on t h i s p o i n t . 
( 3 ) ( 1 9 7 5 / 1 A l l E.R. 849, p . 8 6 1 . 
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p o v e r t y o f t h e c l a i m a n t . ' ( 4 ) 
I t seems t h a t L o r d D e n n i n g based h i s d i s a p p r o v a l o f use o f 
c o n t i n g e n t f e e s g e n e r a l l y on h i s o p i n i o n t h a t t h e p r e s e n t s y s t e m 
o f l e g a l a i d i n t h e U n i t e d Kingdom i s c o m p r e h e n s i v e (5)„ 
I t i s s u b m i t t e d t h a t as t h e p r e s e n t s y s t e m o f l e g a l a i d s t a n d s , 
t h e r e a r e many p e o p l e whose r e s o u r c e s a r e beyond t h e f i n a n c i a l l i m i t s 
f o r l e g a l a i d , y e t t h e y a r e w i t h o u t s u f f i c i e n t money t o f i g h t a l o n g 
l e g a l a c t i o n ( 6 ) . 
I t must be remembered t h a t A r t i c l e 6 o f t h e E u r o p e a n C o n v e n t i o n 
on Human R i g h t s , w h i c h a p p l i e s t o t h e U n i t e d Kingdom, p r o v i d e s t h a t 
' I n t h e d e t e r m i n a t i o n o f h i s c i v i l r i g h t s and o b l i g a t i o n s <> <» . 
e v e r y o n e i s e n t i t l e d t o a f a i r and p u b l i c h e a r i n g w i t h i n a r e a s o n -
a b l e t i m e by an i n d e p e n d e n t and i m p a r t i a l t r i b u n a l e s t a b l i s h e d by 
l a w . ' 
B u t t h e r e may n o t be few p e o p l e l i k e t h e p l a i n t i f f i n 
W a l l e r s t e i h e r v . M o i r ( N o . 2 ) f o r whom l e g a l a i d i s n o t a v a i l a b l e . 
To t h e s e p e o p l e may be added t h o s e a t t e m p t i n g t o b r i n g a t e s t c a s e 
on some n o v e l o r u n c e r t a i n p r i n c i p l e s b u t who n o n e t h e l e s s a r e w i t h -
o u t s u f f i c i e n t money t o r e t a i n a l a w y e r on t h e u s u a l f e e p a y i n g 
b a s i s . F o r t h e m i n o r i t y s h a r e h o l d e r ( a s w e l l as t h e o t h e r p e o p l e 
m e n t i o n e d ) , t h e a v a i l a b i l i t y o f a c o n t i n g e n t f e e w o u l d be a power-
f u l weapon i n c o m b a t t i n g an o p p r e s s i v e ( o r u n f a i r ) o r f r a u d u l e n t 
m a j o r i t y . 
One o f t h e r e a s o n s o p p o s i n g c o n t i n g e n c y f e e s m i g h t be t h e 
supposed i m m o r a l i t i e s o f c o m m e r c i a l l i f e as w e l l as t h e b e l i e f t h a t 
c o n t i n g e n t f e e s w i l l b r i n g h a r m f u l e f f e c t s upon l a w y e r s , c l i e n t s 
and c o u r t S o 
( 4 ) I b i d , p . 8 6 1 . 
( 5 ) I b i d , p . 8 6 1 . 
( 6 ) See M o S a n d e r , L a w y e r s and t h e P u b l i c I n t e r e s t ( 1 9 6 8 ) a t 1 1 5 -
2 0 . 
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B u t any a t t e m p t t o deny t h e c o m m e r c i a l a s p e c t s o f t h e p r a c t i c e 
o f l a w i n 1981 must be u n r e a l ; few w o u l d s t i l l c o n s i d e r t h a t l e g a l 
f e e s a r e mere h o n o r a r i a f o r a s e r v i c e t o j u s t i c e nowadays. 
Of c o u r s e t h e use o f c o n t i n g e n t f e e s w o u l d need t o be s a f e -
g u a r d e d b o t h as t o t h e amount o f f e e s and m e r i t s o f c l a i m s . B u t 
i t i s s u b m i t t e d t h a t t h e s e m a t t e r s c an be c o n t r o l l e d by t h e g o v e r n -
i n g b o d i e s o f t h e two b r a n c h e s o f t h e l e g a l p r o f e s s i o n and a l o n g 
t h e s a f e g u a r d s as s u g g e s t e d by L o r d D e n n i n g i n W a l l e r s t e i n e r v . 
M o i r ( N o . 2 ) . 
I n t h e U n i t e d Kingdom l i t i g a t i o n i s c o n s i d e r e d as s o c i a l l y 
d i s r u p t i v e and so s h o u l d be used as a l a s t r e s o r t ( 7 ) . B u t a t t e n t -
t i o n s h o u l d be drawn t o t h e U n i t e d S t a t e s w h ere l i t i g a t i o n i s seen 
as a s o c i a l l y u s e f u l d e v i c e . T h a t t h e c o n t i n g e n t f e e s y s t e m i s 
u s e d s u c c e s s f u l l y i n t h e U n i t e d S t a t e s and o t h e r c o u n t r i e s and t h e 
p r i n c i p l e o f e q u a l i t y o f a c c e s s t o t h e c o u r t s j u s t i f y f u r t h e r s t u d y 
i n t o t h e c o n t i n g e n t f e e s y s t e m . 
I t may be t h a t t h e n o n - i n t r o d u c t i o n o f t h e c o n t i n g e n t f e e 
s y s t e m i s due t o s h o r t a g e o f p a r l i a m e n t a r y t i m e . I n d e e d i n 
Wal l e r s t e i n e r v . M o i r (No.2) Scarrnan L . J . , who had been c h a i r m a n 
o f t h e Law Commission i n 1966, c o m p l a i n e d w i t h t h e f o l l o w i n g w o r d s : 
" A l t h o u g h I c o u l d have w i s h e d t o have seen by now some r e s u l t s 
f r o m t h e ' f u r t h e r s t u d y ' o f c o n t i n g e n c y f e e s w h i c h t h e Law 
Commission recommended ( p a r a . 2 0 ) , t h e d e l a y i n t h e m a t t e r 
( w h i c h may o r may n o t be i n e v i t a b l e , I do n o t know) i s no e x c u s e 
f o r t h e c o u r t a t t e m p t i n g t o do t h e work o f t h e l e g i s l a t u r e . " ( 8 ) 
I t i s p r o p o s e d t h a t t h e r e s h o u l d be i n t r o d u c t i o n o f some f o r m 
o f c o n t i n g e n t f e e s y s t e m . Such a s y s t e m c o u l d be o f p a r t i c u l a r 
use t o m i n o r i t y s h a r e h o l d e r s as w e l l as m i d d l e i ncome g r o u p s . 
( 7 ) I n d e e d d i s i n c e n t i v e s e x i s t because t h e l o s e r has t o pay t h e 
w i n n e r ' s c o s t s . 
( 8 ) ( 1 9 7 5 / 1 A l l E.R. 849, a t 873. 
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F i n a l l y i t i s p e r h a p s i m p o r t a n t t o e m p h a s i s e t h e p r a c t i c a l 
d i f f i c u l t i e s i n v o l v e d i n d e t e c t i n g f r a u d , s e l f - s e r v i n g n e g l i g e n c e 
and o t h e r b r e a c h e s o f d u t y i n t h e f i r s t p l a c e and t h e n s u b s t a n t i a t -
i n g them,, More o f t e n t h a n n o t b r e a c h e s o f d u t y a r e o n l y d e t e c t e d 
when t h e company r e a c h e s t h e p o i n t o f g o i n g i n t o l i q u i d a t i o n . A t 
t h i s p o i n t i n t i m e t h e p e r s o n a l f o r t u n e s i n c l u d i n g i n s u r a n c e money 
o f t h e d i r e c t o r s i n d e f a u l t a r e l i k e l y t o be i n s u f f i c i e n t t o p r o -
v i d e f o r c o m p e n s a t i o n f o r t h e w r o n g s o r b r e a c h e s o f d u t y t h a t may 
have been c o m m i t t e d , 'Where a company i s n e g l i g e n t l y o r i n c o m p e t -
e n t l y r u n , t h e r e s u l t a n t e c o n o m i c and s o c i a l harm may be v e r y g r e a t . 
Bad and i n c o m p e t e n t management p l a c e s s h a r e h o l d e r s , c r e d i t o r s , 
e m p l o y e e s , consumers and s u p p l i e r s a t r i s k o f l o s s , and as can be 
seen f r o m a b ove, t h e l a w as i t now s t a n d s can o n l y have a l i m i t e d 
r o l e t o p l a y ( 9 ) . 
T h e r e f o r e i t i s s u b m i t t e d t h a t o f f a r g r e a t e r p r a c t i c a l s i g n i -
f i c a n c e i n t h e f u t u r e s h o u l d be t h e c o n t i n u i n g i m p r o v e m e n t o f 
m a n a g e r i a l e d u c a t i o n i n i t s many v a r i e t i e s o f f o r m and t h e c r e a t i o n 
o f e x t e r n a l mechanisms and i n t e r n a l mechanisms w i t h i n t h e company 
t o i m p r o v e s u p e r v i s i o n o f management. I n t h i s c o n n e c t i o n t h e 
w a t c h i n g c o m m i t t e e o r t h e use o f o u t s i d e d i r e c t o r s on a n on-
e x e c u t i v e b a s i s , who have s o m e t h i n g d e f i n i t e t o o f f e r o t h e r t h a n 
mere s o c i a l g r a c e s , w h i c h w i l l be more p a r t i c u l a r l y d e s c r i b e d i n 
C h a p t e r 3 h e r e i n , has a m a j o r r o l e t o p l a y as does e m p l o y e e p a r t i -
c i p a t i o n , w h i c h w i l l be more p a r t i c u l a r l y d e s c r i b e d i n C h a p t e r 2 
h e r e i n o 
( 9 ) See, e.q. W a l l e r s t e i n e r v . M o i r ( N o . 2 ) / 1 9 7 5 / 1 A l l E.R. 8 ^ 9 ; 
[ 1 9 7 5 ] Q.B. 3 7 3 ; / " 1 9 7 5 J 2 W.L.R. 3 8 9 a l t h o u g h r e c e n t l y t h e c o u r t s 
have been more r e a d y t o i n t e r v e n e t o c o r r e c t abuse o f m a j o r i t y 
power and u n f a i r n e s s . 
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CHAPTER 2 EMPLOYEE PARTICIPATION 
U n t i l r e c e n t l y company l a w d i d n o t s e t o u t t o r e c o g n i s e t h e 
i n t e r e s t s o f t h e e m p l o y e e . I t t o o k c a r e o f d i r e c t o r s , s h a r e h o l d e r s , 
c r e d i t o r s , a u d i t o r s , b u t n o t e m p l o y e e s . Thus Plowman J„ s a i d i n 
P a r k e v . D a i l y News ( 1 ) : 
"The v i e w t h a t d i r e c t o r s i n h a v i n g r e g a r d t o t h e q u e s t i o n w h a t 
i s i n t h e b e s t i n t e r e s t s o f t h e i r company a r e e n t i t l e d t o t a k e 
i n t o a c c o u n t t h e i n t e r e s t s o f t h e e m p l o y e e s i r r e s p e c t i v e o f any 
c o n s e q u e n t i a l b e n e f i t t o t h e company i s one w h i c h may be w i d e l y 
h e l d . o . B u t „ „ » i n my j u d g e m e n t such i s n o t t h e l a w . . . 
t h e d e f e n d a n t s were p r o m p t e d by m o t i v e s w h i c h however l a u d a b l e 
and however e n l i g h t e n e d f r o m t h e p o i n t o f v i e w o f i n d u s t r i a l 
r e l a t i o n s were such as t h e l a w does n o t r e c o g n i s e as s u f f i c i e n t 
j u s t i f i c a t i o n . The e s s e n c e o f t h e m a t t e r i s t h i s , t h a t t h e 
d i r e c t o r s o f t h e d e f e n d a n t company a r e p r o p o s i n g t h a t a v e r y 
l a r g e p a r t o f i t s f u n d s s h o u l d be g i v e n t o i t s f o r m e r e m p l o y e e s 
i n o r d e r t o b e n e f i t t h o s e e m p l o y e e s r a t h e r t h a n t h e company." 
S e c t i o n 46 o f t h e Companies A c t 1980, w h i c h came i n t o f o r c e 
on t h e 2 3 r d J u n e , 1980, p r o v i d e s t h a t t h e m a t t e r s t o w h i c h t h e 
d i r e c t o r s o f t h e company a r e t o have r e g a r d i n t h e p e r f o r m a n c e o f 
t h e i r f u n c t i o n s s h a l l i n c l u d e t h e i n t e r e s t s o f t h e company's 
em p l o y e e s i n g e n e r a l as w e l l as t h e i n t e r e s t s o f i t s members. B u t 
t h i s d u t y i s t o be owed by t h e d i r e c t o r s t o t h e company a l o n e and 
i s e n f o r c e a b l e i n t h e same way as any o t h e r f i d u c i a r y d u t y owed 
t o t h e company by i t s d i r e c t o r s . The em p l o y e e s a r e n o t g i v e n any 
c o l l e c t i v e r i g h t o f e n f o r c e m e n t . T h e r e f o r e t h i s p r o v i s i o n w i l l 
n o t as such d i r e c t l y b e n e f i t e m p l o y e e s who w o u l d r e q u i r e t o be 
s h a r e h o l d e r s ( 2 ) t o t a k e a c t i o n and w i l l p r e s u m a b l y come w i t h i n 
( 1 ) / r1962/ Ch. 927; / l 9 6 2 j 3 W.L.R. 566; /1962J 2 A l l E.R. 929; 
106 S.J. 704. 
( 2 ) B u t , o f c o u r s e , t h e t r a d e u n i o n s may buy s h a r e s i n c o m p a n i e s 
e m p l o y i n g t h e i r members so t h a t t h e y c an sue qua members on b e h a l f 
o f t h e compan i e s v/hen t h a t i s a l l o w e d . See a l s o p o s t , p.89. 
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t h e r u l e i n F o s s v. H a r b o t t l e ( 3 ) . So l i t t l e i s changed and t h e 
p r o v i s i o n i s p r o b a b l y o n l y d e c l a r a t o r y of the law as i t s t o o d 
b e f o r e t h i s p r o v i s i o n was b r o ught i n t o f o r c e . S e c t i o n 47 of the 
Companies A c t 1980, however, p r o v i d e s t h a t d i r e c t o r s who a r e 
empowered ( 4 ) so to do may make p r o v i s i o n f o r employees i n the 
e v e n t o f a s e s s a t i o n o r t r a n s f e r of b u s i n e s s even though the 
e x e r c i s e o f the power may not be i n the b e s t i n t e r e s t s o f the 
company, thus r e v e r s i n g P a r k e v. D a i l y News ( 5 ) 
P r e s s u r e s f o r Change and the Arguments 
I n t h e l a s t twenty y e a r s o r so the whole s c a l e o f b u s i n e s s 
o r g a n i s a t i o n has s i g n i f i c a n t l y i n c r e a s e d . New forms of t r a d i n g 
have c r e a t e d v a s t i n d u s t r i a l e m p i r e s . I t has been s a i d t h a t the 
r i s e of the modern c o r p o r a t i o n w i t h c o n c e n t r a t i o n o f economic 
power b e h i n d i t can compete on e q u a l terms w i t h the modern s t a t e . 
I f i t s own i n t e r e s t s a r e a f f e c t e d , i t even a t t e m p t s to dominate 
the s t a t e . To some e x t e n t , t h e n , the law o f c o r p o r a t i o n can be 
c o n s i d e r e d as an a s p e c t of the c o n s t i t u t i o n a l law o f the modern 
s t a t e and i n c r e a s i n g r e c o g n i t i o n i s b e i n g t a k e n o f the p o l i t i c a l 
and s o c i a l i n f l u e n c e o f t h e i r d e c i s i o n s ( 6 ) . 
The l a r g e company today has a l a r g e i n f l u e n c e on market c o n -
d i t i o n s and consumer demands. Sometimes to g e t t h e l a r g e s t p r o f i t s 
f o r i t s s h a r e h o l d e r s seems not to be i t s f i r s t g o a l ; i t c o n c e n t r a t e s 
on growth of s i z e and power as t h e f i r s t o b j e c t i v e ( 7 ) . 
( 3 ) ( 1 8 4 3 ) 2 Hare 261. 
( 4 ) The power must be e x e r c i s e d by the g e n e r a l m eeting u n l e s s the 
d i r e c t o r s a r e a u t h o r i s e d by the memorandum o r a r t i c l e s ( s . 7 4 ( 3 ) of 
t h e Companies A c t 1 9 8 0 ) . S t e p s a r e , however, t a k e n to e n s u r e t h a t 
t h i s i s not used to the d e t r i m e n t o f c r e d i t o r s ; p r o v i s i o n may be 
made o n l y out of p r o f i t s a v a i l a b l e f o r d i v i d e n d o r , i f the company 
i s i n l i q u i d a t i o n , a v a i l a b l e f o r d i s t r i b u t i o n to t h e members ( s . 7 4 ( 6 ) 
o f the 1980 A c t ) . 
( 5 ) Ante, p.46 
( 6 ) C f . Gower, pp.58-9 
( 7 ) C f 0 Gower, p. 59 
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A f u r t h e r c o n s e q u e n c e o f t h e g r o w t h o f g i a n t c o m m e r c i a l 
e n t e r p r i s e s i s t h a t many o f them have ceased t o owe a l l e g i a n c e 
t o one c o u n t r y o n l y . Our w o r l d i s now one where t h e g i a n t company 
has a l r e a d y assumed i n t e r n a t i o n a l p r o p o r t i o n s , e i t h e r by way o f 
t r a d i n g a g r e e m e n t s o r m e r g e r s w i t h f o r e i g n c o m p a n i e s o r by 
o p e r a t i n g s u b s i d i a r y c o m p a n i e s o r b r a n c h e s i n o t h e r c o u n t r i e s ( 8 ) . 
I n 1968, a M i n i s t e r t o l d t h e House o f Commons, "As t h e i n t e r n a -
t i o n a l c o m p a n i e s d e v e l o p , N a t i o n a l G overnments i n c l u d i n g o u r own, 
w i l l be r e d u c e d t o t h e s t a t u s o f p a r i s h c o u n c i l s i n d e a l i n g w i t h 
t h e l a r g e c o r p o r a t i o n s w h i c h w i l l span t h e w o r l d . " 
The c u r r e n t d e v e l o p m e n t o f i n t e r n a t i o n a l m e r g e r s has c a u s e d 
a l a r m . I f two c o m p a n i e s merge, t h e r e i s no need f o r two p e r s o n -
n e l , m a r k e t i n g o r a c c o u n t i n g d e p a r t m e n t s . 
F u r t h e r m o r e B r i t a i n and many d e v e l o p e d n a t i o n s a r e on t h e i r 
way t o b e c o m i n g an a u t o m a t e d s o c i e t y . As t e c h n o l o g y i s so s o p h i s -
t i c a t e d , more and more t a s k s c a n be done by m a c h i n e s and j o b s a r e 
l o s t . 
I n t h e l a s t h a l f o f t h e 1980s W e s t e r n Europe began t o e x p e r i -
ence l e v e l s o f unemployment unknown f o r f o r t y y e a r s . By 1978 
B r i t a i n ' s unemployment r a t e o f o v e r 6 p e r c e n t was n e a r l y t h r e e 
t i m e s g r e a t e r t h a n t h e p o l i t i c a l l y a c c e p t a b l e l e v e l o f t h e mid 
1950s; y e t i t i s g o i n g and e x p e c t e d t o c o n t i n u e t o go u p . Unem-
p l o y m e n t c r e a t e s a l o t o f e c o n o m i c and s o c i a l d i f f i c u l t i e s . 
T o g e t h e r w i t h i n f l a t i o n , u n e m p l o y m e n t i s t h e g r e a t e s t e c o n o m i c 
s t i m u l a n t f o r p o l i t i c a l d i s c o n t e n t . Our t r a d i t i o n a l s y s t e m o f 
m o r a l p r i n c i p l e s r e q u i r e s t h a t p e o p l e work f o r a l i v i n g and t h e 
head o f t h e h o u s e h o l d , u s u a l l y t h e h u s b a n d , i s e x p e c t e d t o keep 
t h o s e who a r e t o o young t o w o r k . A man who i s o u t o f work c a n n o t 
f u l f i l t h i s r e q u i r e m e n t o f s o c i e t y , and i s l o o k e d down upon because 
( 8 ) Gower, p . 6 1 . 
( 9 ) A.W. Benn, M i n i s t e r o f T e c h n o l o g y : O f f i c a l R e p o r t (H.C. 1968, 
C o l . 4 9 1 ) . 
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he i s c o n s i d e r e d n o t c a p a b l e o f s u p p o r t i n g h i s f a m i l y . T h i s may 
have a bad p s y c h o l o g i c a l e f f e c t . A l o n g p e r i o d o f unemployment 
can d e s t r o y a man's p r i d e and e v e n t u a l l y remove h i s m e n t a l and 
p h y s i c a l a b i l i t y t o w o r k . T h e r e a r e c a s e s where men p r e t e n d t o 
go t o w o r k t o p r e v e n t t h e i r c h i l d r e n f r o m f i n d i n g t h e t r u t h . 
Unemployment amongst young p e o p l e i s even w o r s e . The y o u n g s t e r s 
may have a f e e l i n g t h a t t h e y a r e b e i n g r e j e c t e d by a d u l t s o c i e t y 
and t h e y have no s o u r c e o f i n c o m e . Because t h e y have n o t h i n g 
m e a n i n g f u l t o do, some y o u n g s t e r s t u r n t o v a n d a l i s m and c r i m e ( 1 0 ) . 
I t i s b e l i e v e d , h o w e v e r , t h a t t h e unemployment r a t e w i l l f a l l i f 
t h e r e a r e b e t t e r i n d u s t r i a l r e l a t i o n s and r e v i t a l i s a t i o n o f B r i t i s h 
i n d u s try„ 
R e c e n t l y e d u c a t i o n a l o p p o r t u n i t i e s have e x p a n d e d , a phenomenon 
w h i c h w i l l a c c e l e r a t e w i t h t h e r a i s i n g o f t h e s c h o o l l e a v i n g age 
and an i n c r e a s e i n f u r t h e r e d u c a t i o n f a c i l i t i e s ( 1 ) . The new 
o p p o r t u n i t i e s r a i s e t h e a s p i r a t i o n s o f young p e o p l e and e d u c a t i o n a l 
advancement i s p r o d u c i n g a s o c i e t y w h e r e y o u n g e r p e o p l e a r e a g a i n s t 
a u t h o r i t a r i a n i s m i n a p o s i t i v e way; t h e y a r e u r g i n g t h a t man s h o u l d 
have a g r e a t e r say i n h i s d e s t i n y . Such i d e a s have p e r m e a t e d i n t o 
t h e w o r k e n v i r o n m e n t ( 2 ) . 
"Not o n l y must w o r k e r s have t h e r i g h t t o d e t e r m i n e t h e i r e c o n o m i c 
e n v i r o n m e n t by p a r t i c i p a t i n g i n a w i d e n i n g r a n g e o f d e c i s i o n s 
w i t h i n management b u t t h e r e c o g n i t i o n o f t h a t r i g h t and measures 
t o s e c u r e i t a r e m a t t e r s o f u r g e n c y . " ( 3 ) 
The need f o r employee p a r t i c i p a t i o n on t h e b o a r d has p a r t l y 
a r i s e n o u t o f f e a r o f unemployment and r e d u n d a n c i e s r e s u l t i n g f r o m 
m e r g e r s and c o n v e n t i o n a l f i r m s g o i n g b a n k r u p t . 
( 1 0 ) See g e n e r a l l y B u l l o c k R e p o r t , Cmnd 6706, C h a p t e r 3. 
( 1 ) See W.B. C r e i g h t o n ( 1 9 7 7 ) 4 B r i t . J.L. & 3oc. 1 , 6. 
( 2 ) See B u l l o c k R e p o r t , p a r a . 3.7. 
( 3 ) L a b o u r P a r t y document on I n d u s t r i a l Democracy 1967. 
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A n o t h e r base f o r a d v o c a t i n g employee p a r t i c i p a t i o n i s t h a t 
t h e e m p l o y e e s o f a b i g company i n f a c t make a g r e a t e r c o n t i n u i n g 
and p r a c t i c a l c o n t r i b u t i o n t o t h e s u c c e s s and p r o f i t a b i l i t y o f 
i t s b u s i n e s s t h a n s h a r e h o l d e r s and i n v e s t o r s . I t i s t r u e t h a t 
s h a r e h o l d e r s c o n t r i b u t e d some i n i t i a l o r new c a p i t a l , b u t t h e y 
p l a y no a c t i v e o r c o n t i n u i n g p a r t i n r u n n i n g i t . T h e r e f o r e 
e m p l o y e e s o u g h t t o be e n t i t l e d t o r i g h t s a t l e a s t as g r e a t as 
t h o s e o f s h a r e h o l d e r s b o t h i n c o n t r o l l i n g t h e a c t i v i t i e s o f 
management and i n p a r t i c i p a t i n g i n p r o f i t s . S i n c e e m p l o y e e s ' 
t i e s t o t h e company l a s t l o n g e r t h a n t h o s e o f s h a r e h o l d e r s , 
e m p l o y e e s s h o u l d be e n t i t l e d t o s h a r i n g c o n t r o l o v e r i t . I n d e e d 
i t may be a r g u e d t h a t t h e power t o c o n t r o l management i s p r o b a b l y 
more i m p o r t a n t f o r e m p l o y e e s t h a n f o r s h a r e h o l d e r s , s i n c e a s h a r e -
h o l d e r may s e v e r h i s r e l a t i o n s h i p w i t h a company by s e l l i n g h i s 
s h a r e s , w h e r e a s an employee may have much t o l o s e b y l e a v i n g t h e 
company. The s h a r e h o l d e r s , i t i s s u b m i t t e d , s h o u l d be e n t i t l e d 
t o a r e a s o n a b l e r e t u r n by way o f i n t e r e s t on t h e c a p i t a l i n v e s t e d 
and some p r o f i t f o r t h e r i s k o f m a k i n g i n v e s t m e n t . A n y p r o f i t 
r e m a i n i n g a f t e r p a y i n g t h e s e sums s h o u l d be s h a r e d by t h e s h a r e -
h o l d e r s and empl o y e e s e q u a l l y o r i n p r o p o r t i o n t o t h e i r n o t i o n a l 
c o n t r i b u t i o n as t h e c a s e may b e . We l i v e i n an e r a t h a t q u e s t i o n s 
t h e s a n c t i t y o f p r o f i t and r e s t r i c t s t h e p u r s u i t o f s e l f i n t e r e s t . 
A company s h o u l d be a m e e t i n g p l a c e f o r c a p i t a l , management, em-
p l o y e e s , s u p p l i e r s , c o n s u m e r s , and t h e p u b l i c t o g e t h e r . A l l t h e s e 
i n t e r e s t s s h o u l d have a s t a t u s i n company l a w . O w n e r s h i p i n v o l v e s 
n o t o n l y r i g h t s b u t r e s p o n s i b i l i t i e s as w e l l . T h i s r e q u i r e s com-
pany d i r e c t o r s on b e h a l f o f s h a r e h o l d e r s t o d i s c h a r g e t h e i r s o c i a l 
r e s p o n s i b i l i t i e s as w e l l as t o p r o t e c t t h e i r l e g i t i m a t e i n t e r e s t s 
as i n v e s t o r s . 
T h e r e a r e o t h e r r e a s o n s f o r demanding employee p a r t i c i p a t i o n . 
I t i s a r g u e d t h a t t h e new s y s t e m w i l l end t h e e x p l o i t a t i o n o f human 
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b e i n g s . I t i s a l l e g e d t h a t some employees have been t r e a t e d as 
o b j e c t s . T h i s i s c o n t r a r y t o t h e i r n a t u r a l r i g h t s and s h o u l d be 
s t o p p e d . I t i s s a i d t h a t t h e r e a r e u n f a i r i n e q u a l i t i e s i n income 
b e t w e e n e m p l o y e e s and e m p l o y e r s and many w o u l d l i k e t o see t h e end 
o f s u ch phenomenon. I t i s f u r t h e r s a i d t h a t e m p l o y e e p a r t i c i p a t i o n 
w o u l d i n v o l v e more p e o p l e i n t h e p r o d u c t i o n o f w e a l t h and check t h e 
c o n c e n t r a t i o n o f c a p i t a l i n t o f e w e r and f e w e r hands ( 4 ) . I t has 
a l s o been s a i d t o p r o v i d e f o r more r e s p o n s i b l e c i t i z e n s h i p by p r o -
v i d i n g f o r more i n d u s t r i a l d e m o c r a c y . 
However i t may be a r g u e d t h a t t h e e m p l o y e e d i r e c t o r s w o u l d be 
i n e x p e r i e n c e d and u n a b l e t o e f f e c t i v e l y a s s i s t i n m a k i n g d e c i s i o n s 
a t b o a r d l e v e l . W i t h o u t t h e n e c e s s a r y t r a i n i n g e m p l o y e e d i r e c t o r s 
w o u l d f i n d i t d i f f i c u l t t o u n d e r s t a n d c o r p o r a t e p o l i c i e s and manage-
ment w o u l d have t o spend more t i m e e x p l a i n i n g p o l i c i e s t o them and 
t h r o u g h them t o t h e i r c o n s t i t u e n t s o r t h o s e t h e y r e p r e s e n t and 
d e c i s i o n - t a k i n g m i g h t be f u r t h e r s l o w e d down b e c a u s e t h e employee 
d i r e c t o r s w o u l d f e e l o b l i g e d t o r e p o r t back and c o n s u l t t h e i r c o n -
s t i t u e n t s o r t h o s e t h e y r e p r e s e n t b e f o r e c o m m i t t i n g t h e m s e l v e s ( 5 ) . 
On t h e o t h e r h a n d , i t i s a r g u e d t h a t e m ployee p a r t i c i p a t i o n 
on b o a r d s w o u l d b r i n g a b o u t an o p timum c o m b i n a t i o n o f c a p i t a l i s m 
and s o c i a l i s m . C o n f l i c t i n g i n t e r e s t s a t c r u c i a l s t a g e s i n p o l i c y 
f o r m a t i o n w o u l d be s o l v e d a t an e a r l y s t a g e . The e m p l o y e e s w i l l 
be a b l e t o e x p r e s s t h e i r o p i n i o n s b e f o r e a d e c i s i o n i s t a k e n , t o 
p o i n t o u t t h e i m p l i c a t i o n s o f a p r o p o s a l f o r t h e i n t e r e s t s o f 
e m p l o y e e s , t o q u e s t i o n management on w h a t t h e y a r e p r o p o s i n g and t o 
s u g g e s t a l t e r n a t i v e s o r a l t e r a t i o n s , and i n so d o i n g t h e w o r k f o r c e 
w i l l c o m m i t t h e m s e l v e s more t o t h e company. A j o i n t d e c i s i o n can 
u s u a l l y be c a r r i e d o u t w i t h o u t c o s t l y i n d u s t r i a l d i s p u t e s and l o s s 
o f p r o d u c t i o n . A l t h o u g h i n i t i a l l y i t may t a k e l o n g e r t i m e t o 
( 4 ) See W.S. C r e i g h t o n ( 1 9 7 7 ) 4 B r i t . J.L. & Soc. 1,6. 
( 5 ) B u l l o c k R e p o r t , p a r a . 6.27. 
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f o r m u l a t e c o r p o r a t e p o l i c y , once the c o n s e n t of employees has been 
o b t a i n e d , d e c i s i o n s w i l l be e a s i e r and q u i c k e r to implement. T h i s 
w i l l more than make up f o r the l o s s of time i n d i s c u s s i n g c o r p o r a t e 
p o l i c y a t the b e g i n n i n g ( 6 ) . 
C oncern has been e x p r e s s e d o v e r t h a t t h e new system o f employee 
p a r t i c i p a t i o n might have a bad e f f e c t on f o r e i g n i n v e s t m e n t , which 
p l a y s an i m p o r t a n t p a r t i n t he B r i t i s h economy, and fewer i n t e r -
n a t i o n a l companies would s e t up b u s i n e s s e s i n the U n i t e d Kingdom 
b e c a u s e o f t he u n c e r t a i n t y t h a t t h e i n s t r u c t i o n s o f the f o r e i g n 
p a r e n t s would be c a r r i e d o u t by the board of a s u b s i d i a r y company 
i n t h e U n i t e d Kingdom whic h i s s u b j e c t t o t he new proposed r u l e o f 
c o - d e t e r m i n a t i o n . B u l l o c k ( 7 ) c o n s i d e r e d t h a t a t f i r s t f o r e i g n 
i n v e s t m e n t would d e c l i n e ( 8 ) b e c a u s e f o r e i g n e r s might make i n v e s t -
ments e l s e w h e r e . But once i t was proved t h a t the new s y s t e m would 
i n c r e a s e t h e e f f i c i e n c y o f companies, improve i n d u s t r i a l r e l a t i o n s 
and make the companies more p r o f i t a b l e , t h e r e would be an i n c r e a s e 
of f o r e i g n i n v e s t m e n t i n t he U n i t e d Kingdom. F u r t h e r m o r e f o r e i g n 
i n v e s t o r s would e v e n t u a l l y become accustomed to the new sys t e m , 
e x p e c i a l l y when so many c o u n t r i e s i n Europe have adopted the German 
model of c o - d e t e r m i n a t i o n i n some form ( 9 ) . 
Some a t t e n t i o n has been drawn to t h a t board r e p r e s e n t a t i o n 
might c o n f l i c t w i t h t h e t r a d i t i o n a l r o l e of c o l l e c t i v e b a r g a i n i n g , 
which i s seen as one of o p p o s i n g management, not c o l l a b o r a t i n g w i t h 
i t . T h e r e may then be c o n t r a d i c t i o n between the o b j e c t i v e s o f board 
l e v e l r e p r e s e n t a t i o n and c o l l e c t i v e b a r g a i n i n g ( 1 0 ) . But i t i s 
( 6 ) Cf„ B u l l o c k R e p o r t , p a r a s . 6.28, 6.29. 
( 7 ) See B u l l o c k R e p o r t , p a r a s , 6.33 t o 6.41. 
( 8 ) I t was thought t h a t employee p a r t i c i p a t i o n was o n l y one of many 
economic and p o l i t i c a l r e a s o n s t h a t would a f f e c t f o r e i g n i n v e s t m e n t , 
so i t would be v e r y d i f f i c u l t to e s t i m a t e i t s a c t u a l e f f e c t on 
i n v e s t m e n t . See B u l l o c k R e p o r t , p a r a . 6.36. 
( 9 ) F o r e i g n i n t e r e s t s have adapted to employee r e p r e s e n t a t i o n i n 
West Germany and to some e x t e n t Y u g o s l a v i a . See B u l l o c k R e p o r t , 
p a r a . 6.41, 
(10) B u l l o c k R e p o r t , p a r a , 5.18. 
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a r g u e d t h a t b o a r d l e v e l r e p r e s e n t a t i o n and c o l l e c t i v e b a r g a i n i n g 
a r e n o t i n c o m p a t i b l e b e c a u s e b o t h p r o c e s s e s s e r v e t h e same p u r p o s e 
o f e n a b l i n g e m p l o y e e s t o t a k e p a r t i n d e c i s i o n - m a k i n g i n t h e company 
i n w h i c h t h e y w o r k . The two p r o c e s s e s a r e s i m i l a r and a s s i s t each 
o t h e r . No new i s s u e s o f p r i n c i p l e a r e r a i s e d by b o a r d l e v e l r e p r e -
s e n t a t i o n . T h e r e a r e some m a t t e r s w h i c h c o l l e c t i v e b a r g a i n i n g a l o n e 
i s u n a b l e t o h a n d l e and em p l o y e e p a r t i c i p a t i o n may be used as an 
a d d i t i o n a l means t o cope w i t h t h o s e m a t t e r s ( 1 ) . 
B u l l o c k ' s main P r o p o s a l s 
I n r e s p o n s e t o t h e i n c r e a s i n g demand f o r some s o r t o f l e g i s -
l a t i v e a c t i o n t h e Government s e t up a c o m m i t t e e known as t h e Com-
m i t t e e o f I n q u i r y on I n d u s t r i a l Democracy ( 2 ) u n d e r S i r A l a n ( l a t e r 
L o r d ) B u l l o c k . T h i s marked t h e f i r s t r e a l move by t h e Government 
t o w a r d s s t a t u t o r y r e g u l a t i o n o f employee p a r t i c i p a t i o n . The B u l l o c k 
C o m m i t t e e , however, c o u l d n o t r e a c h a unanimous d e c i s i o n . Two r e -
p o r t s w e re i s s u e d , a M a i n R e p o r t s i g n e d by se v e n members i n c l u d i n g 
t h e a c a d e m i c and t r a d e u n i o n members and a M i n o r i t y R e p o r t s i g n e d 
by t h e r e m a i n i n g t h r e e members who were a l l i n d u s t r i a l i s t s . 
B u l l o c k ( 3 ) p r o p o s e d a r e c o n s t i t u t e d b o a r d o f d i r e c t o r s f o r 
c o m p a n i e s e m p l o y i n g 2,000 o r more employees ( 4 ) , e n v i s a g i n g t h e 
p o s s i b i l i t y o f l o w i n g t h e number f r o m 2,000 t o 1,000 i n due course(5)„ 
( 1 ) I b i d , p a r a . 10.54. 
( 2 ) Cmnd 6706. The t e r m s o f t h e B u l l o c k C o m m i t t e e were as f o l l o w s : 
" A c c e p t i n g t h e need f o r a r a d i c a l e x t e n s i o n o f i n d u s t r i a l d e mocracy 
i n t h e c o n t r o l o f c o m p a n i e s by means o f r e p r e s e n t a t i o n on b o a r d s o f 
d i r e c t o r s , and a c c e p t i n g t h e e s s e n t i a l r o l e o f t r a d e u n i o n o r g a n i -
s a t i o n s i n t h i s p r o c e s s , t o c o n s i d e r how such an e x t e n s i o n can best-
be a c h i e v e d , t a k i n g i n t o a c c o u n t i n p a r t i c u l a r t h e p r o p o s a l s o f t h e 
T r a d e s U n i o n C o n g r e s s r e p o r t on i n d u s t r i a l d e m o c r a c y . . ." The 
t e r m s o f r e f e r e n c e o f t h e C o m m i t t e e have been c r i t i c i s e d s i n c e t h e 
t e r m s r e c o g n i s e d t h e e s s e n t i a l r o l e o f t r a d e u n i o n s i n t h e new s y s t e m . 
F u r t h e r m o r e B u l l o c k d i d n o t c o n s i d e r t h e a l t e r n a t i v e o f e x t e n d i n g 
p u b l i c o w n e r s h i p by g o v e r n m e n t . 
( 3 ) B u l l o c k R e p o r t , p a r a . 11.4. See a l s o g e n e r a l l y O. Kahn-Freund 
( 1 9 7 7 ) 6 I . L . J . 65. E x c e p t where i n d i c a t e d B u l l o c k ' s m a j o r i t y p r o -
p o s a l s a r e r e f e r r e d t o as B u l l o c k . 
( 4 ) As t o g r o u p s o f c o m p a n i e s , see b e l o w pp.80-1 
( 5 ) B u l l o c k R e p o r t , p a r a . 11.5. The new s y s t e m w o u l d a f f e c t f o r t h e 
t i m e b e i n g some 738 e n t e r p r i s e s e m p l o y i n g 6 o r 7 m i l l i o n p e o p l e i n 
t h e U n i t e d Kingdom ( o n e t h i r d o f t o t a l p r i v a t e s e c t o r w o r k f o r c e ) . 
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The new b o a r d w o u l d c o n s i s t o f e q u a l numbers o f s h a r e h o l d e r 
d i r e c t o r s and employee d i r e c t o r s w i t h a minimum o f f o u r i n e i t h e r 
c a s e and a t h i r d g r o u p o f d i r e c t o r s ( t h e s o - c a l l e d 2X + Y f o r m u l a ) . 
The t h i r d g r o u p d i r e c t o r s w o u l d be c o - o p t e d j o i n t l y by t h e s h a r e -
h o l d e r s and e m p l o y e e s and w o u l d be c h o s e n f o r t h e i r e x p e r t i s e and 
e x p e r i e n c e ( 6 ) . I n c a se o f d i s a g r e e m e n t as t o who s h o u l d be c o -
o p t e d , an i n d e p e n d e n t c o m m i s s i o n t o be c a l l e d I n d u s t r i a l Democracy 
Commission w o u l d t r y t o c o n c i l i a t e . I f c o n c i l i a t i o n f a i l e d as w e l l , 
t h e C o m m i s s i o n w o u l d impose a b i n d i n g s o l u t i o n upon b o t h s i d e s ( 7 ) . 
The number o f Y members s h o u l d be an odd number and more t h a n one ( 8 ) , 
b u t s h o u l d be s m a l l e r t h a n t h e number o f e i t h e r t h e s h a r e h o l d e r 
d i r e c t o r s o r e mployee d i r e c t o r s ( w h i c h a r e t o be e q u a l o f c o u r s e ) . 
B u l l o c k r e j e c t e d t h e i n t r o d u c t i o n o f a t w o - t i e r s y s t e m and p r o p o s e d 
t h a t t h e e x i s t i n g u n i t a r y b o a r d s t r u c t u r e as r e s t r u c t u r e d as a f o r e -
s a i d be i n t r o d u c e d b e c a u s e , i n t e r a l i a , t h e y f e l t t h a t a t w o - t i e r 
s y s t e m w o u l d be i n c o n s i s t e n t w i t h t h e t r a d i t i o n a l f l e x i b i l i t y o f 
B r i t i s h company l a w and t h e r e m i g h t be f r i c t i o n b e t w e e n t h e s u p e r -
v i s o r y b o a r d and t h e management b o a r d i n t h e t w o - t i e r s y s t e m . 
When c o n s i d e r i n g t h e q u e s t i o n o f c h a n n e l o f r e p r e s e n t a t i o n , 
B u l l o c k p o i n t e d t h a t u n i o n membership was h i g h ( o n a v e r a g e a b o u t 
70% o f t h e t o t a l w o r k f o r c e ) i n l a r g e c o m p a n i e s w i t h 2,000 e m p l o y e e s 
o r more. F u r t h e r m o r e , i n s p i t e o f i n c r e a s e o f unemployment u n i o n 
membership was s t i l l g o i n g up ( 9 ) . 
The T r a d e s U n i o n C o n g r e s s s t r o n g l y a r g u e d t h a t i n o r d e r t o 
a v o i d t h e p o s s i b i l i t y o f c o n f l i c t b e t w e e n t h e p r o c e s s e s o f employee 
p a r t i c i p a t i o n on t h e b o a r d and c o l l e c t i v e b a r g a i n i n g , t h e c h a n n e l 
f o r t h e a p p o i n t m e n t o f e mployee d i r e c t o r s s h o u l d be t h e same m a c h i n -
e r y as was e s t a b l i s h e d f o r c o l l e c t i v e b a r g a i n i n g ( 1 0 ) . 
( 6 ) I b i d . , p a r a s . 9.13, 9.14 and 9.19. 
( 7 ) I b i d . , p a r a . 9.43. 
( 8 ) I t was so p r o p o s e d as t o p r e v e n t a d e a d l o c k f r o m a r i s i n g . 
( 9 ) B u l l o c k R e p o r t , p a r a . 2.9 t o p a r a . 2.17. 
( 1 0 ) I b i d . , p a r a . 4.4. 
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B u l l o c k a g r e e d t o t h e v i e w o f t h e T r a d e s U n i o n C o n g r e s s and 
s u g g e s t e d t h a t e m ployee p a r t i c i p a t i o n on t h e b o a r d s h o u l d be b a s e d 
on a s i n g l e c h a n n e l o f r e p r e s e n t a t i o n t h r o u g h t r a d e u n i o n m a c h i n -
e r y ( 1 ) = Any o t h e r method w o u l d be c o n t r a r y t o t h e e s t a b l i s h e d 
p u b l i s h e d p o l i c y o f e n c o u r a g i n g and s t r e n g t h e n i n g c o l l e c t i v e b a r -
g a i n i n g ( 2 ) and w o u l d a l s o be s t r o n g l y o p p o s s e d by t h e t r a d e u n i o n s , 
w h i c h w o u l d see i t as an a t t a c k on t h e i r e s t a b l i s h e d i n t e r e s t s . 
T h e r e w o u l d be g r e a t d a n g e r s i n p r o c e e d i n g w i t h i n d u s t r i a l d emocracy 
w i t h o u t t h e s u p p o r t o f t h e t r a d e u n i o n s and B u l l o c k f e l t i t i m p r a c -
t i c a l t o p r o p o s e a s y s t e m o f r e p r e s e n t a t i o n on t h e b o a r d w h i c h was 
n o t s u p p o r t e d by t h e t r a d e u n i o n s ( 3 ) . A f u r t h e r j u s t i f i c a t i o n was 
t h a t t h e u n i o n s c o u l d r e a s o n a b l y be e x p e c t e d t o p o s s e s s t h e n e c e s -
s a r y e x p e r t i s e and i n d e p e n d e n t s t r e n g t h e f f e c t i v e l y t o r u n a s y s t e m 
o f e mployee p a r t i c i p a t i o n on t h e b o a r d and w o u l d be a b l e t o e s t a b l i s h 
p r o c e d u r e s t o a v o i d c o n f l i c t w i t h c o l l e c t i v e b a r g a i n i n g ( 4 ) . B u l l o c k 
recommended t h a t t h e shop s t e w a r d s and o t h e r k e y r e p r e s e n t a t i v e s o f 
t h e v a r i o u s t r a d e u n i o n s who had members i n t h e company s h o u l d s e t 
up a c o m m i t t e e t o be c a l l e d t h e J o i n t R e p r e s e n t a t i o n C o m m i t t e e (JRC) 
and s u g g e s t e d t h a t t h e c h o i c e o f t h e r e p r e s e n t a t i v e s s h o u l d l i e w i t h 
JRC. The JRC w o u l d a l s o be r e s p o n s i b l e f o r a r r a n g i n g d i s c u s s i o n s 
b e t w e e n t h e e m p l o y e e d i r e c t o r s and c o l l e c t i v e b a r g a i n i n g u n i o n 
r e p r e s e n t a t i v e s t o d e c i d e how d i f f e r e n t k i n d s o f q u e s t i o n s s h o u l d 
be s o l v e d , f o r e x a m p l e w h e t h e r t h e q u e s t i o n s s h o u l d be r a i s e d a t 
m e e t i n g s o f b o a r d o f d i r e c t o r s o r t h r o u g h c o l l e c t i v e b a r g a i n i n g 
m a c h i n e r y . 
B u l l o c k a l s o recommended t h a t t h e p r o c e s s o f r e c o n s t i t u t i n g 
t h e b o a r d s h o u l d be " t r i g o e r e d " by t h e r e q u e s t o f t h e one o r more 
t r a d e u n i o n s r e c o g n i s e d f o r c o l l e c t i v e b a r g a i n i n g r e p r e s e n t i n g a t 
( 1 ) I b i d . , p a r a . 10.8. 
( 2 ) I b i d . , p a r a . 10.G. 
( 3 ) I b i d . , p a r a . 10.5. 
( 4 ) B u l l o c k R e p o r t , p a r a . 10.7. 
- 5 6 -
l e a s t a f i f t h o f t h e t o t a l w o r k f o r c e . B u l l o c k n e v e r t h e l e s s t o o k 
i n t o a c c o u n t t o some d e g r e e t h e p o s i t i o n o f n o n - u n i o n members by 
s u g g e s t i n g t h a t t h e r e s h o u l d be a r e q u i r e m e n t o f a b a l l o t o f a l l 
e m p l o y e e s b e f o r e t h e s y s t e m c o u l d be t r i g g e r e d i n any g i v e n com-
pany . B u l l o c k p r o p o s e d t h a t i f a m a j o r i t y e q u a l t o o n e - t h i r d o f 
t h o s e e l i g i b l e t o v o t e c a s t e d a f f i r m a t i v e v o t e s t h e n t h e b o a r d 
w o u l d be r e c o n s t i t u t e d . I t i s s u b m i t t e d t h a t B u l l o c k f a i l e d t o 
g u a r a n t e e e m p l o y e e p a r t i c i p a t i o n on t h e b o a r d t o n o n - u n i o n e m p l o y e e s . 
A l t h o u g h a b o u t 70 p e r c e n t , o f t h e w o r k f o r c e i n t h e c o m p a n i e s c o v e r e d 
by t h e B u l l o c k p r o p o s a l s a r e t r a d e u n i o n members, t h e r e seem t o be 
no good r e a s o n f o r c o n f i n i n g r e p r e s e n t a t i o n t o t r a d e u n i o n e m p l o y e e s . 
I n d e e d i t can be a r g u e d t h a t by e x c l u d i n g some 30 p e r c e n t , o f t h e 
w o r k f o r c e , t h e p r o p o s e d s y s t e m o f i n d u s t r i a l d e m o c r a c y i s no so 
' d e m o c r a t i c ' as t h e name s u g g e s t s , ( 5 ) . B u l l o c k ( 6 ) c o n s i d e r e d i t 
u n l i k e l y t h a t e mployees w o u l d w i s h t o d i s c o n t i n u e t h e new s y s t e m 
o f b o a r d r e p r e s e n t a t i o n o n c e i t was s t a r t e d . However, t o a l l o w f o r 
s uch p o s s i b i l i t y B u l l o c k p r o p o s e d t h a t a f t e r f i v e y e a r s a u n i o n o r 
u n i o n s r e p r e s e n t i n g 20 p e r c e n t , o f t h e w o r k f o r c e s h o u l d be a l l o w e d 
t o r e q u e s t a b a l l o t t o d e c i d e upon t h e c o n t i n u a n c e o f t h e new s y s t e m , 
and f o r i t t o be d i s c o n t i n u e d t h e r e s h o u l d be a s i m p l e m a j o r i t y o f 
one t h i r d o f t h o s e e l i g i b l e t o v o t e a g a i n s t c o n t i n u a n c e . 
B u l l o c k a l s o recommended t h a t t h e r e s h o u l d be b e t t e r t r a d e 
u n i o n e d u c a t i o n so t h a t e m p l o y e e d i r e c t o r s w o u l d be p r o p e r l y e q u i p -
ped f o r t h e i r t a s k s . The p u r p o s e o f such e d u c a t i o n was t o " . . . 
e q u i p t h e e mployee r e p r e s e n t a t i v e s w i t h t h e n e c e s s a r y a b i l i t y t o 
t a k e p a r t i n t h e more t e c h n i c a l a s p e c t s o f t h e b o a r d ' s w o r k . F o r 
( 5 ) The B u l l o c k C o m m i t t e e was t o some e x t e n t r e s t r i c t e d by i t s 
t e r m s o f r e f e r e n c e . The M i n o r i t y R e p o r t , h o w e v e r , s u g g e s t e d t h a t 
e m p l o y e e d i r e c t o r s s h o u l d be e l e c t e d by a l l t h e e m p l o y e e s , and t h e 
i n s t i t u t i o n l i n k i n g t h e e m p l o y e e d i r e c t o r s and t h e w o r k f o r c e s h o u l d 
be an e m p l o y e e o r company c o u n c i l , w h i c h c o u n c i l w o u l d be a c o n s u l -
t a t i v e body s e p a r a t e f r o m t h e r e c o g n i s e d t r a d e u n i o n s . 
( 6 ) B u l l o c k R e p o r t , p a r a . 1 0 . 2 1 . 
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t h i s , some a c q u a i n t a n c e i s needed w i t h t h e p r e s e n t a t i o n o f f i n a n -
c i a l i n f o r m a t i o n , b a s i c e c o n o m i c s , management i n f o r m a t i o n and 
c o n t r o l s y s t e m s , some a s p e c t s o f company la w and so o n . " ( 7 ) 
F i f t h D i r e c t i v e 
The L a b o u r P a r t y i s c o m m i t t e d t o t h e B u l l o c k R e p o r t . However, 
t h e p r e s e n t Government i s o p p osed t o any c o m p u l s o r y i n t r o d u c t i o n o f 
e m p l o y e e p a r t i c i p a t i o n ( 8 ) , b u t e v e n t s a r e n o t e n t i r e l y i n i t s own 
h a n d s . The a c c e s s i o n o f t h e U n i t e d Kingdom t o t h e E u r o p e a n Economic 
C o m m u n i t i e s r e q u i r e d B r i t a i n t o h a r m o n i s e B r i t i s h company la w w i t h 
t h o s e o f o t h e r member s t a t e s ( 9 ) . I n i t i a l l y t h e E u r o p e a n Commission 
p r o p o s e d t h e i n t r o d u c t i o n o f t h e German t w o - t i e r model i n a l l EEC 
c o u n t r i e s ( 1 0 ) . B u t a f t e r a s e r i e s o f n e g o t i a t i o n s and c o n s u l t a t i o n , 
i n 1975 t h e E u r o p e a n C o m m i s s i o n recommended "a f r a m e w o r k w h i c h 
p r o v i d e s f o r t h e o b j e c t i v e s t o be r e a c h e d i n a way w h i c h l e a v e s 
d i s c r e t i o n t o t h e member s t a t e s as t o t h e p r e c i s e m o d e l s w h i c h t h e y 
may a d o p t . " ( 1 ) and i n March 1981 t h e L e g a l A f f a i r s C o m m i t t e e o f 
t h e E u r o p e a n Assembly s u g g e s t e d t h e f o l l o w i n g a l t e r n a t i v e s t o t h e 
E u r o p e a n Commission ( 2 ) : -
( 7 ) I b i d . , p a r a . 1 2 . 2 2 . 
( 8 ) The L i b e r a l s and S o c i a l D e m o c r a t s a p p r o v e o f t h e F i f t h D i r e c t i v e . 
( 9 ) See a l s o t h e D r a f t S t a t u t e on t h e European Company. 
( 1 0 ) D r a f t F i f t h D i r e c t i v e t o h a r m o n i s e Company Law i n Member S t a t e s 
( 1 9 7 2 ) . 
( 1 ) EEC C o m m i s s i o n , Employee P a r t i c i p a t i o n and Company S t r u c t u r e 
( 1 9 7 5 ) . 
( 2 ) The F i f t h D i r e c t i v e i s s c h e d u l e d t o be f i n a l i s e d by t h e C o u n c i l 
o f M i n i s t e r s i n September 1 9 8 1 . The p r e s e n t G o vernment i s o p p osed 
t o any c o m p u l s o r y i n t r o d u c t i o n . The F i f t h D i r e c t i v e d e r i v e s i t s 
l e g a l f o r c e f r o m A r t . 5 4 ( 3 ) ( g ) o f t h e T r e a t y o f Rome t h e r e l e v a n t 
t e r m s o f w h i c h r e a d as f o l l o w s : " . . . c o - o r d i n a t i n g t o t h e n e c e s -
s a r y e x t e n t t h e s a f e g u a r d s w h i c h , f o r t h e p r o t e c t i o n o f t h e i n t e r e s t s 
o f members and o t h e r s , a r e r e q u i r e d by member s t a t e s o f c o m p a n i e s 
o r f i r m s . . . w i t h a v i e w t o m a k i n g such s a f e g u a r d s e q u i v a l e n t 
t h r o u g h o u t t h e Community." I t i s d e b a t a b l e w h e t h e r t h e q u e s t i o n o f 
i n d u s t r i a l d emocracy f i t s c o m f o r t a b l y w i t h i n t h e A r t i c l e . I f t h e 
f i n a l v e r s i o n o f t h e F i f t h D i r e c t i v e i s u n a c c e p t a b l e t o and f o r c e d 
upon t h e U n i t e d Kingdom, t h e U n i t e d Kingdom w o u l d be e n t i t l e d t o 
c h a l l e n g e any c o n t e n t i o u s a r t i c l e s i n t h e F i f t h D i r e c t i v e as u l t r a 
v i r e s . See a l s o W. D a u b l e r ( 1 9 7 7 ) 14 C.M.L. Rev. 457. 
- 58 -
( i ) A s u p e r v i s o r y and management b o a r d w i t h e m p l o y e e s s l i g h t l y , 
u n d e r h a l f o f t h e d i r e c t o r s o f t h e s u p e r v i s o r y b o a r d . OR 
( i i ) A u n i t a r y b o a r d w h i c h i s o b l i g e d f r o m t i m e t o t i m e t o 
c o n s u l t w i t h a c o n s u l t a t i v e c o u n c i l on w h i c h e m p l o y e e s a r e r e p r e -
s e n t e d . 0R_ 
( i i i ) A c o n s u l t a t i o n s y s t e m d e r i v e d t h r o u g h a s y s t e m o f c o l -
l e c t i v e b a r g a i n i n g b u t w h i c h must i n v o l v e a s e c r e t b a l l o t when 
c h o o s i n g t h e employee r e p r e s e n t a t i v e s . 
What f i n a l v e r s i o n t h e F i f t h D i r e c t i v e w o u l d be i s c o n j e c t u r a l , 
b u t t h e p r e s s u r e f r o m t h e EEC has been t h e p r i n c i p a l r e a s o n f o r 
Government a c t i o n i n d i s c u s s i n g i n t r o d u c t i o n o f some f o r m o f b o a r d 
l e v e l e m ployee p a r t i c i p a t i o n i n l a r g e c ompanies ( 3 ) . 
The C h o i c e s 
A v i e w has been p u t f o r w a r d t h a t t h e i n t e r e s t s o f empl o y e e s 
a r e b e s t r e p r e s e n t e d by t h e d e v e l o p m e n t o f e x i s t i n g s t r u c t u r e s f o r 
c o l l e c t i v e b a r g a i n i n g o r c o n s u l t a t i o n (4)« I t i s p o i n t e d o u t t h a t 
one s h o u l d n o t l o s e s i g h t o f t h a t m a k i n g c o m p a r i s i o n s i n employee 
p a r t i c i p a t i o n i n d i f f e r e n t c o u n t r i e s i s b o t h d i f f i c u l t and d a n g e r -
ous ( 5 ) b e c a u s e , among o t h e r t h i n g s , one c a n n o t u s e f u l l y examine 
any p a r t i c u l a r a s p e c t o f law o f a c o u n t r y a p a r t f r o m i t s i n s t i t u - ' 
t i o n a l and s o c i a l c o n t e x t i n c l u d i n g i n t h e case o f employee p a r t i -
c i p a t i o n , t h e p r a c t i c a l o p e r a t i o n o f c o l l e c t i v e b a r g a i n i n g , o t h e r 
f o r m s o f w o r k e r r e p r e s e n t a t i o n , t h e s t r u c t u r e and f u n c t i o n s o f u n i o n s 
and e m p l o y e r a s s o c i a t i o n s , t h e p o l i t i c a l s i t u a t i o n and t h e r o l e o f 
g o v e r n m e n t , and t h e i m p a c t o f s o c i a l p r a c t i c e s , a t t i t u d e s and v a l u e s 
and b e c a u s e i t i s so easy t o f a i l t o r e c o g n i z e o r c o r r e c t l y i n t e r -
p r e t i m p o r t a n t e l e m e n t s o f t h e c o n t e x t , and one may p a r t i c u l a r l y 
( 3 ) See Madden, p.44 7. 
( 4 ) See g e n e r a l l y S. S i m i t i s ( 1 9 7 5 ) 38 K,L.R. 1 . 
( 5 ) See a l s o B u l l o c k R e p o r t , p a r a . 6.48. 
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f a i l t o sense d e e p l y - r o o t e d b u t u n a r t i c u l a t e d a s s u m p t i o n s o r a t t i -
t u d e s i n an u n f a m i l i a r s o c i e t y . M a k i n g c o m p a r i s i o n s o n l y h e l p s us 
b e t t e r u n d e r s t a n d o u r own s y s t e m by s e e i n g i t f r o m a d i f f e r e n t 
p e r s p e c t i v e so t h a t we may become c o n s c i o u s o f gaps and weaknesses 
o f o u r s y s t e m w h i c h f a m i l i a r i t y has l e d us t o o v e r l o o k and one 
s h o u l d b e a r t h i s i n mind when one a d v o c a t e s t h e i n t r o d u c t i o n o f 
t h e German model t o o u r c o u n t r y , a l t h o u g h w i t h m o d i f i c a t i o n s t o 
s u i t t h e p a r t i c u l a r needs and c o n d i t i o n s o f o u r s o c i e t y . 
A c c o r d i n g l y t h a t t h e German s y s t e m seems t o have been a s u c c e s s 
i n GermanY'does n o t n e c e s s a r i l y mean t h e German model w o u l d work w e l l 
i n t h t U n i t e d Kingdom b e c a u s e t h e r e a r e s u f f i c i e n t d i f f e r e n c e s i n 
t h e p a t t e r n s o f i n d u s t r i a l and t r a d e u n i o n o r g a n i z a t i o n i n German 
t o make any d i r e c t t r a n s f e r o f t h e German model t o o t h e r c o u n t r i e s 
i m p r a c t i c a l . C o - d e t e r m i n a t i o n i n Germany i s based on a l o n g -
e s t a b l i s h e d and p r e c i s e d i v i s i o n o f power b e t w e e n a s u p e r v i s o r y and 
an e x e c u t i v e b o a r d ( 6 ) . u n t h e c o n t r a r y t h e most s i g n i f i c a n t f e a t -
u r e o f l a b o u r r e l a t i o n s i n B r i t a i n i s t h a t t h e r e has g e n e r a l l y been 
a p r e f e r e n c e f o r c o l l e c t i v e b a r g a i n i n g b e t w e e n t r a d e u n i o n s and 
e m p l o y e r s o v e r l e g a l s o l u t i o n as a method o f r e g u l a t i n g j o b s . The 
t r a d i t i o n a l r e l i a n c e upon c o l l e c t i v e b a r g a i n i n g does n o t r e s t upon 
some p h i l o s o p h i c a l b a s i s , s uch as 'the a b s t e n t i o n o f t h e law' b u t 
s i m p l y on p r a c t i c a l e x p e r i e n c e . D u r i n g t h e c r i t i c a l p e r i o d s o f 
t h e i r d e v e l o p m e n t B r i t i s h t r a d e u n i o n s have f o u n d t h a t t h e y c o u l d 
w i n more economic g a i n s t h r o u g h c o l l e c t i v e i n d u s t r i a l s t r e n g t h 
t h a n t h r o u g h r e l i a n c e upon t h e l a w . H i s t o r i c a l l y t h e w o r k e r s were 
a n t a g o n i s t i c t o w a r d s t h e j u d i c i a r y . The j u s t i c e s o f t h e peace, 
who f i x e d wages f o r n e a r l y 500 y e a r s and f i n e d and i m p r i s o n e d w o r k -
e r s f o r b r e a c h o f c o n t r a c t u n t i l 1375, were n e a r l y a l w a y s l a n d o w n e r s 
( 6 ) Hadden, p.448. 
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and e m p l o y e r s . The s o c i a l o r i g i n s and j u d i c i a l a t t i t u d e s o f t h e 
H i g h C o u r t were a l s o p e r c e i v e d as b e i n g f u n d a m e n t a l l y a n t i - t r a d e 
u n i o n . The common law r u l e s l a i d down by t h e j u d g e s d i d l i t t l e t o 
r e d r e s s t h e b a s i c i n e q u a l i t y o f t h e i n d i v i d u a l e mployment r e l a t i o n -
s h i p , i n w h i c h t h e p r o p e r t y r i g h t s o f t h e e m p l o y e r f a r o u t w e i g h t h e 
b a r g a i n i n g power o f t h e i n d i v i d u a l w o r k e r . T h i s h o s t i l i t y t o t h e 
o r d i n a r y c o u r t s i s r e f l e c t e d , even nowadays, i n t h e e s t a b l i s h m e n t 
o f t r i p a r t i t e i n d u s t r i a l t r i b u n a l s , c o n s i s t i n g o f a l a w y e r , an 
e m p l o y e r and a t r a d e u n i o n i s t , t o d e a l w i t h l e g a l d i s p u t e s i n t h i s 
f i e l d ( 7 ) . 
I t i s a r g u e d t h a t i t i s b e t t e r t o use t r a d i t i o n a l means f o r 
d e a l i n g w i t h i n d u s t r i a l c o n f l i c t s b e c a u s e e x o e r i e n c e shows t h a t 
c o l l e c t i v e a g r e e m e n t s a p p e a r t o be an a d e q u a t e means f o r i n t r o d u c i n g 
p a r t i c i p a t i o n . I t i s e a s i e r t o e x t e n d t h e j u r i s d i c t i o n o f an a l -
r e a d y e x i s t i n g body t h a n t o i n t r o d u c e and e n f o r c e new s t r u c t u r e s . 
B e s i d e s t h e r e a r e d i f f i c u l t i e s . As t h e l a w now s t a n d s , a l l d i r e c -
t o r s ( w h i c h w o u l d i n c l u d e e mployee d i r e c t o r s ) s h o u l d t a k e t h e p r o s -
p e r i t y o f t h e company i n t o a c c o u n t and c o n s i d e r a l w a y s t h e company's 
b e s t i n t e r e s t s i r r e s p e c t i v e l y o f any p o s s i b l y c o n f l i c t i n g p a r t i c u l a r 
i n t e r e s t s . Employees may t h u s e l e c t r e p r e s e n t a t i v e s ; n e v e r t h e l e s s 
t h e y c a n n o t e x p e c t them t o f o l l o w t h e i r i n s t r u c t i o n s o r w i s h e s . I t 
i s up t o t h e r e p r e s e n t a t i v e s t o d e c i d e w h e t h e r t h e e x p e c t a t i o n s o f 
t h e e m p l o y e e s who e l e c t e d them a r e c o m p a t i b l e w i t h t h e company's 
b e s t i n t e r e s t s o r n o t . F u r t h e r m o r e , c o m p a n i e s t h e p o l i c y o f w h i c h 
i s d e t e r m i n e d by e m p l o y e r s ' and e m p l o y e e s ' r e p r e s e n t a t i v e s j o i n t l y 
may g r a d u a l l y t e n d t o a c t o u t s i d e t h e c o l l e c t i v e b a r g a i n i n g s y s t e m ( 8 ) 
They w i l l t r y t o f i x t h e i r own wages. B o a r d r e p r e s e n t a t i o n t h u s 
( 7 ) F o r c o l l e c t i v e b a r g a i n i n g , see g e n e r a l l y C D . D r a k e , L a b o u r 
Law ( 2 n d ed.) pp.273-276; C r o n i n and G r i m e , L a b o u r Law ( 1 9 7 0 ) 
pp.303-318. 
( 8 ) S. S i m i t i s ( 1 9 7 5 ) 38 M.L.R. 1 , 20. 
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l e a d s t o s e l f - g o v e r n i n g c o r p o r a t e wage p o l i c y . . Some em p l o y e e s may 
welcome such phenomenon, b u t such c o m p a n i e s w i l l g r a d u a l l y be i s o -
l a t e d . As a r e s u l t t h e y r i s k p r e v e n t i n g t r a d e u n i o n s , i n t h e l o n g 
r u n , f r o m d e f e n d i n g a b r a n c h , r e g i o n a l o r even n a t i o n a l wage p o l i c y . 
T h e r e f o r e any f o r m o f b o a r d r e p r e s e n t a t i o n w o u l d c h a l l e n g e c o l l e c t i v e 
b a r g a i n i n g . The r i g h t t o s t r i k e i s a l s o a f f e c t e d . I n f a c t , i t i s 
a r g u e d , i f b o a r d r e p r e s e n t a t i o n i s t r e a t e d n o t o n l y as a r i g h t t o 
t a k e p a r t i n m a k i n g b o a r d d e c i s i o n s b u t a l s o as a d u t y t o a c c e p t 
and d e f e n d b o a r d d e c i s i o n s , s t r i k e a c t i v i t i e s may become i n c r e a s i n g l y 
d u b i o u s . The u l t i m a t e s a n c t i o n b e h i n d t h e c o l l e c t i v e b a r g a i n i n g 
m a c h i n e r y i s t h e t h r e a t and e x e r c i s e o f t h e r i g h t t o s t r i k e ( 9 ) and 
any s u g g e s t i o n w h i c h t a k e s away t h i s s a n c t i o n l e a d s t h e r e f o r e t o a 
r e c o n s i d e r a t i o n o f t h e mechanisms o f f e r e d by l a b o u r l a w . I t i s s u g -
g e s t e d ( 1 0 ) t h a t b o a r d r e p r e s e n t a t i o n s h o u l d be seen as an a u x i l i a r y 
o r a s e c o n d a r y mechanism, b u t c o l l e c t i v e a g r e e m e n t s and n o t employee 
p a r t i c i p a t i o n schemes d e t e r m i n e t h e p o s i t i o n o f t h e e m p l o y e e s . Hence 
i t i s a l s o up t o t h e s e a g r e e m e n t s t o c o n t r o l c o r p o r a t e p l a n n i n g i n 
f a v o u r o f e m p l o y e e s . C o n s e q u e n t l y i t i s n o t n e c e s s a r y t o r e s o r t t o 
employee p a r t i c i p a t i o n schemes e x c e p t i n c o n n e c t i o n w i t h m a t t e r s 
w h i c h e v i d e n t l y c a n n o t be coped w i t h by c o l l e c t i v e a g r e e m e n t s . I t 
i s a r g u e d ( l ) t h a t t h e u s e f u l n e s s o f c o l l e c t i v e b a r g a i n i n g has been 
u n d e r - e s t i m a t e d . The l a r g e r t h e r e f o r e i s t h e a r e a o f c o l l e c t i v e 
b a r g a i n i n g , t h e l e s s n e c e s s a r y w i l l be t h e i n t r o d u c t i o n o f a u x i l i a r y 
means. 
I t i s , h o w e v e r , a c c e n t e d t h a t c o l l e c t i v e b a r g a i n i n g i s a t p r e -
s e n t i n a d e q u a t e t o c o v e r t h e p r o c e s s o f c o r p o r a t e p l a n n i n g . I t i s 
by and l a r g e c o n f i n e d t o t h e t r a d i t i o n a l wages and h o u r s i s s u e s o f 
( 9 ) Iv.B. C r e i g h t o n ( 1977) 4 B r i t . J.L. & Soc. 1 , 14. 
( 1 0 ) S. S i m i t i s ( 1 9 7 5 ) 38 M.L.R. 1 , 2 1 . 
( 1 ) S. S i m i t i s ( 1 9 7 5 ) 38 K.L.R. 1,21. 
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i n d u s t r i a l r e l a t i o n s and o n l y e x c e p t i o n a l l y e x t e n d s t o c o v e r i s s u e s 
such as i n v e s t m e n t and p r i c i n g p o l i c y . 
I t i s o b s e r v e d t h a t t h e p u b l i c c o r p o r a t i o n s o f n a t i o n a l i s e d 
i n d u s t r y a r e a l l u n d e r l e g a l o b l i g a t i o n s t o seek n e g o t i a t i o n s w i t h 
t r a d e u n i o n s , b u t t h e s e d u t i e s a r e , f o r v a r i o u s r e a s o n s , s c a r c e l y 
e n f o r c e a b l e i n t h e c o u r t s . So i f i n d u s t r i a l d e mocracy i s e f f e c t e d 
t h r o u g h e x t e n d e d c o l l e c t i v e b a r g a i n i n g , i t i s p r o p o s e d t h a t i t i s 
n o t enough t o j u s t seek n e g o t i a t i o n s ; t h e law s h o u l d s p e c i f y t h a t 
t h e r e i s a d u t y t o b a r g a i n and c o n s u l t w i t h employee r e p r e s e n t a t i v e s . 
B e s i d e s t h i s , t h e l a w s h o u l d a l s o s e t o u t t h e a r e a s o r t o p i c s on 
w h i c h c o n s u l t a t i o n o r b a r g a i n i n g must t a k e p l a c e . The a r e a s o r 
t o p i c s s h o u l d i n c l u d e new w o r k i n g m e t h o d s , d i s m i s s a l s , e m p l o y e e s ' 
p e n s i o n r i g h t s , s u b s t a n t i a l c l o s u r e s and changes i n t h e p l a n t , 
r e d u n d a n c y e t c . The a p p r o p r i a t e M i n i s t e r s h o u l d be g i v e n power t o 
v a r y , a f t e r c o n s u l t a t i o n s , t h e l i s t o f r e q u i r e d t o p i c s o r a r e a s . 
I n o r d e r t o h e l p e x t e n d t h e p r o p o s e d r a n g e o f a r e a s c o v e r e d i n t h e 
p r e s e n t f o r m s o f c o l l e c t i v e b a r g a i n i n g , t h e l a w s h o u l d r e c o g n i s e 
and e n f o r c e t h e r i g h t o f e m p l o y e e s and o f t h e i r r e p r e s e n t a t i v e s t o 
i n f o r m a t i o n a b o u t t h e p r o p o s e d p a r t i c u l a r a r e a s o r t o p i c s f r o m 
e m p l o y e r s . Those who s e l l l a b o u r t o t h e company a r e e n t i t l e d t o 
know a b o u t i t s a f f a i r s . I f t h e c r e d i t o r who l e n d s money t o t h e 
company i s e n t i t l e d t o d i s c l o s u r e , so i s t h e e mployee who b r i n g s 
h i s l a b o u r t o t h e company. The l i s t o f c o m p u l s o r y d i s c l o s u r e s h o u l d 
i n c l u d e , i n t e r a l i a , l a b o u r c o s t a g a i n s t o u t p u t , t h e number and t y p e 
o f e m p l o y e e s e m p l o y e d , p a y r o l l , e t c 
I n t h e U n i t e d Kingdom t h o s e who seek i n d u s t r i a l d e m o c r a c y 
t h r o u g h an e x t e n s i o n o f c o l l e c t i v e b a r g a i n i n g and a g r e a t e r c o m p u l -
s o r y d i s c l o s u r e o f i n f o r m a t i o n a d v o c a t e e i t h e r j o i n t d e c i s i o n - m a k i n g 
w i t h e m p l o y e e s r e p r e s e n t e d s o l e l y by t r a d e u n i o n s o r e x t e n s i o n o f 
c o n s u l t a t i v e m a c h i n e r y , e.g. t h r o u g h w o r k s c o u n c i l s r e p r e s e n t i n g a l l 
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e m p l o y e e s r a t h e r t h a n t h r o u g h t r a d e u n i o n s ( 2 ) . 
A n o t h e r v i e w ( 3 ) i s t h a t employee p a r t i c i p a t i o n i s more l i k e l y 
t o be a c h i e v e d by g i v i n g e m p l o y e e r e p r e s e n t a t i v e s e f f e c t i v e powers 
o f s u p e r v i s i o n and v e t o on s p e c i f i c and l i m i t e d i s s u e s ' r a t h e r t h a n 
by p u r s u i n g t h e more a t t r a c t i v e g o a l o f j o i n t employee/management 
c o n t r o l on a l l issues' a t b o a r d l e v e l . 
A t h i r d a l t e r n a t i v e o f e m p l o y e e p a r t i c i p a t i o n w o u l d be r e p r e -
s e n t a t i o n o f e mployees on t h e b o a r d . I t i s a r g u e d t h a t , b e s i d e s 
t h e s o c i a l r e s p o n s i b i l i t y a r g u m e n t , i n d u s t r i a l r e l a t i o n s w o u l d 
i m p r o v e and t h a t p r o d u c t i v i t y w o u l d i n c r e a s e as a r e s u l t ( 4 ) . 
Employee r e p r e s e n t a t i o n on t h e b o a r d w o u l d n o t o n l y i m p r o v e e f f i c i -
e n c y b u t a r e i n d e e d e s s e n t i a l t o d e v e l o p i n g new f o r m s o f c o - o p e r a t i o n 
b e t w e e n l a b o u r and c a p i t a l , w h i c h a r e needed i f B r i t a i n i s t o o v e r -
come i t s c u r r e n t i n d u s t r i a l and e c o n o m i c d i f f i c u l t i e s . B o a r d r e p r e -
s e n t a t i o n must n o t n e c e s s a r i l y c o n f 1 i c t w i t h c o l l e c t i v e b a r g a i n i n g ; 
t h e p r o p o s e d change w o u l d be i n t h e i n t e r e s t s o f t h e e f f i c i e n c y o f 
c o m p a n i e s ( 5 ) and t h e economy and o f t h e s a t i s f a c t i o n o f e mployees 
( and g r a d u a l l y t h e c o m m u n i t y ) . A t p r e s e n t i t i s b e l i e v e d t h a t much 
i n d u s t r i a l u n r e s t i s c a u s e d by t h e l a c k o f c o m m u n i c a t i o n between 
e m p l o y e e s and management. D e c i s i o n s a r e a r r i v e d a t w i t h o u t c o n s u l -
t a t i o n o f e m p l o y e e s ' r e p r e s e n t a t i v e s , and a r e f r e q u e n t l y announced 
w i t h o u t any a t t e m p t t o e x p l a i n what were t h e c o n s i d e r a t i o n s w h i c h 
l e d t o t h o s e d e c i s i o n s . Once a d e c i s i o n has been r e a c h e d , i t i s 
d i f f i c u l t f o r t r a d e u n i o n s t o p e r s u a d e e m p l o y e r s t o r e c o n s i d e r i n 
t h e l i g h t o f t h e e m p l o y e e s ' i n t e r e s t s , u n l e s s t h e r e i s a work t o 
r u l e , a s t r i k e o r s i m i l a r i n d u s t r i a l a c t i o n t o p r o d u c e a d i r e c t 
( 2 ) See Gower, p.69. 
( 3 ) E.g. see Hadden, p.484. 
( 4 ) I b i d . , p.16 0„ 
( 5 ) I b i d . 
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c o n f r o n t a t i o n o The employees might be more w i l l i n g to c o - o p e r a t e 
w i t h management i f t h e y knew t h a t t h e i r i n t e r e s t s had been 
s e r i o u s l y c o n s i d e r e d by the board o f d i r e c t o r s a t t h e time when 
the d e c i s i o n s were made D B r i t i s h i n d u s t r i a l r e l a t i o n s have a 
long h i s t o r y , but many of t h e i r h i s t o r i c f e a t u r e s have proved 
unworkable i n our modern society» 
The T r a d e s Union C o n g r e s s put f o r w a r d a n o t h e r proposal„ 
They s u g g e s t t h a t r e p r e s e n t a t i o n o f employees on t h e board be 
a l e g a l r i g h t which a r e c o g n i s e d and i n dependent t r a d e u n i o n 
may demand but s e l e c t i o n o f r e p r e s e n t a t i v e s must be through 
t r a d e u n i o n m a c h i n e r y ( 6 ) 0 
European E x p e r i e n c e 
I n t h e U n i t e d Kingdom t h e r e has been l i t t l e l e g a l p r o g r e s s 
towards g i v i n g employees any r i g h t to p a r t i c i p a t e i n management 
o r d e c i s i o n making ( 7 ) Q 
I n o t h e r c o u n t r i e s more p r o g r e s s has been made 0 Co-
d e t e r m i n a t i o n i n West Germany has r e a c h e d the most s o p h i s t i c a t e d 
l e v e l and i s imposed through two and sometimes t h r e e s e p a r a t e 
i n s t i t u t i o n s o A Works C o u n c i l ( 8 ) i s r e q u i r e d i n e a c h company 
employing more t h a n 5 persons<> T h i s C o u n c i l must meet management 
monthly to d i s c u s s problems and the C o u n c i l makes r e p o r t s to 
employees r e g u l a r l y , , The C o u n c i l has t h e r i g h t to v e t o o v e r a 
wide range of management a c t i o n s r a n g i n g from pay and h o l i d a y s 
to h e a l t h and s a f e t y p r e c a u t i o n s and the engagement o f new s t a f f o 
i6) B u l l o c k R e p o r t , p a r a c 4 0 3 o 
( 7 ) T h e r e has been much a c t i v i t y but l i t t l e p r o g r e s s r e g a r d i n g 
t h e F i f t h D i r e c t i v e , and i n Cmnd„ 7 6 5 4 ( 1 9 7 9 ) t h e government s t a t e s 
t h a t no u s e f u l purpose would be s e r v e d by i n t r o d u c i n g l e g i s l a -
t i o n r e q u i r i n g the i n c l u s i o n of d e t a i l e d employment and o t h e r 
n o n = f i n a n c i a l i n f o r m a t i o n i n company accounts„ The government i s 
now c o n s i d e r i n g a d r a f t r e p o r t p r e p a r e d by t h e Dutch r a p p o r t e u r 
( G e u r t s e n ) o 
( 8 ) See g e n e r a l l y Hadden, p p 0 4 7 4 - 6 „ 
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I n c a s e o f d i s a g r e e m e n t t h e r e i s p r o v i s i o n f o r a r b i t r a t i o n . , 
F u r t h e r t o p i c s r e q u i r e d i s c u s s i o n ; t h e s e i n c l u d e d i s m i s s a l o Where 
t h e company employs more th a n 100, a permanent economic committee 
of between 3 and 7 employees must be formed 0 The employer p a r t i -
c i p a t e s i n t h e p r o c e e d i n g s b ut i s not a member. T h i s committee 
must a g r e e w i t h any proposed change i n the economic c i r c u m s t a n c e s 
o f t h e p l a n t such a s i t s s a l e o r c l o s u r e , . Once a g a i n t h e y go to 
a r b i t r a t i o n i n c a s e o f d i s a g r e e m e n t . T h i r d form w h i c h c o -
d e t e r m i n a t i o n t a k e s i s through t h e s u p e r v i s o r y board of t he 
company,, Where a company has more th a n 2,000 employees o r i s 
engaged i n t he mining o r i r o n and s t e e l i n d u s t r i e s , i t must have 
a s u p e r v i s o r y board,, Where such a board i s o b l i g a t o r y , then h a l f 
o f t h e members a r e a p p o i n t e d by the s h a r e h o l d e r s and t he o t h e r 
h a l f by the employees,, The f u n c t i o n o f such a board i s to s u p e r -
v i s e and a p p o i n t t h e management which i s c a r r i e d o u t through a 
management boardo Where a company employs 500 to 2,000 employees, 
one t h i r d c o - d e t e r m i n a t i o n i s r e q u i r e d w i t h one t h i r d o f the 
members o f t h e s u p e r v i s o r y board a p p o i n t e d by t h e employees and 
two t h i r d s by the shareholders« I n p r a c t i c e w o r k e r s tend not to 
be r e p r e s e n t e d by t h e d i r e c t e l e c t i o n of t h e i r own r e p r e s e n t a -
t i v e s and t he u n i o n s u s u a l l y a p p o i n t s e m i - p r o f e s s i o n a l s u p e r -
v i s o r y d i r e c t o r s (9)„ 
Numerous s u r v e y s and r e p o r t s ( 1 0 ) i n Germany have r e p o r t e d 
a s f o l l o w s ; 
Most German w o r k e r s a r e happy w i t h the German system,. The 
fo r m a l s t r u c t u r e s f o r c o - d e t e r m i n a t i o n have r e s u l t e d i n the 
development o f a much more e x t e n s i v e i n f o r m a l network o f communi-
( 9 ) See g e n e r a l l y H„ Wiedemann (1980) Am. J„ Comp 0 L„ 79; Mertens 
And Schanze (1979) 2 J c Comp 0 Corp„ L 0 & Sees,, Regs* 75„ 
(10) Hadden, p p 0 4 5 5 - 7 0 
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c a t i o n between managment and employee r e p r e s e n t a t i v e s a t a l l 
l e v e l s of t h e company. The r e q u i r e m e n t of j o i n t d i s c u s s i o n on 
f o r m a l l y c o n s t i t u t e d b o d i e s a p p e a r s to have g i v e n way, both a t 
t h e s u p e r v i s o r y board and the works c o u n c i l l e v e l , to an i n f o r m a l 
s e a r c h f o r c o n s e n s u s o r compromise between t h e l e a d e r s on each 
s i d e , w i t h the r e s u l t t h a t p r o c e e d i n g s a t the meetings t h e m s e l v e s 
have become l e s s s i g n i f i c a n t . The s u c c e s s o f c o - o p e r a t i o n r e s u l t s 
from t h e r e c e i p t o f c o m p r e h e n s i v e i n f o r m a t i o n by t h e p l a n t r e p r e -
s e n t a t i v e s and i n the o p p o r t u n i t y to d i s c u s s w i t h management a t 
t h e e a r l i e s t p o s s i b l e s t a g e a l l problems of the p l a n t and t h e 
company. Most o f t h e d e c i s i o n s a t s u p e r v i s o r y board l e v e l a r e 
unanimous, l a r g e l y a s a r e s u l t o f p r i o r n e g o t i a t i o n between t h e 
p a r t i e s . 
I t i s a l s o r e p o r t e d t h a t i n some c a s e s t h e system has l e d 
to d e l a y s i n d e c i s i o n - m a k i n g w h i l e t h e r e p r e s e n t a t i o n s o f employee 
r e p r e s e n t a t i v e s a r e d e a l t w i t h and some d i r e c t o r s have g r e a t e r 
problems i n p r e p a r i n g major i n v e s t m e n t p l a n s ( 1 ) . W h i l e t h i s may 
be l o oked a t as some d e f e c t , on the o t h e r hand t h i s i s e x a c t l y 
what t h e system i s f o r . Management p l a n s s h o u l d be s u b j e c t e d to 
more s c r u t i n y as t o t h e i r i m pact on t he w o r k f o r c e and a b a l a n c e 
has to be s t r u c k between t e c h n i c a l and economic c o n s i d e r a t i o n s 
and the demands and e x p e c t a t i o n s of employees,* 
Although i t can n o t be proved t h a t c o - d e t e r m i n a t i o n as such 
has been any d i r e c t c o n t r i b u t i o n to the s u c c e s s o f t he German 
economy, but i t i s d i f f i c u l t to deny t h e i m p l i c a t i o n t h a t i t 
has p l a y e d some p a r t and t h a t i t i s a more e f f e c t i v e method o f 
d e a l i n g w i t h the i n h e r e n t c o n f l i c t s w i t h i n an e n t e r p r i s e than 
t h e B r i t i s h model of a r m s - l e n g t h c o l l e c t i v e b a r g a i n i n g . I t a p p e a r s 
( 1 ) Hadden, p.456. 
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t h a t t h e German system h a s o p e r a t e d s u c c e s s f u l l y f o r about 
t h i r t y y e a r s ( 2 ) . 
The German sy s t e m h a s been w i d e l y f o l l o w e d , though w i t h 
v a r i a t i o n s o H o l l a n d i n 1971 i n t r o d u c e d a s y s t e m whereby the 
s u p e r v i s o r y b o a r d s o f i t s l a r g e r companies w i l l e v e n t u a l l y be 
made up of members approved both by t h e s h a r e h o l d e r s and by the 
employees a c t i n g through t h e works c o u n c i l s - The o b j e c t of t h i s 
was t o a v o i d t h e d i v i s i v e e f f e c t thought to be c h a r a c t e r i s t i c 
o f t h e German model ( 3 ) 8 
F r a n c e , i n 1966, i n t r o d u c e d an o p t i o n f o r companies t o 
adopt a t w o - t i e r s t r u c t u r e , but i t i s l e a r n e d t h a t few have done 
s o . P r o p o s a l s were made i n 1975 f o r a wide v a r i e t y o f c o r p o r a t e 
forms so as to f a c i l i t a t e employee r e p r e s e n t a t i o n a t v a r i o u s 
l e v e l s * But a f o r m a l t w o - t i e r board i s not an e s s e n t i a l 
p r e c o n d i t i o n f o r employee d i r e c t o r s ( 4 ) , 
The N e t h e r l a n d s has r e v i s e d t h e i r company law so a s to 
d i s t i n g u i s h l a r g e companies from s m a l l o n e s . T h e i r c o - d e t e r m i n a -
t i o n r u l e s a r e d i f f e r e n t from the German r u l e s i n some i m p o r t a n t 
ways. Any c o r p o r a t i o n w h i c h has a t l e a s t 100 employees must 
have a Works C o u n c i l w h i c h must be c o n s u l t e d on p l a n s a f f e c t i n g 
employment i n a g e n e r a l way, s u c h as mergers, c l o s u r e s , e x p a n s i o n 
e t c . The p r i o r c o n s e n t o f t h e Works C o u n c i l must be o b t a i n e d 
i n t h e f i e l d o f w o r k i n g c o n d i t i o n s , i n c l u d i n g h e a l t h and s a f e t y 0 
I f , i n a d d i t i o n to e mploying 100 p e o p l e t h e company has n e t 
a s s e t s o f £1% m i l l i o n , t h e n i t must have a s u p e r v i s o r y b o a r d . 
The d u t i e s o f t h i s board c o r r e s p o n d w i t h the German p o s i t i o n 
b u t t h e r e i s an i n t e r e s t i n g d i f f e r e n c e i n the way t h e board i s 
appointed,. I n i t i a l l y t h e board i s a p p o i n t e d by the s h a r e h o l d e r s 
( 2 ) Hadden, p e 4 4 7 . 
( 3 ) Gower, p o 7 0 o 
( 4 ) I b i d . 
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and r e p l a c e m e n t s a r e a p p o i n t e d b y t h e Board i t s e l f 0 Both the 
s h a r e h o l d e r s and the works c o u n c i l , however, have the r i g h t to 
make and v e t o nominations., 
Sweden has r e c e n t l y p r o v i d e d f o r m i n o r i t y r e p r e s e n t a t i o n 
of employees on the u n i t a r y b o a r d s o f i t s l a r g e r companies (5)„ 
Denmark has i n t r o d u c e d a s y s t e m which i s h a l f - w a y between 
the u n i t a r y and t h e t w o - t i e r ( 6 ) 0 
Proposed Form o f P a r t i c i p a t i o n 
I t i s u n l i k e l y t h a t t h e i n t e r e s t i n the i d e a o f employee 
p a r t i c i p a t i o n w i l l go away b e c a u s e the U n i t e d Kingdom have j o i n e d 
t h e EEC and most c o u n t r i e s i n Western Europe have some form 
of i n d u s t r i a l democracy ( 7 ) « I t i s u n l i k e l y t h a t a German 
Works C o u n c i l o r i t s e q u i v a l e n t i n c o u n t r i e s a d o p t i n g t h e 
German model would p e r m i t a s u b s t a n t i a l employing company to 
merge w i t h , o r be a c q u i r e d by a U n i t e d Kingdom company u n l e s s 
the U n i t e d Kingdom company was p r e p a r e d to g r a n t c o - d e t e r m i n a t i o n 
r i g h t S o An example of t h i s a c t u a l l y happening was t h e R o y a l 
Dutch S t e e l w o r k s merger where the German s i d e f o r c e d the Dutch 
to s e t up c o - d e t e r m i n a t i o n i n t h e Dutch p a r e n t company even 
though i t took p l a c e b e f o r e t h e i n t r o d u c t i o n of c o - d e t e r m i n a t i o n 
i n t o Dutch lawo 
As to t h e c h o i c e between a t w o - t i e r and a u n i t a r y board, 
H o l l a n d , Belgium, Sweden and Denmark ( 8 ) have based t h e i r i n t r o -
d u c t i o n of employee r e p r e s e n t a t i v e s on the German model 0 But i n 
each c a s e , t h e r e have been s u b s t a n t i a l m o d i f i c a t i o n s t o t h e 
f o r m a l t w o - t i e r German s t r u c t u r e t o r e f l e c t the c u r r e n t p r a c t i c e 
and o r g a n i z a t i o n of management and u n i o n s 0 Under the t w o - t i e r 
( 5 ) Gower, p o 7 0 o 
( 6 ) I b i d o 
( 7 ) See Wo B o C r e i g h t o n ( 1 9 7 7 ) 4 Brit„ J o L e & S o c c 1 , 1 - 2 ; 
B u l l o c k R e p o r t , p a r a Q 3<>13 and C o n c l u s i o n , p a r a 0 8 C 
( 8 ) Hadden, p 0 4 5 8 0 
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s t r u c t u r e , day-to-day management i s v e s t e d i n an e x e c u t i v e o r 
management board which i s a p p o i n t e d by, and r e s p o n s i b l e t o , a 
s u p e r v i s o r y board which a l s o d e t e r m i n e s m a t t e r s o f fundamental 
p o l i c y 0 The s u p e r v i s o r y board c o n s i s t s of r e p r e s e n t a t i v e s o f t h e 
s h a r e h o l d e r s and employees,. The F i f t h D r a f t D i r e c t i v e s ( 9 ) 
s u g g e s t a c a t a l o g u e o f measures on which t h e e x e c u t i v e board i s 
bound to c o n s u l t and o b t a i n the a u t h o r i s a t i o n o f the s u p e r v i s o r y 
b o a r d . The c a t a l o g u e i n c l u d e s ( i ) t h e c l o s u r e o r t r a n s f e r of 
th e u n d e r t a k i n g o r o f a s u b s t a n t i a l p a r t of i t ; ( i i ) s u b s t a n t i a l 
c u r t a i l m e n t o r e x t e n s i o n of t he a c t i v i t i e s o f t h e u n d e r t a k i n g ; 
( i i i ) s u b s t a n t i a l o r g a n i s a t i o n a l changes w i t h i n t h e u n d e r t a k i n g ; 
and ( i v ) e s t a b l i s h m e n t o f l o n g - t e r m c o - o p e r a t i o n w i t h o t h e r 
u n d e r t a k i n g s o r t h e t e r m i n a t i o n t h e r e o f . 
I t c a n be argued t h a t t h e u n i t a r y board s y s t e m i n t h e U n i t e d 
Kingdom was c r e a t e d a t a time when d i r e c t o r s were n o r m a l l y 
e n t r e p r e n e u r s and were i n t e r e s t e d b a s i c a l l y o n l y i n p r o f i t s 
f o r t h e m s e l v e s . I t i s not s u i t a b l e f o r n o n - e x e c u t i v e d i r e c t o r s , 
p a r t i c u l a r l y f o r employee d i r e c t o r s . I t has been argued t h a t 
t h e u n i t a r y board r e j e c t s t h e l o g i c of modern o r g a n i s a t i o n . 
The d i s s o c i a t i o n of t h e o v e r a l l o b j e c t i v e s , p o l i c i e s and c o n t r o l 
a f f o r d s a c l e a r e r check and e n a b l e s n o n - e x e c u t i v e d i r e c t o r s , 
whether employees o r n o t , to make a more m e a n i n g f u l c o n t r i b u t i o n 
than when d e b a t i n g day-to-day problems w i t h e x e c u t i v e d i r e c t o r s 
who have s p e n t h o u r s o r days on t he problems and t h e background. 
The m i n o r i t y B u l l o c k r e p o r t c o n s i d e r e d t h a t the i n t r o d u c t i o n o f 
employee d i r e c t o r s on to t h e main board o f a company would l e a d 
to t h e d i l u t i o n of management e x p e r t i s e and the c o n f u s i o n o f 
o b j e c t i v e s . T h e i r recommendation was t h a t any employee 
( 9 ) See C. M. S c h m i t t h o f f (1973) J . B . L . 312, 320. 
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r e p r e s e n t a t i o n s h o u l d be on a s u p e r v i s o r y b o a r d . Such a s u p e r -
v i s o r y board, where e s t a b l i s h e d , would not i n v o l v e i t s e l f w i t h 
d e t a i l e d d e c i s i o n making of e x i s t i n g b o a r d s of d i r e c t o r s , but 
s h o u l d be p r i m a r i l y c o n c e r n e d w i t h t h e q u a l i t y o f the management 
o f t h e company and i t s c a p a c i t y to run the company p r o f i t a b l y 
and c o m p e t i t i v e l y ( 1 0 ) . 
The m a j o r i t y B u l l o c k r e p o r t ( 1 ) c o n s i d e r e d t h a t i t was not 
p r a c t i c a l to i n t r o d u c e t h e t w o - t i e r s y s t e m i n t o the U n i t e d 
Kingdom. I t f e l t t h a t employee d i r e c t o r s on a s u p e r v i s o r y b oard 
had l i t t l e r e a l power and proposed t h a t r e p r e s e n t a t i o n s h o u l d 
be on t h e e x i s t i n g company b o a r d . 
The White Paper ( 2 ) s t a t e d t h a t t h e t w o - t i e r board s t r u c t u r e 
had c e r t a i n a d v a n t a g e s o v e r a u n i t a r y b o a r d . I n p a r t i c u l a r t h e 
d i v i s i o n of r e s p o n s i b i l i t y between a management board r e s p o n s i b l e 
f o r t h e day-to-day a f f a i r s o f t h e company and an ind e p e n d e n t 
s u p e r v i s o r y p o l i c y board as a watchdog o v e r s e e i n g t h e management 
board was seen a s a d e s i r a b l e s p l i t o f f u n c t i o n . 
The b o a r d s o f l a r g e B r i t i s h companies have t r a d i t i o n a l l y 
combined both e x e c u t i v e and s u p e r v i s o r y f u n c t i o n s and i t seems 
b e t t e r to l e a v e t h e p r e c i s e a l l o c a t i o n of r e s p o n s i b i l i t y f o r 
e x e c u t i v e and s u p e r v i s o r y f u n c t i o n s to e a c h i n d i v i d u a l company 
b e c a u s e t h e r e i s such a wide range of d i f f e r e n t m a n a g e r i a l 
s t r u c t u r e s i n companies and groups i n v a r i o u s s e c t o r s o f the 
s o c i e t y e The German sy s t e m a c h i e v e s a c l e a r e r a l l o c a t i o n o f 
powers. The p r e s e n t B r i t i s h s y s t e m i s more f l e x i b l e . I t i s h a r d 
to s a y which system i s t h e b e t t e r one, so t h e r e a r e no c o m p e l l i n g 
r e a s o n s f o r c h a n g i n g t h e p r e s e n t B r i t i s h s y s t e m . I t i s b e t t e r 
( 1 0 ) See B u l l o c k R e p o r t , p.167. P r o f e s s o r S c h m i t t h o f f a l s o 
f a v o u r e d t h e t w o - t i e r b o a r d . See h i s a r t i c l e , New C o n c e p t s i n 
Company Law (1973) J . B . L . 312, 320. 
( 1 ) B u l l o c k R e p o r t , Cmnd. 6706 ( 1 9 7 7 ) . See above, p.54. 
( 2 ) I n d u s t r i a l Democracy, Cmnd. 7231 ( 1 9 7 8 ) . See Gower, p.75. 
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to l e t t h i n g s a s th e y a r e , and t h e r e f o r e i t i s proposed ( 3 ) t h a t 
f o r e v e r y p u b l i c company o r l a r g e unquoted company o r a l t e r n a t i v e l y 
f o r e v e r y company employing more than 50 employees t h e r e s h o u l d 
be a r e c o n s t i t u t e d u n i t a r y board w i t h an e q u a l number of s h a r e -
h o l d e r and employee d i r e c t o r s and a t h i r d group from p r o f e s s i o n a l s 
r e c o g n i s e d by t h e government f o r t h a t p u r p o s e . The employee 
d i r e c t o r s may be e l e c t e d by t h e employees t h e m s e l v e s o r t h e i r 
u n i o n s . T h e r e s h o u l d not be a s i n g l e c h a n n e l o f r e p r e s e n t a t i o n 
through t r a d e u n i o n s . Manual w o r k e r s , s a l a r i e d employees, e x e c u t i v e s , 
e t c . w i l l be e n t i t l e d to r e p r e s e n t a t i o n a c c o r d i n g to t h e i r 
numbers i n t h e company, but a t l e a s t one r e p r e s e n t a t i v e o f 
eac h c l a s s s h o u l d appear on t h e boa r d . The p a r t i c i p a t i o n o f the 
t h i r d group i s n e c e s s a r y b e c a u s e t h e p a r t - t i m e o r f u l l - t i m e 
employee d i r e c t o r s may not be a match f o r f u l l - t i m e p r o f e s s i o n a l 
s h a r e h o l d e r d i r e c t o r / m a n a g e r s . The t h i r d group may be i n a 
p o s i t i o n to h e l p t h e employee d i r e c t o r s u n d e r s t a n d o r c l a r i f y 
f o r t h e sak e of t h e s h a r e h o l d e r d i r e c t o r s e f f e c t i v e m a n a g e r i a l 
p l a n n i n g and o f f i c e p r a c t i c e ; t h e y a l s o a c t a s an independent 
watchdog and check t h e a c t i v i t i e s o f management. I t i s a l s o 
proposed t h a t f o r t he companies under d i s c u s s i o n , a p a r t from 
employee d i r e c t o r s , t h e r e s h o u l d be an e v o l u t i o n o f a m a n a g e r i a l 
p r o f e s s i o n . The t h i r d group a r e e x p e c t e d to keep an eye on t h e 
co n d u c t of t h e company's a f f a i r s a t l e a s t a s w e l l a s many o f t h e 
i n v e s t m e n t i n s t i t u t i o n s o r u n i t t r u s t s a r e a t p r e s e n t d o i n g on 
b e h a l f o f t h e i r i n v e s t o r - c l i e n t s . Most o f t h e s e i n s t i t u t i o n s 
m a i n t a i n a s t a f f of s k i l l e d i n v e s t m e n t a n a l y s t s e a c h ; t h e y a r e 
competent to mo n i t o r , q u e s t i o n and s c r u t i n i z e the management 
( 3 ) See g e n e r a l l y N„ M a r t i n - K a y e (1976) J.B.L. 235; N.M. 
Hunnings (1976) J . B . L . 377; CM. S c h m i t t h o f f (1975) J . B . L . 265; 
CM. S c h m i t t h o f f (1973) J . B . L . 312; C.W. Summers (1980) 28 Am. 
J . Comp. L . 367; P.L. D a v i e s (1975) 38 M.L.R. 254. 
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o f any company and may a t any time a t t e n d company me e t i n g s as p a r t 
o f t h e i r j o b . A l t e r n a t i v e l y the t h i r d group s h o u l d be s i m i l a r i n 
n a t u r e t o t h e w a t c h i n g c o m m i t t e e s to be d i s c u s s e d i n C h a p t e r 3 
h e r e i n ( 4 ) 0 
W h i l e a s t a t u t o r y r i g h t o f board l e v e l r e p r e s e n t a t i o n may 
prove i n due c o u r s e i n s u f f i c i e n t to s e c u r e a r e a l e x t e n s i o n of 
i n d u s t r i a l democracy, i t i s a t l e a s t an e s s e n t i a l p r e r e q u i s i t e to 
the j o i n t r e g u l a t i o n of major p o l i c y d e c i s i o n s and i s more l i k e l y 
t han any o t h e r l e g i s l a t i v e measure to improve e x i s t i n g forms of 
i n d u s t r i a l democracy below board l e v e l . The p r e s e n c e o f employee 
d i r e c t o r s on the board a s o f r i g h t and a c c e s s to documents would 
h e l p to e n s u r e t h a t i m p o r t a n t i s s u e s of i n d u s t r i a l r e l a t i o n s a r e 
not l e f t o u t o f a c c o u n t i n t he p r e p a r a t i o n and d i s c u s s i o n o f com-
pany p o l i c i e s , to s a y n o t h i n g of t he i m p a r t i a l i t y and a s s i s t a n c e 
of t h e n e u t r a l t h i r d group, t h o s e from p r o f e s s i o n a l s r e c o g n i s e d 
by t h e government. 
I t i s s u b m i t t e d t h a t changes a t board l e v e l a r e not by them-
s e l v e s s u f f i c i e n t to e n s u r e an e x t e n s i o n o f i n d u s t r i a l democracy. 
What i s needed i s an i n t e r - r e l a t e d s t r u c t u r e o f p a r t i c i p a t i o n o r 
j o i n t r e g u l a t i o n a t a l l l e v e l s o f t h e company, o r a t l e a s t a t 
p l a n t l e v e l to s t a r t w i t h , and a s u f f i c i e n t l y w e l l d e v e l o p e d 
s t r u c t u r e o f p a r t i c i p a t i o n below the board i s i m p o r t a n t . T h e r e -
f o r e i t i s f u r t h e r proposed ( 5 ) t h a t the law s h o u l d r e q u i r e a works 
c o u n c i l f o r e v e r y p u b l i c company o r l a r g e unquoted company o r 
a l t e r n a t i v e l y f o r e v e r y company employing more tha n 50 employees. 
The number of members o f the works c o u n c i l s h o u l d depend on t h e 
number o f employees, s a y r o u g h l y 1 to 2 i n e v e r y 100 to 200 em-
p l o y e e s w i t h a minimum o f 3 members. I t s h o u l d r e p r e s e n t manual 
( 4 ) See p o s t , pp. 137-8 
( 5 ) See a n t e , p.71, n . ( 3 ) . 
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w o r k e r s , w h i t e c o l l a r employees, e t c . i n p r o p o r t i o n to t h e i r num-
b e r s . The works c o u n c i l may a l s o form o t h e r committees to perform 
s p e c i a l i s e d f u n c t i o n s . I f t h e r e a r e s e v e r a l i n d e p e n d e n t p l a n t s , 
t h e r e s h o u l d be a c o r r e s p o n d i n g number of works c o u n c i l , and they 
may form a j o i n t works c o u n c i l 0 Where t h e r e a r e more tha n 5 
employees of l e s s than 18 y e a r s o f age, t h e r e s h o u l d be e s t a b l i s h e d 
a youth c o u n c i l to t a k e c a r e o f the s p e c i a l i n t e r e s t s of j u v e n i l e 
employees, e.g. c a r e e r t r a i n i n g . The f o l l o w i n g s h o u l d be w i t h i n 
t h e scope of the work of t h e works c o u n c i l , t h e d e t e r m i n a t i o n o f 
h o u r s and days of work, t h e d e t e r m i n a t i o n of the p l a c e , time and 
method o f payment o f wages and s a l a r i e s , q u e s t i o n s i n v o l v i n g 
h o l d i a y s , t h e d e t e r m i n a t i o n o f m a t t e r s r e l a t i n g to t h e s ystem o f 
r e m u n e r a t i o n , the e s t a b l i s h m e n t of p i e c e r a t e s and o v e r t i m e , the 
f o r m u l a t i o n o f r e g u l a t i o n s r e l a t i n g to p r e v e n t i o n o f i n d u s t r i a l 
a c c i d e n t s and d i s e a s e s , the c o n d u c t o f the employees i n the p l a n t , 
and m a t t e r s i n c o n n e c t i o n w i t h t h e i n t r o d u c t i o n of improvement. 
I n c a s e of d i s a g r e e m e n t between t h e management and the works c o u n c i l , 
t h e y s h o u l d go to a r b i t r a t i o n . T h e r e s h o u l d be a l e g a l duty on both 
the employer and the works c o u n c i l , u n l i k e the t r a d e u n i o n s , t h a t 
t h e y must r e f r a i n from doing any a c t which might have a h a r m f u l 
e f f e c t on p r o d u c t i o n or t h e w o r k i n g peace of the p l a n t . Both the 
employer and the works c o u n c i l must a l s o e n s u r e the l e g a l and f a i r 
t r e a t m e n t of a l l p e r s o n s employed w i t h i n the p l a n t , and the absence 
o f d i s c r i m i n a t i o n a g a i n s t any o f them. Members of the works c o u n c i l 
s h o u l d not be i n t e r f e r e d w i t h o r d i s t u r b e d i n the e x e r c i s e o f t h e i r 
f u n c t i o n s , and may not be d i s c r i m i n a t e d a g a i n s t by r e a s o n o f t h e i r 
a c t i v i t i e s . 
The l a s t but not the l e a s t , as an a l t e r n a t i v e o r a n c i l l a r y 
r e f o r m , i s t h e development o f the c o n c e p t by way of e d u c a t i o n and 
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p r o f e s s i o n a l conduct i n r e l e v a n t p r o f e s s i o n a l b o d i e s (6) t h a t a 
company i s f o r b o t h i n v e s t o r s and employees e q u a l l y , and indeed f o r 
t h e consumer and the community a t l a r g e as well„ Much e x i s t i n g 
management t r a i n i n g i s concerned w i t h m a x i m i z a t i o n o f p r o f i t s f o r 
s h a r e h o l d e r s and c r e a t i n g h i g h e r s t a n d a r d s o f management w i t h i n t h e 
o r g a n i s a t i o n . , A new system s h o u l d supplement t h i s by e x p l o r i n g t h e 
c r u c i a l f a c t o r s a f f e c t i n g t h e l o n g - t e r m success and s t a t u s o f i n d u s t r y 
and commerce and t h e i r r e l a t i o n s h i p s t o s o c i e t y ( 7 ) , The t a s k o f 
management i s t o s t r i k e a f a i r b alance between r e a s o n a b l e d i v i d e n d s 
t o s h a r e h o l d e r s , good wages f o r employees and f a i r p r i c e s t o consumers 
a f t e r t h e p r i m a r y r e q u i r e m e n t s o f t h e company i t s e l f by way o f expan-
s i o n and r e i n v e s t m e n t have been met. The d u t y s h o u l d e x t e n d t o making 
p r o v i s i o n f o r t h e w e l f a r e and r e c r e a t i o n o f t h e employees i n c l u d i n g 
t h e i r f a m i l i e s and f o r r e asonable c o n t r i b u t i o n s t o l o c a l and n a t i o n a l 
c h a r i t i e s o These are t h e modern c o n d i t i o n s a p p r o p r i a t e i n our s o c i e t y 
on which p r i v a t e c a p i t a l i n a mixed economy can be a l l o w e d t h e p r i -
v i l e g e o f i n c o r p o r a t i o n w i t h l i m i t e d l i a b i l i t y , . I n o r d e r t o i n t r o d u c e 
m e a n i n g f u l p a r t i c i p a t i o n i n any d e p t h , i t i s necessary t o c r e a t e a 
change i n peoples' whole p h i l o s o p h y t o management and t h e purposes o f 
work. These types o f concept may be argued as f o r e i g n t o p r a c t i c a l 
company law, b u t i t i s s u b m i t t e d t h a t i f a modern t h e o r y o f e n t e r -
p r i s e i s t o be s t a b l e and r e s p e c t e d , i t must p r o v i d e an u p - t o - d a t e 
p h i l o s o p h y o f e t h i c s and s o c i a l a s p i r a t i o n s ( 8 ) c The way t o r e f o r m 
(6) C f 0 Hadden, p 0 4 8 4 0 See a l s o M„Po F o g a r t y , Company and 
C o r p o r a t i o n - One Law? (1965) pp<,12-170 
(7) See C h a r l e s de Hoghton, t h e Company (1970) p,>29o 
(8) See a l s o EEC Commission's Green Paper on Employee P a r t i c i p a t i o n 
and Company S t r u c t u r e E o C B u l l o Supp= 8/75; "Company laws o f t h e 
t r a d i t i o n a l p a t t e r n have not c o n t a i n e d such p r o v i s i o n s i n t h e past 
p r e c i s e l y because th e y were based on economic and s o c i a l p o l i c i e s 
which saw employees' r e l a t i o n s h i p s w i t h companies as e s s e n t i a l l y 
c o n t r a c t u a l o I n so f a r as economic and s o c i a l p o l i c i e s come t o 
r e g a r d t h e company as an e n t e r p r i s e where l a b o u r and c a p i t a l combine 
i n t h e i r own s o c i e t y ' s i n t e r e s t , then t h e laws r e l a t i n g t o companies 
w i l l sooner o r l a t e r have t o r e f l e c t t h i s ' c h a n g e o f u n d e r l y i n g p h i l o -
sophy and i n c l u d e p r o v i s i o n s e x p r e s s l y d e a l i n g w i t h r e l a t i o n s h i p s 
between t h e p r o v i d e r s o f c a p i t a l , t h e management and t h e employees 
i r r e s p e c t i v e o f whether t h e y are f o r m a l l y deemed t o be 'company law'" 
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does n o t l i e i n law a l o n e ; management e d u c a t i o n i s o f paramount and 
p a r a l l e l i mportance t o o . Business e d u c a t i o n h e l p s t o encourage 
c o r p o r a t e r e s p o n s i b i l i t y . As an academic d i s c i p l i n e , i t d e f i n e s 
i t s o b j e c t i v e s around the concept o f an e n l i g h t e n e d businessman; 
by t h i s s t a n d a r d , the educated businessman w i l l have l e a r n e d t o 
t h i n k o f h i m s e l f i n t h e p e r s p e c t i v e o f t h e t o t a l s o c i a l and b u s i -
ness system. Such a r o l e r e q u i r e s an u n d e r s t a n d i n g o f t h e v a r i o u s 
i n s t i t u t i o n s t h a t a company encounters i n t h e course o f i t s ope-
r a t i o n s , and o f the i n t e r - r e l a t i o n s h i p s between such i n s t i t u t i o n s . , 
I t enables d i r e c t o r s and managers t o examine t h e p r i n c i p l e s , con-
c e p t s and r e s p o n s i b i l i t i e s u n d e r l y i n g b u s i n e s s decisions., 
I m p l i c a t i o n s o f Employee P a r t i c i p a t i o n on Company Law 
An aspect o f company law which w i l l be m a t e r i a l l y a f f e c t e d by 
t h e i m p l e m e n t a t i o n o f any p r o p o s a l s on c o - d e t e r m i n a t i o n i s t h a t 
r e l a t i n g t o d i r e c t o r s ' d u t i e s . 
Under the e x i s t i n g law, d i r e c t o r s are r e q u i r e d t o conduct t h e 
company's business f o r t h e b e n e f i t o f t h e company ( i n c l u d i n g the 
employees) as a whole ( 9 ) . Thus d i r e c t o r s are r e q u i r e d t o take a 
detached view o f t h e i n t e r e s t s o f any p a r t i c u l a r group o f persons, 
whether s h a r e h o l d e r s , employees o r o t h e r w i s e , and t h i s would make 
i t v e r y d i f f i c u l t , i n c e r t a i n s i t u a t i o n s , f o r employee r e p r e s e n t a -
t i v e s t o pursue t h e i n t e r e s t s o f those whom they r e p r e s e n t . F o r 
example on redundancy i t seems most l i k e l y t h a t an employee d i r e c t o r 
has t o v o t e f o r redundancy i f he i s t o do h i s d u t y as a d i r e c t o r , 
b u t such an a c t would e a s i l y be m i s r e p r e s e n t e d by those e l e c t i n g 
him. 
( 9 ) See Report o f the I n s p e c t o r o f June 14, 1954 i n t h e second 
Savoy H o t e l I n v e s t i g a t i o n (HMSO); Gaiman v. N a t i o n a l A s s o c i a t i o n 
f o r Mental H e a l t h t l 9 7 l j Ch. 317; A970J 3 W 0L 0Ro 42; /"1970J 2 
A l l E.R. 362; 114 S.J. 416; Greenhalqh v a Arderne Cinemas L t d . 
[1951/ Ch. 286; [1950J 2 A l l E.R. 1120; 94 S.J. 855; S e c t i o n 46 
o f Companies A c t 1980; below pp.88-9 
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One may note t h a t under s.448 o f the Companies A c t 1948 t h e 
C o u r t i s empowered t o r e l i e v e , e i t h e r w h o l l y o r p a r t l y and on such 
terms as i t t h i n k s f i t , a d i r e c t o r from l i a b i l i t y f o r n e g l i g e n c e , 
d e f a u l t , breach o f d u t y o r breach o f t r u s t . The C o u r t must be 
s a t i s f i e d t h a t the d i r e c t o r concerned has acted h o n e s t l y and r e a -
sonably and t h a t h a v i n g r e g a r d f o r a l l the c i r c u m s t a n c e s o f the 
case, i n c l u d i n g those connected w i t h h i s appointment, he ought 
f a i r l y t o be excused. The C o u r t c o u l d , of c o u r s e , use t h i s power 
i n a case i n v o l v i n g an employee d i r e c t o r , b u t i t i s d o u b t f u l whe-
t h e r o r n o t t h e C o u r t would c o n s i d e r t h a t an employee d i r e c t o r had 
a c t e d r e a s o n a b l y i f he had, f o r example, c o n s i d e r e d o n l y the 
i n t e r e s t s o f t h e employees. 
B u l l o c k (10) proposed t h a t i n p r i n c i p l e a l l d i r e c t o r s i n c l u d i n g 
employee d i r e c t o r s s hould be under t h e same l e g a l d u t i e s and l i a b i -
l i t i e s . C o d i f i c a t i o n o f two s t a n d a r d s f o r employee d i r e c t o r s and 
s h a r e h o l d e r d i r e c t o r s r e s p e c t i v e l y would not promote c o o p e r a t i o n 
between employee and s h a r e h o l d e r d i r e c t o r s on t h e board ( 1 ) ; nor 
would people have c o n f i d e n c e i n t h e new system o f board l e v e l r e p r e -
s e n t a t i o n . But t h e law s h o u l d p r o v i d e t h a t t h i s s h o u l d not impede 
employee d i r e c t o r s from a r g u i n g s p e c i f i c a l l y from an employee's 
v i e w p o i n t a t board meetings ( 2 ) . The s p e c i a l s t a t u s o f employee 
d i r e c t o r s s hould be r e c o g n i s e d i n o r d e r t o take p r o p e r account o f 
t h e i r r e s p o n s i b i l i t y t o t h e i r c o n s t i t u e n t s o r those t h e y r e p r e s e n t , 
b u t employee d i r e c t o r s s h o u l d n o t be a l l o w e d t o be i n s t r u c t e d t o 
v o t e i n a p a r t i c u l a r way on a p a r t i c u l a r i s s u e . An employee d i r e c -
t o r must be a r e p r e s e n t a t i v e , , He should be f r e e t o form and express 
h i s view, weigh up the v a r i o u s i n t e r e s t s i n the company and reach 
h i s own c o n c l u s i o n s about which p o l i c i e s w i l l work f o r t h e g r e a t e r 
(10) B u l l o c k Report, para.8.37. 
(1) I b i d . 
( 2 ) B u l l o c k R e p o r t , p a r a . 8.40. 
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good o f t h e company. The emphasis s h o u l d be on t h e b e n e f i t o f t h e 
company as a whole. An employee d i r e c t o r should n o t be a d e l e g a t e ( 3 ) 
T h i s i s t o ensure t h a t a l l d i r e c t o r s s h o u l d look t o t h e l o n g - t e r m 
i n t e r e s t s o f the company and are f r e e from e x t e r n a l p r e s s u r e . I n 
o t h e r words, a l l d i r e c t o r s w i l l be r e q u i r e d t o a c t on t h e i r own 
a u t h o r i t y and r e s p o n s i b i l i t y b u t must keep i n touch w i t h t h e o p i n i o n 
o f those they r e p r e s e n t . They have t o take i n t o account t h e d i f f e r -
i n g and c o n f l i c t i n g i n t e r e s t s i n t h e company i n o r d e r t o reach 
d e c i s i o n s which they g e n u i n e l y b e l i e v e t o be i n the company's o v e r -
a l l b e s t i n t e r e s t as a whole. B u l l o c k ( 4 ) a l s o proposed t h a t d i r e c -
t o r s s h o u l d be e n t i t l e d t o t a k e account o f t h e i n t e r e s t s o f sha r e -
h o l d e r s and employees i n s u b s i d i a r y companies. As members o f t h e 
board, a l l d i r e c t o r s s h o u l d , o f co u r s e , have t o t a l access t o 
i n f o r m a t i o n . But how can t h e employee r e p r e s e n t a t i v e ' s d u t y t o 
r e p o r t back t o h i s c o n s t i t u e n t o r those he r e p r e s e n t s be r e c o n c i l e d 
w i t h h i s d u t y as a d i r e c t o r n o t t o d i s c l o s e c o n f i d e n t i a l i n f o r m -
a t i o n ? Three o b s e r v a t i o n s can be made on t h i s . F i r s t , i t would 
n o t u s u a l l y be necessary t o d i s c l o s e c o n f i d e n t i a l i n f o r m a t i o n i n 
o r d e r t o make an e f f e c t i v e r e p o r t . Secondly, t h e r e i s l i t t l e 
reason t o suppose t h a t employee r e p r e s e n t a t i v e s are more l i k e l y 
t h an o t h e r d i r e c t o r s t o d i s c l o s e t h e i r company's t r a d e s e c r e t s o r 
t o use c o n f i d e n t i a l i n f o r m a t i o n which m i g h t be d e t r i m e n t a l t o t h e 
company f o r p e r s o n a l g a i n . T h i r d l y , many t r a d e u n i o n r e p r e s e n t a -
t i v e s and o f f i c i a l s have a l r e a d y had access t o , and have d e a l t w i t h , 
c o n f i d e n t i a l i n f o r m a t i o n f o r many years w i t h o u t any p a r t i c u l a r 
d i f f i c u l t i e s a p p e a r i n g t o have a r i s e n . But t h e r e a l problem a r i s e s 
when an employee d i r e c t o r o b t a i n s c o n f i d e n t i a l i n f o r m a t i o n which 
p l a c e s him i n a p o s i t i o n where h i s r e s p o n s i b i l i t y t o t h e company 
(3) I b i d . 
( 4 ) I b i d . , p a r a . 8.38„ 
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comes i n t o d i r e c t c o n f l i c t w i t h h i s r e s p o n s i b i l i t y t o those he 
r e p r e s e n t s . For example, t h e company may be f o r m u l a t i n g l o n g - t e r m 
p l a n s which would s e r i o u s l y a f f e c t t h e w o r k f o r c e b u t w h i c h , f o r 
busines s reasons, t h e management may wish t o keep s e c r e t u n t i l they 
are f i n a l i s e d . Where t h e d i r e c t o r s a re i n breach o f t h e i r f i d u c i a r y 
d u t i e s , t h e s h a r e h o l d e r s i n g e n e r a l meeting can, a f t e r f u l l and 
f r a n k d i s c l o s u r e , r a t i f y t h e i r a c t i o n s by o r d i n a r y r e s o l u t i o n . The 
e f f e c t o f such a r e s o l u t i o n i s , i n most cases, t o absol v e t h e d i r e c -
t o r s from l i a b i l i t y ( 5 ) . However i f an employee d i r e c t o r were i n 
breach o f h i s d u t y because he c o m p l e t e l y s u b o r d i n a t e d t h e i n t e r e s t s 
o f t h e company t o those o f t h e employees, i t would be most u n l i k e l y 
t h a t such an a c t would be r a t i f i e d by t h e s h a r e h o l d e r s . B u l l o c k ( 6 ) 
t h o u g h t t h a t t h e problem o f c o n f i d e n t i a l i t y o f i n f o r m a t i o n had been 
o v e r s t a t e d and was r e l u c t a n t t o see a s t a t u t o r y r e d e f i n i t i o n o f 
confidentiality„ I t i s c o n c e i v a b l e t h a t i n the absence o f such 
r e d e f i n i t i o n , a d i s g r u n t l e d s h a r e h o l d e r may i n some cases b r i n g a 
d e r i v a t i v e a c t i o n t o complain o f a breach o f d u t y by an employee 
d i r e c t o r i n r e l e a s i n g c o n f i d e n t i a l i n f o r m a t i o n , t o harass him o r 
o t h e r w i s e , and t h e employee d i r e c t o r might j u s t as w e l l be ad v i s e d 
t o ask t h e board t o agree on what i n f o r m a t i o n i s c o n f i d e n t i a l . 
Where t h e board has agreed on t h e d i s c l o s u r e o f c e r t a i n i n f o r m a t i o n , 
i t i s d o u b t f u l i f the c o u r t s would a l l o w a d e r i v a t i v e a c t i o n a g a i n s t 
t h e employee d i r e c t o r concerned f o r d i s c l o s i n g t h e i n f o r m a t i o n . 
As the law now s t a n d s , a d i r e c t o r i s not o b l i g e d t o g i v e con-
t i n u o u s a t t e n t i o n t o the company's a f f a i r s . I f any change o f the 
law r e q u i r e s a h i g h e r s t a n d a r d o f such d u t y and t h e d i r e c t o r s h i p o f 
employee d i r e c t o r s i s p a r t - t i m e , t h i s may p r o v i d e some s h a r e h o l d e r s 
(5) See, e.g. Bamford v. Bamford [1969] 1 A l l E.R. 969; [1910] 
Cho 212; £19697 2 W.L.R. 1107; 113 S.J. 123. 
(6) B u l l o c k R e p o r t , p a r a . 8.54. 
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w i t h an o p p o r t u n i t y t o harass an employee d i r e c t o r , u n l e s s a 
d i s t i n c t i o n i s made between the d u t i e s o f a s h a r e h o l d e r r e p r e -
s e n t a t i v e and an employee r e p r e s e n t a t i v e ( 7 ) . 
An e f f e c t i v e s h a r i n g o f power by employee d i r e c t o r s w i l l 
n e c e s s i t a t e t h e severe c o u r t a i l m e n t o f t h e ownership r i g h t s o f 
s h a r e h o l d e r s . T h e r e f o r e t h e r e l a t i o n s h i p between the new board 
and t h e s h a r e h o l d e r s has t o be a d j u s t e d i n o r d e r t o ensure t h a t 
employee d i r e c t o r s on t h e board have a r e a l say i n d e c i s i o n making 
on fundamental q u e s t i o n s l i k e w i n d i n g - u p . I t would be f r u s t r a t i n g 
and i l l o g i c a l t o t h e t r u e o b j e c t i v e o f i n d u s t r i a l democracy t o put 
employee d i r e c t o r s on t h e board and then a l l o w t he s h a r e h o l d e r s 
t h e power t o r e t a i n c o n t r o l o f a l l major d e c i s i o n s . 
B u l l o c k ( 8 ) proposed t h a t i n c o n n e c t i o n w i t h c e r t a i n ' a t t r i -
b u t e d f u n c t i o n s ' t h e board s h o u l d have t h e e x c l u s i v e r i g h t t o sub-
m i t a r e s o l u t i o n f o r c o n s i d e r a t i o n t o t h e s h a r e h o l d e r s i n g e n e r a l 
m e e t i n g . These a t t r i b u t e d f u n c t i o n s a f f e c t t h e p r e s e n t powers o f 
s h a r e h o l d e r s i n f i v e i m p o r t a n t areas: changing t h e company's memo-
randum and a r t i c l e s o f a s s o c i a t i o n , w i n d i n g - u p , changes i n the 
company's c a p i t a l s t r u c t u r e , t h e f i x i n g o f d i v i d e n d s , and t h e d i s -
p o s a l s o f a s u b s t a n t i a l p a r t o f the u n d e r t a k i n g . These m a t t e r s are 
d i r e c t l y r e l a t e d t o t h e employees' f u t u r e employment and income b u t 
are g e n e r a l l y s u b j e c t t o s h a r e h o l d e r s ' power o f i n i t i a t i v e by 
r e q u i s i t i o n i n g an e x t r a - o r d i n a r y g e n e r a l meeting p u r s u a n t t o s e c t i o n 
132 o f t h e Companies A c t 1948, a p a r t from r e t a i n i n g u l t i m a t e c o n t r o l 
by a p p r o v i n g o r r e j e c t i n g p r o p o s a l s p u t t o them by t h e board. The 
new law should g i v e t he board o f d i r e c t o r s t h e e x c l u s i v e r i g h t t o 
i n i t i a t e p r o p o s a l s f o r a p p r o v a l o r v e t o a t the s h a r e h o l d e r s ' meeting. 
( 7 ) But t h i s would v i o l a t e t h e p r i n c i p l e a l l d i r e c t o r s should have 
the same l e g a l d u t i e s and l i a b i l i t i e s . 
(8) B u l l o c k Report, p a r a . 8.27. 
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Thus, i n e f f e c t , t h e s h a r e h o l d e r s have o n l y a power o f v e t o . 
As t o t h e r i g h t t o d i s p o s e o f a s u b s t a n t i a l p a r t o f the under-
t a k i n g , which would be a f f e c t e d by t h e B u l l o c k p r o p o s a l s , i t i s 
perhaps o f importance t o note t h a t i n some cases t h e meaning o f 
' s u b s t a n t i a l p a r t ' may cause d i f f i c u l t y and u n r e a s o n a b l y d e l a y the 
s a l e (and purchase) o f c h a t t e l s and machinery. The words 'substan-
t i a l p a r t * s hould be w e l l d e f i n e d t o a v o i d any a m b i g u i t y . 
I t may be argued t h a t i t would be u n f a i r t o bar t h e s h a r e h o l d e r s 
t o i n i t i a t e p r o p o s a l s i n r e s p e c t o f t h e a t t r i b u t e d f u n c t i o n s a l t o -
g e t h e r , and t h e r e f o r e i t i s proposed t h a t as an a l t e r n a t i v e s o l u t i o n 
t o t he B u l l o c k ' s p r o p o s a l s , the s h a r e h o l d e r s may s t i l l r e q u i s i t i o n 
an e x t r a o r d i n a r y g e n e r a l meeting i n r e s p e c t o f t h e a t t r i b u t e d f u n c -
t i o n s , b u t t h e i r r e s o l u t i o n need t o be approved by t h e new proposed 
board t o be e f f e c t i v e . 
The proposed i n t r o d u c t i o n o f employee d i r e c t o r s c r e a t e s s p e c i a l 
problems i n t h e case o f groups o f companies, whether on a n a t i o n a l 
o r m u l t i - n a t i o n a l b a s i s ( 9 ) . B u l l o c k proposed t h a t employee p a r t i -
c i p a t i o n on t h e board s h o u l d a p p l y b o t h t o t h e h o l d i n g company i n 
a group where t h e group employ 2,000 o r more i n t o t a l i n the U n i t e d 
Kingdom and t o any s u b s i d i a r y company i n t h e group which s u b s i d i a r y 
alone has 2,000 o r more employees i n t h e U n i t e d Kingdom. To ensure 
power o f h o l d i n g companies t o c o n t r o l t he a c t i v i t i e s o f t h e i r sub-
s i d i a r i e s , B u l l o c k recommended t h a t t h e p a r e n t o f a B r i t i s h - b a s e d 
group should be e n t i t l e d t o a p p o i n t t h e n e u t r a l members o f the board 
i n any s u b s i d i a r y w i t h i n which t h e r e has been a v o t e f o r board l e v e l 
(9) See g e n e r a l l y Hadden, pp„466-7; D.D. P r e n t i c e (1978) 56 Can. B. 
Rev. 277, 293-5; D.B. Br o a d h u r s t (1978) 128 N.L.J. 1227, 1228; 
Lewis and C l a r k (1977) 40 M.L.R. 323, 337. 
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r e p r e s e n t a t i o n . I n the case o f an E n g l i s h s u b s i d i a r y o f a f o r e i g n 
p a r e n t B u l l o c k proposed t h a t t h e u l t i m a t e r i g h t t o a p p o i n t t h e 
n e u t r a l members t o the board s h o u l d be w i t h t h e I n d u s t r i a l Democracy 
Commission i n case o f dead l o c k , b u t suggested t h a t such an a p p o i n t -
ment sh o u l d o n l y be made a f t e r c o n s u l t a t i o n by the I n d u s t r i a l 
Democracy Commission w i t h t h e f o r e i g n p a r e n t and w i t h t h e S e c r e t a r y 
o f S t a t e f o r I n d u s t r y ( 1 0 ) . As re g a r d s s u b s i d i a r i e s o f f o r e i g n -
based m u l t i - n a t i o n s which have n o t been a c t u a l l y i n c o r p o r a t e d i n t h e 
U n i t e d Kingdom, B u l l o c k proposed t h a t t h e s u b s i d i a r i e s s h o u l d be 
r e q u i r e d t o be i n c o r p o r a t e d i n t h e U n i t e d Kingdom i f t h e necessary 
m a j o r i t y i n f a v o u r o f employee r e p r e s e n t a t i o n i s o b t a i n e d ( 1 ) . 
B u l l o c k r e c o g n i s e d t h a t i n t h e case o f f o r e i g n - b a s e d m u l t i - n a t i o n a l s 
i t i s u n a v o i d a b l e t h a t major d e c i s i o n s are o f t e n made o u t s i d e t h e 
U n i t e d Kingdom and the board o f a B r i t i s h s u b s i d i a r y w i l l have l i t t l e 
say i n t h e d e c i s i o n s . A s i t u a t i o n which i s r e a d i l y c o n c e i v a b l e i s 
where t h e f o r e i g n p a r e n t recommends the d i s t r i b u t i o n as d i v i d e n d o f 
a g r e a t p o r t i o n o f p r o f i t s made by a B r i t i s h s u b s i d i a r y i n s t e a d o f 
p l o w i n g back t h e p r o f i t s i n t o t h e business i n t h e U n i t e d Kingdom 
w h i l e t h e B r i t i s h s u b s i d i a r y wishes t o make use o f t h e p r o f i t s f o r 
expansion o f t h e business i n t h e U n i t e d Kingdom. But u n l e s s t h e r e 
were i n t e r n a t i o n a l agreements on t h e m a t t e r , B u l l o c k f e l t t h a t t h e i r 
p r o p o s a l s were t he b e s t t h a t c o u l d be de v i s e d i n t h e c i r c u m s t a n c e s . 
Another problem c o n c e r n i n g groups o f companies a r i s e s i n the 
case o f t a k e o v e r s . Since by v i r t u e o f the r e s i d u a l power f o r h o l d i n g 
(10) B u l l o c k Report, p a r a . 11.59* The M i n o r i t y B u l l o c k Report was 
a g a i n s t employee p a r t i c i p a t i o n on the boards o f s u b s i d i a r y companies*. 
I f l e g i s l a t i o n was i n s i s t e d upon, i t recommended t h a t then t h e o t h e r 
s u p e r v i s o r y boards should have more power than t h e s u p e r v i s o r y board 
o f a s u b s i d i a r y company. I n any event i t proposed t h a t s u b s i d i a r i e s 
o f f o r e i g n companies sh o u l d be exempted; o t h e r w i s e t h e r e would be 
a d e l e t e r i o u s e f f e c t on i n w a r d i n v e s t m e n t by f o r e i g n e r s , which p l a y s 
an i m p o r t a n t p a r t i n t h e economy o f the U n i t e d Kingdom. 
(1) B u l l o c k Report, p a r a . 11.52* 
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companies, an i n t e n d i n g h o l d i n g company would be a b l e not o n l y t o 
c o n t r o l t h e s h a r e h o l d e r d i r e c t o r s on t h e board of t h e t a k e n - o v e r 
company b u t a l s o r e p l a c e t h e co-opted d i r e c t o r s o f t h e l a t t e r com-
pany, the b e n e f i t s o f employee p a r t i c i p a t i o n might be d e s t r o y e d i f 
t h e i n t e n d i n g h o l d i n g compamy h e l d o b j e c t i v e s d i f f e r e n t f r o m those 
o f the taken-over company,. B u l l o c k (2) proposed t h a t the d e f i n i t i o n 
o f ' s u b s i d i a r y ' i n s e c t i o n 154(1) o f t h e Companies A c t 1948 s h o u l d 
be amended so t h a t a t a k e n - o v e r company would o n l y become a s u b s i -
d i a r y i f an a d d i t i o n a l r e q u i r e m e n t i s complied w i t h , namely t h e 
r e g i s t r a t i o n w i t h t h e R e g i s t r a r o f Companies o f an agreed " i n s t r u m e n t 
o f c o n t r o l " . ( 3) B u l l o c k was a b l e t o p o i n t t o s i m i l a r methods i n 
o t h e r l e g a l systems. The new d e f i n i t i o n would a p p l y t o a l l companies 
whether or n o t t h e r e i s employee p a r t i c i p a t i o n on t h e b o a r d . W i t h 
t h i s new system t h e employee d i r e c t o r s and the co-opted d i r e c t o r s 
would be a b l e t o demand u n d e r t a k i n g s o f importance t o t h e w o r k f o r c e 
such as s e c u r i t y o f j o b s and i n v e s t m e n t b e f o r e the i n s t r u m e n t o f 
c o n t r o l i s signed by the board o f the t a k e n - o v e r company. I t i s 
s u b m i t t e d t h a t w h i l e such a p r o p o s a l would c u r t a i l t h e power o f 
c a p i t a l , t h i s would a c t as a d i s i n c e n t i v e t o t h e t a k e o v e r o f a 
f a i l i n g b u s i n e s s . 
There are some companies whose a r t i c l e s p r e c l u d e d i r e c t o r s 
f rom v o t i n g on m a t t e r s i n which they have a p e r s o n a l i n t e r e s t . And 
B u l l o c k proposed t h a t t h e new law should p r o v i d e t h a t employee d i r e c -
t o r s s hould n o t be a f f e c t e d by these a r t i c l e s o r p r o v i s i o n s s i m p l y 
( 2 ) B u l l o c k Report, paras. 11.37 t o 11.44. 
(3 ) The i n s t r u m e n t o f c o n t r o l might be c a n c e l l e d l a t e r on by agree-
ment between t h e h o l d i n g company and s u b s i d i a r y , , But the expected 
o p p o s i t i o n by t h e employee d i r e c t o r s of the s u b s i d i a r y t o any a t t e m p t 
by t h e h o l d i n g company t o b r i n g about such c a n c e l l a t i o n w i t h o u t t h e 
r e a l consent of t h e s u b s i d i a r y was t h o u g h t t o be a s e r i o u s check o f 
such a t t e m p t . See B u l l o c k R e p o r t , p a r a . 11.44. 
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because they t a k e p a r t i n board d e c i s i o n s concerned w i t h i n d u s t r i a l 
r e l a t i o n s o r c o l l e c t i v e b a r g a i n i n g ( 4 ) . 
Under t h e p r e s e n t law an employee d i r e c t o r would always be 
l i a b l e t o removal from t h e board by o r d i n a r y r e s o l u t i o n under s e c t i o n 
184 o f t h e Companies A c t 1948 b e f o r e t h e e x p i r a t i o n o f h i s p e r i o d o f 
o f f i c e , n o t w i t h s t a n d i n g a n y t h i n g i n i t s a r t i c l e s o r i n any agreement 
between i t and him, and a c c o r d i n g l y s.184 should be amended so as t o 
c u r t a i l t h e s h a r e h o l d e r s ' r i g h t o f removal i n t h e case o f an employee 
d i r e c t o r * 
The p r e s s u r e f o r employee p a r t i c i p a t i o n has been g r o w i n g , and 
the B u l l o c k Report c o n s t i t u t e s by f a r one of t h e most thorough and 
t h o u g h t f u l e x a m i n a t i o n s o f t h e impact o f employee p a r t i c i p a t i o n on 
t h e customary r u l e s o f company law. I m p l e m e n t a t i o n o f p r o p o s a l s t o 
g i v e an e f f e c t i v e v o i c e t o employees i n c o r p o r a t e management w i l l 
b r i n g i n i t s t r a i n a h o s t o f s i g n i f i c a n t changes i n company law, 
e s p e c i a l l y t h e r i g h t s o f s h a r e h o l d e r s and d i r e c t o r s ' d u t i e s . 
( 4 ) B u l l o c k R e p o r t , p a r a . 10.58. 
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CHAPTER 3 DIRECTORS' DUTIES 
The e f f e c t i v e l e g a l c o n t r o l o f l i m i t e d companies r e q u i r e s t h e 
i m p o s i t i o n on d i r e c t o r s o f s u i t a b l y s t r i n g e n t d u t i e s which are r e a d i l y 
e n f o r c e a b l e . So i t i s o f importance t o see what d u t i e s a r e owed by 
d i r e c t o r s and managers i n t h e e x e r c i s e o f t h e i r powers i n those areas 
which have been s u b j e c t s o f debate o r which have caused some d i f f i -
c u l t i e s and t o d i s c u s s t h e enforcement o f d i r e c t o r s * d u t i e s . 
The powers and d u t i e s o f a company d i r e c t o r are d e r i v e d p r i m a r i l y 
from the company's memorandum and a r t i c l e s o f a s s o c i a t i o n . The Com-
panies A c t s p r o v i d e l i t t l e guidance on t h e n a t u r e o f a d i r e c t o r ' s 
d u t i e s , a p a r t from t h e f o r m a l r e q u i r e m e n t s as t o t h e h o l d i n g o f 
p e r i o d i c meetings, e t c . When a person accepts t h e o f f i c e o f a d i r e c -
t o r , he accepts w i t h i t c e r t a i n d u t i e s towards the company. These 
d u t i e s are p a r t l y dependent on t h e law o f agents and persons i n a 
f i d u c i a r y p o s i t i o n , p a r t l y s t a t u t o r y , and p a r t l y r e g u l a t o r y ( 1 ) . 
Such d u t i e s v a r y from company t o company, and w i t h i n any g i v e n com-
pany t h e d i r e c t o r s may have d i f f e r e n t r e s p o n s i b i l i t i e s . Breach o f 
these d u t i e s o r n e g l i g e n c e i n p e r f o r m i n g them on t h e p a r t o f a d i r e c -
t o r g i v e s t h e company, and, i n i t s w i n d i n g up, the l i q u i d a t o r , r i g h t s 
and remedies a g a i n s t him f o r any damage which has been s u f f e r e d by 
the company as a r e s u l t o f t h e breach o r n e g l i g e n c e ( 2 ) . 
D i r e c t o r s are agents o f a company. As agents they s t a n d i n a 
f i d u c i a r y r e l a t i o n s h i p t o t h e i r p r i n c i p a l , t h e company. The d u t i e s 
o f good f a i t h which t h i s f i d u c i a r y r e l a t i o n s h i p imposes are v e r y 
s i m i l a r t o those imposed on t r u s t e e s , and t o t h i s e x t e n t d i r e c t o r s 
can be regarded as t r u s t e e s ( 3 ) . But t h e p o s i t i o n o f a d i r e c t o r 
d i f f e r s c o n s i d e r a b l y from t h a t o f an o r d i n a r y t r u s t e e . The d u t y o f 
(1) See Palmer's Company Law, V o l . 1, p.684. 
(2) I b i d . , V o l . 1, p.684. 
(3) Gower, p.572. 
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t h e t r u s t e e s o f a s e t t l e m e n t o r w i l l i s t o be c a r e f u l and t o a v o i d 
r i s k s t o the c a p i t a l o f t h e t r u s t ( 4 ) , b u t t a k i n g r i s k s seems t o be 
i n e v i t a b l e i n r u n n i n g a company, which would not be l e g a l l y p e r m i s -
s i b l e f o r a t r u s t e e . , A businessman s e e k i n g p r o f i t i s e n t i r e l y d i f -
f e r e n t from a t r u s t e e , and i t would not be r e a l i s t i c t o s u b j e c t t h e 
f o r m e r t o t h e same r u l e s . 
" I t has sometimes been s a i d t h a t d i r e c t o r s are t r u s t e e s . I f t h i s 
means no more than t h a t d i r e c t o r s i n t h e performance o f t h e i r 
d u t i e s s t a n d i n a f i d u c i a r y r e l a t i o n s h i p t o t h e company, th e 
s t a t e m e n t i s t r u e enough. But i f t h e s tatement i s meant t o be 
an i n d i c a t i o n by way o f analogy o f what those d u t i e s a r e , i t i s 
w h o l l y m i s l e a d i n g . I t i s indeed i m p o s s i b l e t o d e s c r i b e t h e d u t i e s 
o f d i r e c t o r s i n g e n e r a l terms, whether by way o f analogy o r o t h e r -
w i s e . The p o s i t i o n o f t h e d i r e c t o r c a r r y i n g on a s m a l l r e t a i l 
b u s i n e s s i s v e r y d i f f e r e n t from t h a t o f a d i r e c t o r o f a r a i l w a y 
company." 
( p e r Romer J . , a t p.426) ( 5 ) 
I n Smith v e Anderson ( 6 ) , James, L.J. had t h i s t o say; 
"A t r u s t e e i s a man who i s t h e owner o f p r o p e r t y and d e a l s w i t h 
i t as p r i n c i p a l , as owner, and as master, s u b j e c t o n l y t o an 
e q u i t a b l e o b l i g a t i o n t o account t o some persons t o whom he stands 
i n t h e r e l a t i o n o f t r u s t e e . . . The o f f i c e o f a d i r e c t o r i s t h a t 
o f a p a i d s e r v a n t o f the company. A d i r e c t o r never e n t e r s i n t o a 
c o n t r a c t f o r h i m s e l f , b u t f o r h i s p r i n c i p a l . . . he cannot sue on 
such c o n t r a c t s , nor be sued on them." 
F u r t h e r , t h e p r o v i s i o n s o f t h e T r u s t e e A c t 1925 i n c l u d i n g 
s e c t i o n 61 ( t h e r e l i e f p r o v i s i o n ) do n o t a p p l y t o d i r e c t o r s , and a 
a s i m i l a r l y worded r e l i e f p r o v i s i o n ( s e c t i o n 448) has t o be p r o v i d e d 
( 4 ) Gower, p,.5729 
( 5 ) I n r e C i t y E q u i t a b l e F i r e I n s u r a n c e Co. /19257 1 Ch. 407. 
( 6 ) (1880) 15 Ch. D. 247; 50 L.J.Ch. 39; 43 L.T. 329; 29 W.R, 21. 
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by t h e Companies Act 1948. 
I t i s c o n v e n i e n t t o d i s c u s s t h e d u t i e s o f d i r e c t o r s (7) 
under two headings: (A) f i d u c i a r y d u t i e s o f l o y a l t y and good 
f a i t h , and (B) d u t i e s o f c a r e d i l i g e n c e and s k i l l o 
(A) F i d u c i a r y D u t i e s 
As f i d u c i a r i e s , d i r e c t o r s must d i s p l a y the utmost good f a i t h 
towards t h e company i n t h e i r d e a l i n g s w i t h i t o r on i t s b e h a l f 0 
B e f o r e p r o c e e d i n g f u r t h e r , i t i s u s e f u l t o emphasize c e r t a i n 
p o intSo 
F i r s t , each d i r e c t o r owes h i s d u t i e s o f good f a i t h 
i n d i v i d u a l l y . 
Secondly, t h e d u t i e s are owed t o the company and t o t h e 
company a l o n e 0 T h i s p r i n c i p l e i s regarded as e s t a b l i s h e d by t h e 
d e c i s i o n i n P e r c i v a l v. W r i g h t (8) where a d i r e c t o r bought some 
shares i n the company from a member who wished t o s e l l them 0 The 
d i r e c t o r knew a t t h e t i m e t h a t n e g o t i a t i o n s were i n p r o g r e s s f o r 
a s a l e o f a l l the company's shares a t a h i g h e r p r i c e t h a n he was 
p a y i n g , b u t he d i d not d i s c l o s e t h i s f a c t t o t h e s e l l e r 0 I t was 
h e l d t h a t t h e s a l e should n o t be s e t a s i d e because t h e d i r e c t o r 
owed no d u t y t o t h a t i n d i v i d u a l member. 
Sometimes, however, t h e d i r e c t o r s are i n the p o s i t i o n o f 
agents o f t h e s h a r e h o l d e r s as w e l l o T h i s can a r i s e where the 
s h a r e h o l d e r s e x p r e s s l y a p p o i n t them t o a c t as t h e i r a g e n t s , 
B r i e s s v. Woolley ( 9 ) , o r where by t h e i r own b e h a v i o u r t h e y 
r e n d e r themselves agents f o r t h e s h a r e h o l d e r s , A l l e n v. H y a t t (10) 
But t h i s i s n ot t h e normal l e g a l p o s i t i o n and o n l y a r i s e s i n 
(7) Gower, p 0 5 7 2 0 
(8) [1902/ 2 Cho 421; 71 L 0 J 0 C h 0 846; 18 T 0L„R. 697; 9 Mans. 443 D (9) /1954/ A.C. 333; [1954J 2 W.L.R, 832; [19 5 47 1 A l l EoR. 
909; 98 S = J. 286 D (10) (1914) 30 T.LoRo 444. 
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e x c e p t i o n a l c i r c u m s t a n c e s ( D o 
T h i r d l y t h e f i d u c i a r y d u t i e s are imposed on d i r e c t o r s 
because o f t h e n a t u r e o f t h e work t h e y p e r f o r m . I t i s f o r t h i s 
reason t h a t t h e same d u t i e s ( a l t h o u g h l e s s r i g o r o u s depending 
on t h e p a r t i c u l a r c i r c u m s t a n c e s o f t h e case) a p p l y t o any o f f i c i a l s 
( o t h e r t h a n d i r e c t o r s i n t h e u s u a l sense) o f t h e company who are 
a u t h o r i s e d t o a c t on i t s b e h a l f , p a r t i c u l a r l y t o those i n a 
man a g e r i a l c a p a c i t y a t t h e m a t e r i a l t i m e ( 2 ) . 
As P r o f e s s o r Gower has s t a t e d ( 3 ) , t h e f a c t t h a t d i r e c t o r s 
are f i d u c i a r i e s imposes on them ( i ) s u b j e c t i v e d u t i e s o f honesty 
and good f a i t h , and ( i i ) o b j e c t i v e d u t i e s n o t t o p l a c e themselves 
i n a p o s i t i o n where t h e i r d u t i e s might c o n f l i c t w i t h t h e i r 
p r i v a t e i n t e r e s t s . 
I n p r a c t i c e , i t i s c o n v e n i e n t t o break down each o f these 
i n t o t h r e e subheadings f o r purposes o f a n a l y s i s ( a l t h o u g h i n 
p r a c t i c e t h e y t e n d t o b l e n d t o g e t h e r ) . F i r s t , t h e d i r e c t o r s must 
a c t bona f i d e , t h a t i s i n what t h e y b e l i e v e t o be t h e b e s t i n t e r e s t s 
o f t h e company. Secondly, t h e y must e x e r c i s e t h e i r powers f o r 
the p a r t i c u l a r purpose f o r which they were c o n f e r r e d and not f o r 
some ex t r a n e o u s purpose ( 4 ) . T h i r d l y , t h e d i r e c t o r s must n o t , 
w i t h o u t t h e consent o f the company, p l a c e themselves i n a p o s i t i o n 
i n which t h e r e i s a c o n f l i c t between t h e i r d u t i e s and t h e i r 
p e r s o n a l i n t e r e s t s ( 5 ) . 
1 . Bona Fi d e s 
I t has been s t a t e d by L o r d Green (6) t h a t " ( t h e d i r e c t o r s ) 
(1) See f o r example Coleman v. Myers [1977] 2 N.Z.L.R. 255 0 
( 2 ) See Gower, p.574. 
(3) Gower, p.576. 
(4 ) I b i d . 
( 5 ) Gower, pp.576=-70 
(6) See Re Smith & Fawcett L t d . /1942J 1 A l l E.R. 542; [1942] 
Ch. 304; 111 L.J.Cho 265; 166 L.T. 279. 
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must e x e r c i s e t h e i r d i s c r e t i o n bona f i d e i n what th e y c o n s i d e r — 
n o t what a c o u r t may c o n s i d e r — t o be i n t h e i n t e r e s t s o f t h e 
company, and n o t f o r any c o l l a t e r a l purpose,," 
A q u e s t i o n i s sometimes asked whether o r not t h e e x p r e s s i o n 
• t h e company' means a l l t h e s h a r e h o l d e r s , o r t h e m a j o r i t y s h a r e -
h o l d e r s , o r t h e company as a busine s s c o n c e r n , o r t h e sum t o t a l 
o f t h e p r o p r i e t a r y , employees' and p u b l i c i n t e r e s t s as r e p r e s e n t e d 
by t h e s h a r e h o l d e r s , t h e company's employees, and t h e consumers 
o r p u b l i c a t l a r g e . 
Megarry J . was o f t h e view t h a t ' t he company' does n o t mean 
t h e s e c t i o n a l i n t e r e s t o f some o f t h e p r e s e n t members, b u t o f 
p r e s e n t and f u t u r e members o f t h e company and t h a t a l o n g - t e r m 
view has t o be balanced a g a i n s t s h o r t - t i m e i n t e r e s t s o f p r e s e n t 
members. Thus he remarked i n Gaiman v. N a t i o n a l A s s o c i a t i o n f o r 
Mental H e a l t h ( 7 ) ; 
"The i n t e r e s t s o f some p a r t i c u l a r s e c t i o n o r s e c t i o n s o f t h e 
company cannot be equated w i t h those o f t h e company, and I 
would accept t h e i n t e r e s t s o f b o t h p r e s e n t and f u t u r e members 
o f t h e company, as a whole, as b e i n g a h e l p f u l e x p r e s s i o n o f 
a human e q u i v a l e n t . " 
And L o r d D i p l o c k was o f t h e o p i n i o n t h a t 'the company' may 
cover c r e d i t o r s . Thus he commented i n Lonrho L t d . v. S h e l l 
P e t r o l e u m ( 8 ) t 
" i t i s t h e d u t y o f t h e board t o c o n s i d e r . t h e b e s t i n t e r e s t s 
o f t h e company. These a r e not e x c l u s i v e l y those o f i t s share-
h o l d e r s b u t may i n c l u d e those o f i t s c r e d i t o r s " 
The e x p r e s s i o n 9 the company" now i n c l u d e s the employees 
(7 ) [1971] Ch 0 317 a t 330. But c f . Hogg v. Cramphorn /1967/ Ch. 
254; £19667 3 W.LoR. 995; 110 S.J. 887; /19667 3 A l l E.R. 420. 
See a l s o above p s75„ 
(8) /19807 1 W.L.R. 627, 634. 
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because t h e d i r e c t o r s have now t o r e g a r d t h e i r i n t e r e s t s i n 
g e n e r a l as w e l l as th e i n t e r e s t s o f t h e members o f t h e company (9) 
2 . Proper Purpose 
I f d i r e c t o r s do not e x e r c i s e t h e i r powers f o r purposes f o r 
which t h e y a r e c o n f e r r e d , t h e y have exceeded t h e i r a u t h o r i t y and 
are l i a b l e a c c o r d i n g l y . The r u l e , known as t h e p r o p e r purpose 
r u l e ( 1 0 ) , i s g e n e r a l l y a p p l i c a b l e i n cases i n which d i r e c t o r s 
have used t h e i r powers as d i r e c t o r s f o r an u l t e r i o r purpose 
o t h e r t h a n , o r i n a d d i t i o n t o , t h e i r a p parent o r p r o f e s s e d purpose 
I t i s s p e c i a l l y r e l e v a n t i n cases where d i r e c t o r s misuse t h e i r 
powers t o p r o t e c t t h e i r p o s i t i o n as d i r e c t o r s i n t h e f a c e o f a 
ta k e - o v e r t h r e a t . L i k e any o t h e r power v e s t e d i n t h e d i r e c t o r s , 
t h i s power must be e x e r c i s e d i n t h e b e s t i n t e r e s t s o f th e company 
as a whole, as opposed t o those o f i n d i v i d u a l directors« 
I n Hogg v. Cramphorn ( 1 ) , t h e d i r e c t o r s wished t o g e t c o n t r o l 
i n o r d e r t o f o r e s t a l l a t a k e - o v e r b i d , and t h e r e f o r e t r a n s f e r r e d 
u n i s s u e d shares i n t h e company t o t r u s t e e s t o be h e l d f o r t h e 
b e n e f i t o f t h e employees.. The shares were p a i d f o r by the 
t r u s t e e s o u t o f an i n t e r e s t - f r e e l o a n from t h e company. I t was 
h e l d by Buckley J . t h a t t h a t was a w r o n g f u l e x e r c i s e o f t h e 
d i r e c t o r s ' f i d u c i a r y power. I n r e a c h i n g h i s d e c i s i o n , Buckley J . 
was i n f l u e n c e d by th e d i r e c t o r s t a k i n g i n t o account t h e s t a f f ' s 
i n t e r e s t s . Thus he s a i d ; 
" I am s a t i s f i e d t h a t Mr. B a x t e r ' s o f f e r , when i t became known 
t o t h e company's s t a f f , had an u n s e t t l i n g e f f e c t on them. I am 
(9) S e c t i o n 46 o f Companies A c t 1980. See a l s o above, pp 046~7 and below, p 092 
(10) See g e n e r a l l y Gower, pp.580=2; Hadden, pp„245-8; P e n n i n g t o n , 
Company Law (4th ed.) pp e538=42. 
(1) [19677 Cho 254; /19667 3 W.LoRo 995; /1966J 3 A l l E.R. 420; 
110 S.J. 887. See a l s o L.S. Sealy (1967) C.L.J. 33; K.W. 
Wedderburn (1967) 30 M.L.R. 77; (1968) 31 M.L.R. 688. 
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a l s o s a t i s f i e d t h a t t h e d i r e c t o r s and t h e t r u s t e e s o f t h e t r u s t 
deed g e n u i n e l y c o n s i d e r e d t h a t t o g i v e t he s t a f f t h r o u g h t h e 
t r u s t e e s a s i z e a b l e , though i n d i r e c t , v o i c e i n t h e a f f a i r s o f 
th e company would b e n e f i t b o t h t h e s t a f f and t h e company„ I am 
sure t h a t C o l o n e l Cramphorn and a l s o p r o b a b l y h i s f e l l o w d i r e c t o r s 
f i r m l y b e l i e v e d t h a t t o keep t h e management o f t h e company's 
a f f a i r s i n t h e hands o f t h e e x i s t i n g board would be more 
advantageous t o t h e s h a r e h o l d e r s , t h e company's s t a f f and i t s 
customers than i f i t were committed t o a board s e l e c t e d by 
Mr. B a x t e r . " 
However Buckley J . took t h e view t h a t t he d i r e c t o r s had no r i g h t 
t o e x e r c i s e t h e i r power t o i s s u e shares, i n o r d e r t o d e f e a t an 
a t t e m p t t o secure c o n t r o l o f t h e company, even i f t h e y c o n s i d e r e d 
t h a t i n d o i n g so they were a c t i n g i n t h e company's b e s t interests« 
Buckley J's view about t h e d i r e c t o r s t a k i n g i n t o account t h e 
s t a f f ' s i n t e r e s t s was not shared by h i s c o u n t e r p a r t i n Canada 
because i n Teck C o r p o r a t i o n v. M i l l a r ( 2 ) Berger J . r e f u s e d t o 
f o l l o w Hogg y B Cramphorn L t d c Thus he commented? 
" I n d e f i n i n g t h e f i d u c i a r y d u t i e s o f d i r e c t o r s , t h e law ought 
t o t a k e i n t o account t h e f a c t t h a t t h e c o r p o r a t i o n p r o v i d e s t h e 
l e g a l framework f o r t h e development o f r e s o u r c e s and t h e gene-
r a t i o n o f w e a l t h i n t h e p r i v a t e s e c t o r o f t h e Canadian economy., 
A c l a s s i c a l t h e o r y t h a t once was u n c h a l l e n g e a b l e must y i e l d t o 
th e f a c t s o f modern l i f e , , I n f a c t , o f course, i t has. I f today 
t h e d i r e c t o r s o f a company were t o c o n s i d e r t h e i n t e r e s t s o f 
i t s employees no one would argue t h a t i n d o i n g so t h e y were 
n o t a c t i n g bona f i d e i n t h e i n t e r e s t s o f t h e company i t s e l f 0 
S i m i l a r l y , i f t h e d i r e c t o r s were t o c o n s i d e r t he consequences 
(2 ) (1972) 33 DoLoRo (3d) 288, a d e c i s i o n from Supreme C o u r t o f 
B r i t i s h C o l umbia 0 See a l s o B 0V. S l u t s k y (1974) 37 M„L 0Ro 457; MoEo Bennun (1975) 24 IoCLoQo 359„ 
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t o t h e community o f any p o l i c y t h a t t h e company i n t e n d e d t o 
pursue, and were d e f l e c t e d i n t h e i r commitment t o t h a t p o l i c y 
as a r e s u l t , i t c o u l d n o t be s a i d t h a t they had n o t c o n s i d e r e d 
bona f i d e t h e i n t e r e s t s o f t h e s h a r e h o l d e r s . I a p p r e c i a t e t h a t 
i t would be a breach o f t h e i r d u t y f o r d i r e c t o r s t o d i s r e g a r d 
e n t i r e l y t h e i n t e r e s t s o f a company's s h a r e h o l d e r s i n o r d e r t o 
c o n f e r a b e n e f i t on i t s employees. But i f t h e y observe a decent 
r e s p e c t f o r o t h e r i n t e r e s t s l y i n g beyond those o f t h e company's 
s h a r e h o l d e r s i n the s t r i c t sense, t h a t w i l l n o t , i n my v i e w , 
l e a v e d i r e c t o r s open t o t h e charge t h a t they have f a i l e d i n 
t h e i r f i d u c i a r y d u t y t o t h e company." ( 3 ) 
The Teck case was approved by t h e P r i v y C o u n c i l i n Howard 
Smith L t d . v . Ampol Petroleum Ltdo ( 4 ) , another t a k e - o v e r b a t t l e 
case, L o r d W i l b e r f o r c e commenting; 
" ( B e r g e r J's) d e c i s i o n u p h o l d i n g t h e agreement w i t h Canex on 
t h i s b a s i s appears t o be i n l i n e w i t h t h e E n g l i s h and 
A u s t r a l i a n a u t h o r i t i e s t o which r e f e r e n c e has been made." (5) 
I t i s o f importance t o note t h e approach Berger J . used i n 
t h e Teck case. The r u l e he used seemed t o be whether t h e d i r e c t o r s 
had r e a s o n a b l e grounds f o r t h e i r b e l i e f (6) n o t whether t h e i r 
(3) Berger J . was o f t h e view t h a t Hogg v. Cramphorn /1967/ Ch. 254; 
£19667 3 w.L.R. 995; /1966J 3 A l l E.R. 420; 110 S.J. 887 was i n c o n -
s i s t e n t w i t h t h e view o f t h e law taken i n Re Smith and Fawcett L t d e 
[1942] 1 A l l E.R. 542 t o t h e e f f e c t t h a t t h e d i r e c t o r s must e x e r c i s e 
t h e i r d i s c r e t i o n bona f i d e i n what t h e y , and n o t t h e c o u r t , c o n s i d e r 
t o be t h e i n t e r e s t s o f t h e company and f o r no c o l l a t e r a l purpose. 
He t r i e d t o d i s t i n g u i s h Hogg case from the case b e f o r e him by 
s t a t i n g t h a t i n Hogg case t h e d i r e c t o r s were s e e k i n g t o r e t a i n 
c o n t r o l o f t h e i r company w h i l e he was concerned w i t h a case where 
t h e i r p r i m a r y purpose was t o make the b e s t c o n t r a c t f o r the company 
t h a t t h e y c o u l d , n o t b e i n g m o t i v a t e d p r i m a r i l y by a d e s i r e t o 
r e t a i n control„ 
(4) f l 9 7 4 ] A.Co 821; [1914] 2 W.L.R0 689; /1974J 1 A l l E.R. 1126. 
See a l s o J.R. B i r d s (1974) 37 M.L.R. 580; M.E. Bennun (1975) 24 
I.C.L.Q. 359. 
(5) I t i s i n t e r e s t i n g t o n o t e t h a t t h e P r i v y C o u n c i l appears t o 
have s i m u l t a n e o u s l y approved b o t h Hogg v. Cramphorn and Teck case 
a l t h o u g h the two cases are i n c o n s i s t e n t w i t h each o t h e r D 
(6) (1973) 33 DoLoRe (3d) a t 315-6 0 
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b e l i e f was c o r r e c t o He was a p p a r e n t l y t r y i n g t o e s t a b l i s h n o t 
what t h e rea s o n a b l e d i r e c t o r ought t o do under a g i v e n s e t o f 
ci r c u m s t a n c e s b u t what the re a s o n a b l e d i r e c t o r m i g h t d o e Thus 
he remarked? 
"My own v i e w , i s t h a t t h e d i r e c t o r s ought t o be a l l o w e d t o 
c o n s i d e r who i s seeki n g c o n t r o l and why. I f they b e l i e v e t h a t 
t h e r e w i l l be s u b s t a n t i a l damage t o t h e company's i n t e r e s t s i f 
th e company i s taken o v e r , then t h e e x e r c i s e o f t h e i r powers 
t o d e f e a t those seeking a m a j o r i t y w i l l n o t n e c e s s a r i l y be 
c a t e g o r i s e d as i m p r o p e r 0 . . 1 t i s no p a r t o f t h i s c o u r t ' s 
f u n c t i o n t o decide what c o n t r a c t A f t o n s h o u l d have made o r 
whom i t s h o u l d have made i t w i t h o " 
On t h e o t h e r hand t h e P r i v y C o u n c i l adopted a more o b j e c t i v e 
t e s t i n t h e Howard Smith case. Thus L o r d W i l b e r f o r c e s a i d : 
"o..the C o u r t . . . i s e n t i t l e d t o lo o k a t t h e s i t u a t i o n o b j e c t i v e l y 
i n o r d e r t o e s t i m a t e how c r i t i c a l o r p r e s s i n g , o r s u b s t a n t i a l , 
o r per c o n t r a , i n s u b s t a n t i a l an a l l e g e d r e q u i r e m e n t may have 
beerio I f i t f i n d s t h a t a p a r t i c u l a r r e q u i r e m e n t , though r e a l , 
was n o t u r g e n t , o r c r i t i c a l , a t t h e r e l e v a n t t i m e , i t may have 
reason t o doubt, o r d i s c o u n t , t h e a s s e r t i o n o f i n d i v i d u a l s t h a t 
t h e y a c t e d s o l e l y i n o r d e r t o d e a l w i t h i t , p a r t i c u l a r l y when 
th e a c t i o n t h e y took was unusual o r even extremeo" ( 7) 
S e c t i o n 46 o f t h e Companies Act 1980 (8) has now come t o 
the a i d o f d i r e c t o r s who t a k e i n t o account employees' i n t e r e s t s 
i n t h e performance o f t h e i r f u n c t i o n s , and i t i s d o u b t f u l whether, 
i f s i m i l a r f a c t s arose t o d a y , t h e c o u r t would d e c i d e i n t h e same 
manner as Buckley J c d i d i n t h e Hogg case= Indeed i t l o o k s l i k e l y 
(7) /19747 1 A l l E 0Ro 1126 a t 1131-2. 
(8) See a l s o above, p p a 4 6 - 7 0 
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t h a t t h e c o u r t would g i v e a judgment i n f a v o u r o f t h e d i r e c t o r s * 
I t i s n o t v e r y c l e a r whether the p r o p e r purpose d o c t r i n e i s 
a d i r e c t o r ' s f i d u c i a r y d u t y o r a mere r u l e o f i n t e r p r e t a t i o n o f 
th e a r t i c l e s so t h a t i t can be excluded by a p p r o p r i a t e d r a f t i n g ( 9 ) 
The view t h a t t h e p r o p e r purpose d u t y can be exc l u d e d i s 
founded on Re Smith & Fawcett (10) where t h e a r t i c l e s gave t he 
d i r e c t o r s an u n c o n t r o l l e d d i s c r e t i o n t o r e f u s e t o r e g i s t e r a 
t r a n s f e r . A, as e x e c u t o r o f h i s f a t h e r , c l a i m e d t o be p u t on 
t h e r e g i s t e r i n r e s p e c t o f 4,001 shares h e l d by h i s f a t h e r . The 
d i r e c t o r s r e f u s e d t o pu t A on t h e r e g i s t e r u n l e s s he s o l d 2,000 
shares t o a d i r e c t o r , i n which case t h e y would r e g i s t e r A i n 
r e s p e c t o f 2,001 shares. A c h a l l e n g e d t h e r e f u s a l . 
The C o u r t o f Appeal h e l d t h a t as t h e d i r e c t o r s were a c t i n g 
i n t h e b e s t i n t e r e s t s o f t h e company as the y saw them t h e d i r e c t o r s 
d i s c r e t i o n was u n l i m i t e d . F u r t h e r , no mala f i d e s had been shown 
and the r e f u s a l t o r e g i s t e r t h e t r a n s f e r was a l l o w e d t o s t a n d . 
L o r d Green, M.R. commented: 
" . . . t h i s t y p e o f a r t i c l e i s one which i s f o r the most p a r t 
c o n f i n e d t o p r i v a t e companies. P r i v a t e companies a r e , o f co u r s e , 
s e p a r a t e e n t i t i e s i n law j u s t as much as are p u b l i c companies, 
b u t from the b u s i n e s s and p e r s o n a l p o i n t o f view t h e y are much 
more analogous t o p a r t n e r s h i p s t h a n t o p u b l i c c o r p o r a t i o n s . 
A c c o r d i n g l y , i t i s t o be expected t h a t , i n t h e a r t i c l e s o f such 
a company, t h e c o n t r o l o f th e d i r e c t o r s o v e r the membership may 
(9) See J.R= B i r d s (1974) 37 M.L.R. 580; B.V. S l u t s k y (1974) 37 
M.LoR. 457, 460? D.D. P r e n t i c e (1970) 33 M.L.R. a t 703. See a l s o 
D.D. P r e n t i c e ' s m o d i f i e d views i n h i s a r t i c l e (1977) 40 M.L.R. 
589. Gower on Modern Company Law, 3rd ed., s t a t e d a t p.524, " i t 
i s f o r t h e c o u r t t o d e c i d e on a t r u e i n t e r p r e t a t i o n o f t h e 
a r t i c l e s what t h e ;purpose was f o r which t h e power was c o n f e r r e d 
b u t i t appears t h a t he has not r e f e r r e d t o any i n t e r p r e t a t i o n 
o f a r t i c l e s i n t h e S e c t i o n on Proper Purpose (p.580) i n h i s 
4 t h e d i t i o n . 
(10) [19A2] 1 A l l E.R. 542; /1942/ Ch. 304; 111 L.J.Ch. 265; 
166 L.T. 279. 
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be v e r y s t r i c t i n d e e d . There are v e r y good b u s i n e s s reasons, o r 
t h e r e may be v e r y good b u s i n e s s reasons, why those who b r i n g such 
companies i n t o e x i s t e n c e s h o u l d g i v e them a c o n s t i t u t i o n which 
g i v e s t o the d i r e c t o r s powers o f t h e w i d e s t d e s c r i p t i o n , . I n t h e 
p r e s e n t case t h e a r t i c l e i s as f o l l o w s : "The d i r e c t o r s may a t any 
t i m e i n t h e i r a b s o l u t e and u n c o n t r o l l e d d i s c r e t i o n r e f u s e t o 
r e g i s t e r any t r a n s f e r o f shares." As I have s a i d , i t i s beyond 
q u e s t i o n t h a t t h a t i s a f i d u c i a r y power, and t h e d i r e c t o r s must 
e x e r c i s e i t bona f i d e i n what they c o n s i d e r t o be t h e i n t e r e s t s 
o f t h e company. The language o f t h e a r t i c l e does n o t p o i n t t o 
any p a r t i c u l a r m a t t e r as b e i n g the o n l y m a t t e r t o which t h e 
d i r e c t o r s are t o pay a t t e n t i o n i n d e c i d i n g whether o r not they 
w i l l a l l o w the t r a n s f e r t o be r e g i s t e r e d „ . . I n cases where 
a r t i c l e s a re framed w i t h some such l i m i t a t i o n on t h e d i s c r e t i o n -
a r y power o f r e f u s a l as . . . i t f o l l o w s on p l a i n p r i n c i p l e t h a t , 
i f t h e y go o u t s i d e t h e m a t t e r s which t h e a r t i c l e s say are t o be 
th e o n l y m a t t e r s t o w h i c h t h e y are t o have r e g a r d , t h e d i r e c t o r s 
w i l l have exceeded t h e i r powers 
From t h e case i t seems t h a t the c o u r t d e a l t w i t h t h e i n t e r -
p r e t a t i o n o f a r e l e v a n t a r t i c l e a t g r e a t e r l e n g t h than t h e bona 
f i d e s o f d i r e c t o r s o 
I n r e c e n t years t h e r e has been a growth o f s c h o o l o f t h o u g h t 
i n t h e Commonwealth ( 1 ) r e g a r d i n g t h e 'proper purposes' as merely 
one aspect o f the much w i d e r d u t y r e q u i r i n g a d i r e c t o r t o a c t bona 
f i d e i n the b e s t i n t e r e s t s o f t h e company as a whole ( 2 ) . 
For example i n Teck C o r p o r a t i o n L t d o v. M i l l a r ( 3 ) i t was h e l d 
t h a t t h e 'proper purpose r u l e ' i s merely an aspect o f the broader 
( 1 ) See BoVo S l u t s k y ( 1 9 7 4 ) 37 M .LoRo 4 5 7 ; S . J . B u r r i d g e ( 1 9 8 1 ) 
44 M .LcRo 40 a t 4 4 . 
( 2 ) See a l s o Sealy's Cases and M a t e r i a l s on Company Law (2nd ed.) 
p p „ 4 6 8 - 7 0 o 
( 3 ) ( 1 9 7 2 ) 33 DoL.Ro ( 3 d ) 2 8 8 . 
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p r i n c i p l e t h a t d i r e c t o r s must a c t bona f i d e i n the b e s t i n t e r e s t s 
o f t h e company as a whole. Thus Berger J . remarked t h e r e : 
"The cases decided i n t h e U n i t e d Kingdom make i t p l a i n t h a t 
d i r e c t o r s , i n the e x e r c i s e o f t h e i r powers, must a c t i n what they 
bona f i d e c o n s i d e r t o be t h e b e s t i n t e r e s t s o f t h e company. I f 
th e y i s s u e shares t o r e t a i n c o n t r o l f o r themselves, t h a t i s an 
improper purpose . . . L o r d Green M.R., expressed t h e g e n e r a l 
r u l e i n t h i s way i n Re Smith & Fawcett L t d . , ZJ942.7 Ch.304 a t 
p.306: "They ( t h e d i r e c t o r s ) must e x e r c i s e t h e i r d i s c r e t i o n bona 
f i d e i n what they c o n s i d e r - n o t what a c o u r t may c o n s i d e r - i s 
i n t he i n t e r e s t s o f t h e company, and not f o r any c o l l a t e r a l 
purpose." Y e t , i f Hogg v. Cramphorn L t d . , supra, i s r i g h t , d i r e c -
t o r s may n o t a l l o t shares t o f r u s t r a t e an a t t e m p t t o o b t a i n c o n t r o l 
o f t h e company, even i f t h e y b e l i e v e t h a t i t i s t h e b e s t i n t e r e s t s 
o f t h e company t o do so. T h i s i s i n c o n s i s t e n t w i t h t h e law as 
l a i d down i n Re Smith & Fawcett L t d . How can i t be s a i d t h a t 
d i r e c t o r s have t h e r i g h t t o c o n s i d e r t he i n t e r e s t s o f t h e company, 
and t o e x e r c i s e t h e i r powers a c c o r d i n g l y , b u t t h a t t h e r e i s an 
e x c e p t i o n when i t comes t o t h e power t o i s s u e s h a r e s , and t h a t i n 
the e x e r c i s e o f such power t h e d i r e c t o r s cannot i n any c i r c u m s t a n c e s 
i s s u e shares t o d e f e a t an a t t e m p t t o g a i n c o n t r o l o f t h e company? 
I t seems t o me t h i s i s what Hogg v. Cramphorn L t d . s a y s e I f t h e 
g e n e r a l r u l e i s t o be i n f r i n g e d h e r e , w i l l i t n o t be i n f r i n g e d 
elsewhere? I f t h e d i r e c t o r s , even when th e y b e l i e v e t h e y are s e r -
v i n g t h e b e s t i n t e r e s t s o f the company, cannot i s s u e shares t o 
d e f e a t an a t t e m p t t o o b t a i n c o n t r o l , then presumably t h e y cannot 
e x e r c i s e any o t h e r o f t h e i r powers t o d e f e a t t h e c l a i m s of t h e 
m a j o r i t y o r , f o r t h a t m a t t e r , t o d e p r i v e t h e m a j o r i t y o f t h e 
advantages o f c o n t r o l . I do n o t t h i n k t h e power t o i s s u e shares 
can be se g r e g a t e d , on the b a s i s t h a t t he r u l e i n Hogg v. Cramphorn 
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L t d . a p p l i e s o n l y i n a case o f an a l l o t m e n t o f shares." 
And i n t h e P e n n e l l case Templeman J . (as he t h e n was) seemingly 
f a v o u r e d t h i s school o f t h o u g h t ( 4 ) . 
As t h e case law now stands ( 5 ) , t h e o p e r a t i o n o f t h e p r o p e r 
purpose d o c t r i n e remains some k i n d o f guesswork f o r those concerned 
and i t i s t o be hoped t h a t i n the n e x t Companies A c t i t w i l l e x p r e s s l y 
be s t a t e d whether o r n o t t h e proper purpose d u t y has been o r should 
be regarded as a f i d u c i a r y d u t y . I t should be noted t h a t t h e a p p l i -
c a t i o n o f the proper purpose d o c t r i n e i s n o t c o n f i n e d t o a power t o 
i s s u e shares and i t i s as w e l l t h a t i n the n e x t p r o p o s a l t o govern-
ment t h e Department o f Trade should r e c o g n i s e t h a t i n s t e a d o f p r o -
v i d i n g f o r a g e n e r a l s t a t e m e n t o f t h e d u t i e s o f d i r e c t o r s i n s t a t u t e 
law, t h e r e should be d e t a i l e d s t a t e d s t a t u t o r y d u t i e s o f d i r e c t o r s . 
3. C o n f l i c t o f Duty and I n t e r e s t 
As f i d u c i a r i e s , d i r e c t o r s must not p l a c e themselves i n a 
p o s i t i o n i n which t h e r e i s a c o n f l i c t between t h e i r d u t i e s t o t h e 
company and t h e i r p e r s o n a l i n t e r e s t s . 
For purposes of a n a l y s i s i t i s c o n v e n i e n t t o break t h i s down 
i n t o two subheadings, namely ( a ) c o n t r a c t s w i t h t h e company and (b) 
use o f c o r p o r a t e p r o p e r t y , i n f o r m a t i o n o r o p p o r t u n i t y . 
( a ) C o n t r a c t s w i t h t h e Company 
D i r e c t o r s have been e n t e r i n g i n t o t r a n s a c t i o n s w i t h t h e i r 
companies. Commonly such t r a n s a c t i o n s are i n t h e form o f a s a l e 
t o t h e company by the d i r e c t o r of assets i n which he i s i n t e r e s t e d , 
(4) See SoJo B u r r i d g e (1981) 44 M.L.R. 40 a t 50. 
(5) See, e.g., P i e r c y v. S. M i l l s & Co., L t d . ^1920j 1 Ch. 77 where 
a company was i n no f u r t h e r need o f c a p i t a l , b u t t h e d i r e c t o r s used 
t h e i r powers t o i s s u e shares by a l l o t t i n g some t o themselves s o l e l y 
i n o r d e r t o a c q u i r e t h e m a j o r i t y o f t h e v o t i n g power, and t o d e f e a t 
t h e wishes of t h e e x i s t i n g m a j o r i t y s h a r e h o l d e r s ; Punt v. Symons & 
Co., L t d . /"1903J 2 Ch. 506 where t h e d i r e c t o r s i s s u e d shares w i t h 
t h e s o l e o b j e c t and i n t e n t i o n o f c r e a t i n g v o t i n g power t o c a r r y o u t 
a proposed a l t e r a t i o n i n t h e a r t i c l e s ; Gaiman v. N a t i o n a l A s s o c i a t i o n 
o f M e n t a l H e a l t h {19707 2 A l l E.R. 362. 
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or a purchase o f p r o p e r t y from t h e company by the d i r e c t o r . As 
a f o r e s a i d , as f i d u c i a r i e s , d i r e c t o r s must n o t pl a c e themselves i n 
a p o s i t i o n i n which t h e r e i s a c o n f l i c t between t h e i r d u t i e s t o t h e 
company and t h e i r p e r s o n a l i n t e r e s t s . So a c o n t r a c t o r t r a n s a c t i o n 
which produces such a c o n f l i c t i s l i a b l e t o be r e s c i n d e d o r avoided 
by t h e company. The a u t h o r i t y f o r t h i s p r o p o s i t i o n i s founded i n 
Aberdeen Railway v. B l a i k l e ( 6 ) where L o r d Cranworth L.C. had t h i s 
t o say: 
"A c o r p o r a t e body can o n l y a c t by agents, and i t i s , o f co u r s e , 
th e d u t y o f those agents so t o a c t as b e s t t o promote t h e i n t e r e s t s 
o f t h e c o r p o r a t i o n whose a f f a i r s t h e y are c o n d u c t i n g . Such agents 
have d u t i e s t o d i s c h a r g e o f a f i d u c i a r y n a t u r e towards t h e i r p r i n -
c i p a l . And i t i s a r u l e o f u n i v e r s a l a p p l i c a t i o n t h a t no one, 
h a v i n g such d u t i e s t o d i s c h a r g e , s h a l l be a l l o w e d t o e n t e r i n t o 
engagements i n which he has, o r can have, a p e r s o n a l i n t e r e s t 
c o n f l i c t i n g , o r which p o s s i b l y may c o n f l i c t , w i t h t h e i n t e r e s t s 
o f those whom he i s bound t o p r o t e c t . . . So s t r i c t l y i s t h i s 
p r i n c i p l e adhered t o t h a t no q u e s t i o n i s a l l o w e d t o be r a i s e d as 
t o t h e f a i r n e s s o r u n f a i r n e s s o f a c o n t r a c t so e n t e r e d i n t o . " 
I t i s n o t s u r p r i s i n g t h a t t h i s s t r i c t r u l e was not a c c e p t a b l e 
t o t h e business community and i t soon became the p r a c t i c e t o ensure 
t h a t t h e company waived i t . P r i o r t o 1929 i t was e s t a b l i s h e d t h a t 
a r t i c l e s c o u l d e f f e c t i v e l y exempt from l i a b i l i t y e xcept f o r breaches 
which were f r a u d u l e n t . Thus i n Re C i t y E q u i t a b l e F i r e I n s u r a n c e 
Co. ( 7 ) a p e t i t i o n was f i l e d f o r t h e wi n d i n g - u p o f an i n s u r a n c e 
company a t one ti m e d o i n g a l a r g e b u s i n e s s , owing t o l o s s e s caused 
by t h e f r a u d and m i s a p p r o p r i a t i o n o f t h e managing d i r e c t o r , and i t 
(6) (1854) 1 Macq. 461. 
(7) [1925] 1 Ch.407; 94 L.J.Ch. 445; 133 L.T. 520; 40 T.L.R. 853; 
[1925] B. & C.R. 109. See a l s o t he cases r e f e r r e d t o t h e r e i n and 
Re B r a z i l i a Rubber P l a n t a t i o n s and E s t a t e s L t d . / l 9 1 l j 1 Ch. 425„ 
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was d i s c o v e r e d t h a t t h e r e was a d e f i c i t o f about £1,200,000 i n t h e 
funds which t he company s h o u l d have possessed. The balance sheets 
showed l a r g e t r a d i n g p r o f i t s , and the l o s s was due t o d e p r e c i a t i o n 
o f i n d u s t r i a l s e c u r i t i e s i n which t he company's money had been 
i n v e s t e d , and t o a l l o w i n g t h e company's manager and t h e i r s t o c k -
b r o k e r s , o f which f i r m t h e i r managing d i r e c t o r was s e n i o r p a r t n e r , 
t o become possessed o f v e r y l a r g e sums o f money p r o p e r l y b e l o n g i n g 
t o t h e company, which were e n t i r e l y l o s t . The o f f i c i a l r e c e i v e r , 
as l i q u i d a t o r , took o u t a misfeasance summons a l l e g i n g misfeasance, 
n e g l i g e n c e , breach o f t r u s t , and breach o f d u t y a g a i n s t t h e d i r e c -
t o r s . I t was h e l d t h a t i n c e r t a i n p a r t i c u l a r s t he d i r e c t o r s had 
f a i l e d i n t h e i r f u l l d u t y t o the company, b u t were excused from 
l i a b i l i t y by a r t i c l e 150 o f t h e company's a r t i c l e s , which p r o v i d e d : 
"None o f the d i r e c t o r s . . . s h o u l d be answerable f o r the a c t s , 
r e c e i p t s , n e g l e c t s , o r d e f a u l t s o f the o t h e r s o f them, o r f o r any 
bankers o r o t h e r persons w i t h whom any moneys o r e f f e c t s b e l o n g i n g 
t o t h e company should be lodged f o r s a f e c u s t o d y , o r f o r i n s u f f i -
c i e n c y o r d e f i c i e n c y o f any s e c u r i t y upon which any moneys o f the 
company should be i n v e s t e d , o r f o r any o t h e r l o s s , m i s f o r t u n e , o r 
damage i n r e l a t i o n t h e r e t o , u n l e s s t h e same sho u l d happen by o r 
t h r o u g h t h e i r own w i l f u l n e g l e c t o r d e f a u l t . " 
As a consequence o f t h i s d e c i s i o n , the Greene Committee Report( 
recommended t h a t such a r t i c l e s s hould be f o r b i d d e n . T h i s recom-
mendation was d u l y enacted i n the Companies A c t o f 1929 and sub-
s e q u e n t l y r e e n a c t e d as s e c t i o n 205 o f t h e Companies A c t 1948. 
S e c t i o n 205 o f t h e Companies a c t 1948 p r o v i d e s as f o l l o w s : 
o . any p r o v i s i o n , whether c o n t a i n e d i n t h e a r t i c l e s o f a 
company o r i n any c o n t r a c t w i t h t he company o r o t h e r w i s e , f o r 
exempting any o f f i c e r „ „ . from „ . . any l i a b i l i t y which by 
(8) Cmdo 2657. 
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v i r t u e o f any r u l e o f law would o t h e r w i s e a t t a c h t o him i n r e s p e c t 
o f any n e g l i g e n c e , d e f a u l t , breach o f d u t y o r breach o f t r u s t o f 
which he may be g u i l t y i n r e l a t i n g t o the company s h a l l be void«," 
A l l t h i s causes no d i f f i c u l t y , and no p o s s i b i l i t y o f doubt as 
t o t h e meaning o f s.205 o f t h e 1948 A c t c o u l d have a r i s e n i f i t had 
n o t been f o r the f a c t t h a t A r t i c l e 84(3) o f Table A, which i s con-
t a i n e d i n t h e v e r y same 1948 A c t as i s s.205 o f t h e 1948 A c t , appears 
on t h e f a c e o f i t t o r e l i e v e d i r e c t o r s from t h e consequences o f a 
breach o f d u t y which t a k e s t h e form o f h a v i n g an i n t e r e s t i n any 
c o n t r a c t t o which t h e company i s a party» A r t i c l e 84(3) reads as 
f o l l o w s : 
". o «, nor s h a l l e « . any c o n t r a c t e n t e r e d i n t o by o r on b e h a l f 
o f t h e company i n which any d i r e c t o r i s i n any way i n t e r e s t e d , be 
l i a b l e t o be av o i d e d , nor s h a l l any d i r e c t o r so c o n t r a c t i n g o r 
b e i n g so i n t e r e s t e d be l i a b l e t o account t o t h e company f o r any 
p r o f i t r e a l i s e d by any such c o n t r a c t o r arrangement by reason o f 
such d i r e c t o r h o l d i n g t h a t o f f i c e o r o f the f i d u c i a r y r e l a t i o n 
t h e r e b y e s t a b l i s h e d . , " 
I f such an a r t i c l e had not appeared i n Table A o f t h e Companies 
Ac t 1948, i t would n o t have been doubted t h a t i t c o n t r a v e n e d s„205 
o f t h e 1948 A c t and was t h e r e f o r e v o i d o 
What i s even worse i s t h a t some companies adopt a r t i c l e s i n 
terms s i m i l a r t o the f o l l o w i n g i n s t e a d o f a d o p t i n g a r t i c l e 84(2) o f 
Table A, which p r o h i b i t s a d i r e c t o r f rom v o t i n g on a c o n t r a c t i n 
which he has an i n t e r e s t o r b e i n g counted i n t h e quorum a t t h e board 
meeting a t which t he board o f d i r e c t o r s decides t h a t t he company 
shou l d e n t e r i n t o such a c o n t r a c t : 
"A d i r e c t o r may v o t e i n r e g a r d t o any c o n t r a c t o r arrangement i n 
which he i s i n t e r e s t e d o r upon any m a t t e r a r i s i n g t h e r e o u t and i f 
he s h a l l so v o t e h i s v o t e s h a l l be counted and he s h a l l be reckoned 
i n e s t i m a t i n g t h e quorum p r e s e n t o " 
- 100 -
Such an a r t i c l e seems t o be i n more f l a g r a n t breach o f s e c t i o n 
205 o f t h e Companies A c t 1948, y e t i t appears t h a t a r t i c l e s i n t h i s 
f o rm are adopted by some p r i v a t e companies. 
One s c h o o l o f t h o u g h t i s o f t h e o p i n i o n t h a t t h e e f f e c t o f s.205 
o f t h e 1948 A c t i s t h a t l i a b i l i t y f o r breach o f d u t y cannot be 
e x c l u d e d by t h e a r t i c l e s , b u t t h a t t h e scope o f t h e d u t y can s t i l l 
be d e t e r m ined by t h e a r t i c l e s , s u b j e c t t o the g e n e r a l p r i n c i p l e t h a t 
no c l a u s e can p r o t e c t the d i r e c t o r s a g a i n s t the consequences o f 
t h e i r own f r a u d ( 9 ) 0 
Construed l i t e r a l l y , s e c t i o n 205 o f the 1948 A c t does r e f e r 
o n l y t o r e s t r i c t i o n s on l i a b i l i t y , n o t on the scope o f any p a r t i c u l a r 
d u t y . But t h e d i f f i c u l t y i s t h i s . A l t h o u g h such a submission has 
some m e r i t , i t would p e r m i t a r t i c l e s t o r e l e a s e d i r e c t o r s from n e a r l y 
a l l d u t i e s so l o n g as one remained because i t c o u l d s t i l l be argued 
t h a t n o t a l l t h e d u t y had been e x c l u d e d ; i t had merely been r e s t r i c t e d . 
B i r d s (10) argues t h a t d e s p i t e t h a t , l i t e r a l l y c o n s t r u e d , s e c t i o n 
205 o f t h e 1948 A c t r e f e r s o n l y t o e x c l u s i o n o f l i a b i l i t y , a r t i c l e s 
p u r p o r t i n g t o e x c l u d e any d u t y which t h e g e n e r a l law c a s t s upon a 
company d i r e c t o r , o t h e r than t h e p r o p e r purposes d o c t r i n e , are v o i d 
under s e c t i o n 205 o f t h e 1948 A c t . Sometimes i t i s t r u e t h a t these 
d u t i e s can be m o d i f i e d t o c e r t a i n e x t e n t , but the p o s i t i o n i s not 
c l e a r as t o t h e e x t e n t o f such m o d i f i c a t i o n . I t i s u n f o r t u n a t e t h a t 
t h e r e are some A r t i c l e s i n T a b l e A which seem t o e x c l u d e a d u t y o f 
d i r e c t o r s . But they are b e s t t r e a t e d t o be e x c e p t i o n a l f o r t h e i r 
v a l i d i t y r e l i e s on t h e i r i n c l u s i o n i n an A c t . 
(9) E.g. Gower and Gore-Browne. I n 4 t h edn. o f P r i n c i p l e s o f Modern 
Company Law, Gower argues ( i n a d d i t i o n ) a t p.586 t h a t j u s t as the 
normal o b l i g a t i o n s o f t r u s t e e s can be waived o r m o d i f i e d by express 
p r o v i s i o n s i n the t r u s t deed under which t h y y were a p p o i n t e d , so 
( w i t h i n l i m i t s ) can t h e normal f i d u c i a r y d u t i e s o f d i r e c t o r s be 
m o d i f i e d by express p r o v i s i o n i n t h e company's c o n s t i t u t i o n . 
(10) See J.R. B i r d s (1976) 39 M.L.R. 394, 399. 
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I t seems t h a t t h e s p e c i a l a r t i c l e a l l o w i n g a d i r e c t o r t o v o t e 
i n r e g a r d t o c o n t r a c t s i n which he i s i n t e r e s t e d quoted t o be used 
i n l i e u o f A r t i c l e 84(2) o f Table A, a l t h o u g h i n t h e o p i n i o n o f t h e 
w r i t e r a breach o f s.205 o f the 1948 A c t , i s f a i r and reasonable i n 
th e case o f a sm a l l p r i v a t e company, b u t not so f o r a company w i t h 
m i n o r i t y s h a r e h o l d e r s o r a p u b l i c company. I t goes t o show t h a t 
t h e p e r p l e x i t i e s i n t h i s 1 f i e l d o f company law a r i s e o u t o f t h a t one 
se t o f company law has t o c a t e r f o r companies o f a v a s t l y d i f f e r e n t 
c h a r a c t e r and f o r m . I t i s h i g h time t h a t t h e r e s h o u l d be se p a r a t e 
r u l e s o f d i r e c t o r s * d u t i e s f o r p u b l i c ( o r l a r g e ) companies, medium 
( o r medium unquoted) companies and sm a l l companies r e s p e c t i v e l y ( 1) 
The law on wa i v e r c l a u s e s i n a r t i c l e s i s thus c o n f u s e d . But 
i t i s i n e v i t a b l e t h a t companies w i l l wish and need t o e n t e r i n t o 
c o n t r a c t s w i t h t h e i r d i r e c t o r s , and i t i s t h e r e f o r e necessary t h a t 
t h e y may be a b l e t o do so. Some form o f s o l u t i o n t o t h e problem o f 
th e r e s u l t i n g c o n f l i c t o f d u t y and i n t e r e s t has t h e r e f o r e t o be 
fo u n d , and i t i s s u b m i t t e d t h a t a more e f f e c t i v e s a f e g u a r d f o r a 
d i r e c t o r who d e s i r e s t o p r o t e c t h i m s e l f a g a i n s t the p o s s i b i l i t y o f 
r e s c i s s i o n i n these c i r c u m s t a n c e s ( i n s t e a d o f r e l y i n g on some s o r t 
o f e x c l u s i o n c l a u s e ) i s t o f u l l y d i s c l o s e h i s i n t e r e s t t o th e share 
h o l d e r s o f th e company and t o have t h e c o n t r a c t e n t e r e d i n t o o r 
r a t i f i e d by th e company i n g e n e r a l meeting o r , i f t h e a r t i c l e s o f 
a s s o c i a t i o n c o n t a i n an a p p r o p r i a t e p r o v i s i o n , t o t h e board o f 
d i r e c t o r s (2) . 
(1) See below, p.123. 
(2) H e l y - H u t c h i n s o n v. Brayhead L t d . /19687 1 Q.B0 549; /1967/ 3 
W.L.R. 1408; /19677 3 A l l E , R . 98; 111 S . J . 830. D i s c l o s u r e t o 
d i r e c t o r s i s i n e f f e c t i v e even i f the i n t e r e s t e d d i r e c t o r s r e f r a i n 
f rom a t t e n d i n g and v o t i n g l e a v i n g an independent quorum t o d e c i d e , 
f o r t h e company has a r i g h t t o th e unbiased v o i c e and ad v i c e o f 
ever y d i r e c t o r . Bensor v. Heathorn (1842) 1 Y. & C.C.C. 326, per 
^ n i g h t - B r u c e V„-C. a t pp.341-342, and I m p e r i a l M e r c a n t i l e C r e d i t 
A s s o i c a t i o n v . Coleman (1871) L.R. 6 ;Ch. App. 558, per H a t h e r l e y 
L.C. a t pp.567-568. But c_f= Queensland Mines L t d . v. Hudson (1978) 
52 A . L . J . R . 399. For comments on Queensland Mines L t d . v. Hudson, 
see GoRo S u l l i v a n (1979) M.L.R. 711 and Gower, Supplement t o 4 t h ed 
par a . 598. /3^P\. 
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A d i r e c t o r who makes pr o p e r d i s c l o s u r e o f h i s i n t e r e s t t o the 
s h a r e h o l d e r s i s e n t i t l e d t o p a r t i c i p a t e i n and v o t e upon the neces-
sa r y r e s o l u t i o n a p p r o v i n g t h e t r a n s a c t i o n because on t h e a u t h o r i t y 
o f North-West T r a n s p o r t a t i o n Co. L t d . v 0 B e a t t y ( 3) v o t e s are p r o -
p r i e t a r y r i g h t s , t o the same e x t e n t as any o t h e r i n c i d e n t s o f the 
shares, which t h e h o l d e r may e x e r c i s e i n h i s own i n t e r e s t s even i f 
these are opposed t o o t h e r h o l d e r s ' i n t e r e s t s . 
I t may n o t be c o n s i d e r e d as a v e r y good s o l u t i o n o f t h e p r o -
blem, b u t i t i s s u b m i t t e d t h a t t h i s s o l u t i o n i s s a f e r t h a n one 
r e l y i n g upon w a i v e r c l a u s e s . I t need o n l y be added t h a t i n s t a n c e s 
o f s e r i o u s abuse, f o r example company purchases a t gross o v e r - v a l u e , 
are w i t h i n t h e scope o f m i n o r i t y p r o t e c t i o n under s e c t i o n 75 o f t h e 
Companies A c t 1980 o 
P a r t i c u l a r T r a n s a c t i o n s g i v i n g Rise t o a C o n f l i c t o f I n t e r e s t 
The Companies A c t 1980 has r e c e n t l y extended t h e r e g u l a t i o n 
of p a r t i c u l a r t r a n s a c t i o n s i n which t h e r e i s l i k e l y t o be a c o n f l i c t 
o f i n t e r e s t s ( 4 ) . 
Under s e c t i o n 47 o f t h e Companies Act 1980, t h e consent o f t h e 
g e n e r a l meeting i s r e q u i r e d f o r any term whereby a d i r e c t o r ' s em-
ployment cannot be t e r m i n a t e d by the company by n o t i c e ( o r by n o t i c e 
o n l y i n s p e c i f i e d c i r c u m s t a n c e s ) f o r a p e r i o d exceeding f i v e y e a r s . 
I f no consent i s o b t a i n e d , t h e term i n q u e s t i o n w i l l be v o i d and 
t h e employment i s deemed t o be d e t e r m i n a b l e by t h e company on r e a -
sonable n o t i c e b e i n g g i v e n . The s e c t i o n i s an a t t e m p t t o p r o t e c t 
companies a g a i n s t t h e abuse whereby d i r e c t o r s , p o s s i b l y i n a n t i c i -
p a t i o n o f a t t e m p t t o d i s m i s s them under s.184 o f t h e Companies Act 
(3 ) (1887) 12 App. Cas. 589; 56 L .J.P.C. 102; 57 L.T. 426; 3 T.L.R. 
789; 36 W.R. 647. See a l s o B u r l a n d v. E a r l e fl902j A.C. 83 and 
Dominion C o t t e n M i l l s Co. L t d . v. Amyot /1912J A.C. 546. But see 
a l s o P r u d e n t i a l Assurance Co. L t d . v. Newman I n d u s t r i e s L t d . And 
Other's"!No.2) 1198073 W.L.R. 543; above pp.29-30; below pp.111-5 
(4 ) See g e n e r a l l y Gower, Supplement t o 4 t h ed., para.589-592. 
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1948, e n t e r s i n t o l o n g term s e r v i c e c o n t r a c t s so t h a t t h e y cannot 
be d i s m i s s e d except on payment o f heavy compensation payments f o r 
w r o n g f u l d i s m i s s a l . S e c t i o n 54 o f the 1980 A c t r e q u i r e s d i s c l o s u r e 
o f such agreements i n t h e a c c o u n t s . And s e c t i o n 61 o f t h e 1980 Act 
extends s.26 o f t h e Companies A c t 1967 i n r e s p e c t o f d i r e c t o r s ' 
s e r v i c e c o n t r a c t s b e i n g open t o i n s p e c t i o n by members o f the company 
S e c t i o n 48 o f t h e 1980 A c t p r o v i d e s t h a t the consent o f t h e 
g e n e r a l meeting i s r e q u i r e d i f a company i s t o e n t e r i n t o an arrange 
ment w i t h a d i r e c t o r whereby t h e company i s t o a c q u i r e from him o r 
t o d i s p o s e o f t o him one o r more non-cash a s s e t s o f t h e " r e q u i s i t e 
v a l u e " , i . e . w o r t h £50,000 o r 10 per c e n t (minimum £1,000) o f the 
company's a s s e t s . The s e c t i o n extends t o d e a l i n g s w i t h d i r e c t o r s 
o f h o l d i n g companies and t o d e a l i n g s w i t h persons connected w i t h 
d i r e c t o r s . A person connected w i t h a d i r e c t o r i s d e f i n e d as the 
d i r e c t o r ' s spouse, i n c l u d i n g a s e p a r a t e d b u t not a d i v o r c e d spouse; 
h i s c h i l d r e n under 18, i n c l u d i n g s t e p c h i l d r e n and i l l e g i t i m a t e 
c h i l d r e n ; an a s s o c i a t e d body c o r p o r a t e i n which t h e d i r e c t o r and 
any person connected w i t h him t o g e t h e r are i n t e r e s t e d i n more than 
o n e - f i f t h o f t h e e q u i t y share c a p i t a l o r c o n t r o l more than o n e - f i f t h 
o f t h e v o t i n g power; and any t r u s t e e f o r o r p a r t n e r o f t h e d i r e c t o r 
o r h i s spouse, c h i l d r e n o r a s s o c i a t e d body c o r p o r a t e . Any a r r a n g e -
ment e n t e r e d i n t o i n c o n t r a v e n t i o n o f t h e s e c t i o n i s a v o i d a b l e by 
t h e company u n l e s s a f f i r m e d by t h e company w i t h i n a r e a s o n a b l e t i m e . 
The r i g h t s o f an i n n o c e n t t h i r d p a r t y are p r o t e c t e d , b u t t h e o f f e n d -
i n g d i r e c t o r , connected person and any d i r e c t o r s who a u t h o r i s e d the 
t r a n s a c t i o n are l i a b l e t o r e s t o r e t h e i r g a i n s and t o i n d e m n i f y the 
company a g a i n s t any l o s s , s u b j e c t t o a l i m i t e d r i g h t t o r e l i e f . 
Under s e c t i o n 49 o f t h e 1980 A c t , prima f a c i e a l l t y p e s o f 
company are p r o h i b i t e d from making l o a n s , o r g u a r a n t e e i n g o r p r o -
v i d i n g s e c u r i t y f o r loans made by o t h e r s , t o t h e i r d i r e c t o r s o r the 
d i r e c t o r s o f t h e i r h o l d i n g companies. I n r e l a t i o n t o r e l e v a n t 
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companies t h e r e are s i m i l a r p r o h i b i t i o n s i n r e l a t i o n t o q u a s i - l o a n s 
and c r e d i t t r a n s a c t i o n s b o t h t o d i r e c t o r s and t o those connected 
w i t h them. A r e l e v a n t company i s d e f i n e d as a p u b l i c company and 
company f o r m i n g p a r t o f a group c o n t a i n i n g a p u b l i c company. A 
q u a s i - l o a n i s a t r a n s a c t i o n between t h e company and t h e d i r e c t o r o r 
connected person whereby t h e company pays, o r promises t o pay, a 
t h i r d p a r t y on terms t h a t t h e d i r e c t o r ( o r person on h i s b e h a l f ) w i l l 
r e i m b u r s e t h e company. A c r e d i t t r a n s a c t i o n i s one which i n v o l v e s 
t h e s u p p l y o r l e a s e o f goods, s e r v i c e s o r l a n d by a r e l e v a n t company 
on d e f e r r e d terms. These wide p r o h i b i t i o n s cover t h e use o f c r e d i t 
c a r d s by d i r e c t o r s and connected persons where the company i s the 
c a r d h o l d e r and t h e p r o v i s i o n o f goods and s e r v i c e s on t h e under-
s t a n d i n g t h a t payment w i l l be made l a t e r . I n t h e case o f n o n - r e l e v a n t 
companies, t h e r e i s a s t r a i g h t p r o h i b i t i o n o f l oans t o d i r e c t o r s and 
d i r e c t o r s o f h o l d i n g companies, b u t t h e p r o v i s i o n s r e l a t i n g t o q u a s i -
l o a n s , c r e d i t t r a n s a c t i o n s , a n d loans t o connected persons do not 
a p p l y . 
S e c t i o n 50 o f t h e 1980 A c t s e t s o u t e x c e p t i o n s t o t h e p r o h i b i -
t i o n s i n s e c t i o n 49 o f t h e 1980 A c t ; these i n c l u d e l o a n s , q u a s i -
l o ans and c r e d i t t r a n s a c t i o n s w i t h a h o l d i n g company, th e p r o v i s i o n 
o f f u n d s t o enable a d i r e c t o r t o p e r f o r m h i s d u t i e s p r o p e r l y ( i n the 
case o f a r e l e v a n t company t h e r e i s a c e i l i n g o f £10,000), s u b j e c t 
t o v a r i o u s c o n d i t i o n s , and l oans and q u a s i - l o a n s by money l e n d i n g 
companies i n the o r d i n a r y course o f business on normal terms. 
S e c t i o n 52 o f t h e 1980 A c t c o n f e r s on a company making a l o a n 
i n c o n t r a v e n t i o n o f s.49 o f t h e 1980 A c t a r i g h t t o a v o i d the t r a n -
s a c t i o n and r e c o v e r t h e p r o p e r t y . The d i r e c t o r o r connected person 
b e n e f i t i n g , and any d i r e c t o r who a u t h o r i s e d the t r a n s a c t i o n , may be 
l i a b l e t o account f o r r e s u l t i n g l o s s e s and g a i n s . S e c t i o n 53 o f t h e 
1980 A c t imposes c r i m i n a l s a n c t i o n s . 
S e c t i o n s 54 t o 60 o f t h e 1980 A c t make new p r o v i s i o n s f o r 
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d i s c l o s u r e o f t r a n s a c t i o n s i n v o l v i n g d i r e c t o r s , r e p l a c i n g s e c t i o n 
197 o f t h e Companies A c t 1948 and s e c t i o n 1 6 ( l ) ( c ) o f t h e Companies 
Act 1967. I n p a r t i c u l a r , accounts w i l l have t o d i s c l o s e ( i ) any 
t r a n s a c t i o n o r arrangement o f a k i n d d e s c r i b e d by s e c t i o n 49 o f the 
1980 A c t ( t h u s even though l o a n s t o connected persons are not p r o -
h i b i t e d i n the case o f p r i v a t e companies, they w i l l have t o be 
d i s c l o s e d ) and ( i i ) any o t h e r t r a n s a c t i o n o r arrangement w i t h the 
company o r w i t h a s u b s i d i a r y i n which a d i r e c t o r o f t h e company or 
i t s h o l d i n g company o r a person connected w i t h him had d i r e c t l y o r 
i n d i r e c t l y a m a t e r i a l i n t e r e s t . Heading ( i i ) i s d e l i b e r a t e l y vague 
so t h a t d i s c l o s u r e w i l l be r e q u i r e d i n the accounts o f ( a ) the 
s u b s t a n t i a l p r o p e r t y t r a n s a c t i o n s d e s c r i b e d i n s.48 o f t h e 1980 A c t ; 
( b ) c o n s u l t a n c y and o t h e r c o n t r a c t s f o r s e r v i c e s n o t d i s c l o s e d as 
c o n t r a c t s o f employment under s.26 o f the Companies Ac t 1967; and 
( c ) t r a n s a c t i o n s f a l l i n g o u t s i d e ss. 48 and 49 of t h e 1980 A c t 
because th e y are made t o persons o t h e r than the s p e c i f i e d range o f 
connected persons t o c a t c h a s i t u a t i o n where, say, a d i r e c t o r might 
have a m a t e r i a l i n t e r e s t i n a t r a n s a c t i o n between h i s company and 
a company run by h i s f a t h e r . A d i r e c t o r i n v o l v e d i s under a d u t y 
t o c o n s u l t w i t h h i s f e l l o w d i r e c t o r s and t h e board o f d i r e c t o r s 
e x c l u d i n g the d i r e c t o r concerned may d e c ide t h a t h i s i n t e r e s t i s 
n o t m a t e r i a l . 
V a r i o u s minor t r a n s a c t i o n s i n v o l v i n g d e f e r r e d payment by d i r e c -
t o r s are excluded from t h e d i s c l o s u r e p r o v i s i o n s o f s.54 o f t h e 
1980 A c t . 
(b) Use o f C o r p o r a t e P r o p e r t y , I n f o r m a t i o n o r O p p o r t u n i t y 
Because t h e powers and d u t i e s o f d i r e c t o r s are f i d u c i a r y i n 
n a t u r e , fundamental p r i n c i p l e s o f e q u i t y p r e c l u d e a d i r e c t o r from 
d e r i v i n g p e r s o n a l p r o f i t o r b e n e f i t (as opposed t o d i r e c t o r s ' f ees 
o r r e m u n e r a t i o n ) from h i s o f f i c e . Any p r o f i t so r e c e i v e d i s r e c o v e r -
a b l e by t h e company i n p r o c e e d i n g s a g a i n s t the d i r e c t o r concerned,, 
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The l e a d i n g c a s e i s R e g a l ( H a s t i n g s ) L t d . , v„ G u l l i v e r ( 5 ) 0 I n t h a t 
c a s e t h e a p p e l l a n t company w e r e t h e o w n e r s o f a c i n e m a i n H a s t i n g s * 
W i t h a v i e w t o t h e s a l e o f t h e p r o p e r t y as a g o i n g c o n c e r n t h e y 
w e r e a n x i o u s t o a c q u i r e two o t h e r c i n e m a s i n H a s t i n g s . , To do t h i s 
a s u b s i d i a r y company was f o r m e d t o buy t h e two c i n e m a s . I n o r d e r 
t o meet v a r i o u s demands t h e p a i d - u p c a p i t a l o f t h e company had t o 
be £5,000 b u t u n f o r t u n a t e l y t h e t o t a l c a s h a v a i l a b l e t o t h e a p p e l -
l a n t company was o n l y £ 2 ,000 o One o f t h e methods u s e d t o f i n d t h e 
e x t r a c a p i t a l was f o r t h e d i r e c t o r s e a c h t o t a k e 500 £1 s h a r e s i n 
t h e s u b s i d i a r y company ( t h e a p p e l l a n t company t o o k 2,000 s h a r e s ) . 
T h i s a r r a n g e m e n t was a g r e e d upon a t a b o a r d m e e t i n g o f b o t h t h e 
a p p e l l a n t and t h e s u b s i d i a r y company,, As e v e n t s t u r n e d o u t , t h e 
s a l e o f a l l t h r e e p r o p e r t i e s was e f f e c t e d b y t h e s a l e o f t h e s h a r e s 
h e l d i n t h e two companieso The s h a r e s s o l d b y t h e d i r e c t o r s w e r e 
s o l d a t a p r o f i t o f £2 ls» 6d« p e r s h a r e e I t was f o u n d as a f a c t 
t h a t a l l t h e t r a n s a c t i o n s w e r e bona f i d e and was h e l d t h a t t h e 
d i r e c t o r s w e r e i n a f i d u c i a r y p o s i t i o n t o w a r d s t h e company and w e r e 
bound t o pay t o t h e company t h e p r o f i t s made o u t o f t h i s position„ 
On t h a t o c c a s i o n V i s c o u n t Sankey s a i d : 
" A t a l l m a t e r i a l t i m e s t h e y w e r e d i r e c t o r s and i n a f i d u c i a r y 
p o s i t i o n , and t h e y u s e d and a c t e d upon t h e i r e x c l u s i v e k n o w l e d g e 
a c q u i r e d as such d i r e c t o r s . They f r a m e d r e s o l u t i o n s by w h i c h 
t h e y made a p r o f i t f o r t h e m s e l v e s . They s o u g h t no a u t h o r i t y f r o m 
t h e company t o do s o , a n d , by r e a s o n o f t h e i r p o s i t i o n and a c t i o n s , 
t h e y made l a r g e p r o f i t s f o r w h i c h , i n my v i e w , t h e y a r e l i a b l e t o 
a c c o u n t t o t h e c o m p a n y 0 " 
w h i l e L o r d R u s s e l l o f K i l l o w e n commented; 
"The r u l e o f e q u i t y w h i c h i n s i s t s o n t h o s e , who b y use o f a f i d u -
c i a r y p o s i t i o n make a p r o f i t , b e i n g l i a b l e t o a c c o u n t f o r t h a t 
( 5) /1942.7 1 A l l E.Ro 378; fl967] 2 A.Co 134n„ 
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p r o f i t , i n no way depends on f r a u d , o r a b s e n c e o f bona f i d e s ; o r 
upon such q u e s t i o n s o r c o n s i d e r a t i o n s as w h e t h e r t h e p r o f i t w o u l d 
o r s h o u l d o t h e r w i s e h a ve gone t o t h e p l a i n t i f f , o r w h e t h e r t h e 
p r o f i t e e r was u n d e r a d u t y t o o b t a i n t h e s o u r c e o f t h e p r o f i t f o r 
t h e p l a i n t i f f , o r w h e t h e r he t o o k a r i s k o r a c t e d as he d i d f o r 
t h e b e n e f i t o f t h e p l a i n t i f f , o r w h e t h e r t h e p l a i n t i f f has i n f a c t 
been damaged o r b e n e f i t e d by h i s a c t i o n . The l i a b i l i t y a r i s e s 
f r o m t h e mere f a c t o f a p r o f i t h a v i n g , i n t h e s t a t e d c i r c u m s t a n c e s 
been made. The p r o f i t e e r , however h o n e s t and w e l l - i n t e n t i o n e d , 
c a n n o t e s c a p e t h e r i s k o f b e i n g c a l l e d upon t o a c c o u n t . " 
^ t was c l e a r t h a t t h e d i r e c t o r s i n t h e R e g a l c a s e had n o t d e p r i v e d 
t h e company o f any o f i t s p r o p e r t y ( u n l e s s i n f o r m a t i o n can be r e g a r d e d 
as p r o p e r t y ) , o r , s e e m i n g l y , r o b b e d i t o f an o p p o r t u n i t y w h i c h i t 
m i g h t h a ve e x e r c i s e d f o r i t s own a d v a n t a g e ; t h e 3,000 s h a r e s i n t h e 
s u b s i d i a r y had n e v e r been t h e company's p r o p e r t y a n d , on t h e f a c t s 
as f o u n d , t h e company c o u l d n o t have a v a i l e d i t s e l f o f t h e o p p o r t u n i t y 
t o a c q u i r e them. B u t i t e x e m p l i f i e s t h e h i g h s t a n d a r d s o f d e t a c h m e n t 
w h i c h t h e l a w r e q u i r e s o f anyone who a d o p t s t h e s t a t u s o f t r u s t e e . 
R e c e n t l y a g r e a t e r d e g r e e o f t h e f i d u c i a r y o b l i g a t i o n o f d i r e c -
t o r s has been r e q u i r e d by t h e c o u r t s i n Canada. Thus i n C a n a d i a n 
A e r o S e r v i c e s L i m i t e d v . O ' M a l l e y ( 6 ) L a s k i n J . ( a s he t h e n was) 
s a i d : 
. . w h a t t h e s e d e c i s i o n s i n d i c a t e i s an u p d a t i n g o f t h e e q u i -
t a b l e p r i n c i p l e whose r o o t s l i e i n t h e g e n e r a l s t a n d a r d s t h a t I 
h a v e a l r e a d y m e n t i o n e d , n a m e l y , l o y a l t y , good f a i t h and a v o i d a n c e 
o f a c o n f l i c t o f d u t y and s e l f - i n t e r e s t . S t r i c t a p p l i c a t i o n a g a i n s t 
d i r e c t o r s and s e n i o r management o f f i c i a l s i s s i m p l y r e c o g n i t i o n o f 
( 6 ) ( 1 9 7 3 ) 40 D.L.R. ( 3 d . ) 3 7 1 . See a l s o S.M. Beck ( 1 9 7 5 ) 53 Can. 
B. Rev. 7 7 1 ; M. I a c o n o ( 1 9 7 5 ) 21 M c G i l l L . J . 445. 
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t h e d e g r e e o f c o n t r o l w h i c h t h e i r p o s i t i o n s g i v e them i n c o r p o r a t e 
o p e r a t i o n s , a c o n t r o l w h i c h r i s e s above d a y - t o - d a y a c c o u n t a b i l i t y 
t o o w n i n g s h a r e h o l d e r s and w h i c h comes u n d e r some s c r u t i n y o n l y 
a t a n n u a l g e n e r a l o r a t s p e c i a l m e e t i n g s . I t i s a n e c e s s a r y 
s u p p l e m e n t , i n t h e p u b l i c i n t e r e s t , o f s t a t u t o r y r e g u l a t i o n and 
a c c o u n t a b i l i t y w h i c h t h e m s e l v e s a r e , a t one and t h e same t i m e , an 
a c k n o w l e d g m e n t o f t h e i m p o r t a n c e o f t h e c o r p o r a t i o n i n t h e l i f e 
o f t h e c o m m u n i t y and o f t h e need t o compel o b e d i e n c e by i t and by 
i t s p r o m o t e r s , d i r e c t o r s and managers t o norms o f e x e m p l a r y 
b e h a v i o u r 
The C a n a d i a n A e r o c a s e e x e m p l i f i e s t h o s e c a s e s w i t h i n t h e 
d o c t r i n e o f c o r p o r a t e o p p o r t u n i t y ( 7 ) w h i c h d e a l w i t h d i r e c t o r s 
who t a k e f o r t h e m s e l v e s o p p o r t u n i t i e s t h a t f i r s t came t o them w h i l e 
a c t i n g , and b e c a u s e t h e y w e r e so a c t i n g , as d i r e c t o r s . The c a s e 
e s t a b l i s h e s a more f l e x i b l e r u l e t h a n t h e n a r r o w e r t e s t t h o u g h t t o 
be e s t a b l i s h e d by some by t h e R e g a l c a s e w h i c h n a r r o w e r t e s t r e q u i r e s 
t h a t t h e b e n e f i t o r a d v a n t a g e must be o b t a i n e d by r e a s o n and i n c o u r s e 
o f t h e i r o f f i c e o f d i r e c t o r s ( 8 ) . I n t h e C a n a d i a n A e r o c a s e t h e 
d i r e c t o r s had n o t o b t a i n e d a r e l e v a n t c o n t r a c t i n t h e c o u r s e o f t h e i r 
d u t i e s as d i r e c t o r s * They competed w i t h t h e p l a i n t i f f company a f t e r 
r e s i g n a t i o n f r o m t h e i r p o s i t i o n s w i t h t h e p l a i n t i f f and s u c c e e d e d i n 
b i d d i n g f o r t h e c o n t r a c t . They d i d n o t use any c o n f i d e n t i a l i n f o r -
m a t i o n i n o b t a i n i n g t h e c o n t r a c t . B u t t h e r e L a s k i n J . o b s e r v e d : 
". o . t h e f i d u c i a r y r e l a t i o n s h i p goes a t l e a s t t h i s f a r : a d i r e c -
t o r o r a s e n i o r o f f i c e r „ „ . i s p r e c l u d e d f r o m o b t a i n i n g f o r h i m -
s e l f , e i t h e r s e c r e t l y o r w i t h o u t t h e a p p r o v a l o f t h e company ( w h i c h 
w o u l d have t o be p r o p e r l y m a n i f e s t e d upon f u l l d i s c l o s u r e o f t h e 
f a c t s ) , any p r o p e r t y o r b u s i n e s s a d v a n t a g e e i t h e r b e l o n g i n g t o t h e 
( 7 ) See g e n e r a l l y D„D<, P r e n t i c e ( 1 9 7 4 ) 37 M„L„R= 464* 
( 8 ) ( 1 9 7 3 ) 40 D.L.R. ( 3 d ) 3 7 1 , 386 p e r L o r d R u s s e l l . 
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company o r f o r w h i c h i t has been n e g o t i a t i n g ; and e s p e c i a l l y i s 
t h i s so w h e r e t h e d i r e c t o r o r o f f i c e r i s a p a r t i c i p a n t i n t h e 
n e g o t i a t i o n s on b e h a l f o f t h e company . . . I n my o p i n i o n t h i s 
e t h i c d i s q u a l i f i e s a d i r e c t o r o r s e n i o r o f f i c e r f r o m u s u r p i n g f o r 
h i m s e l f o r d i v e r t i n g t o a n o t h e r p e r s o n o r company w i t h whom o r 
w i t h w h i c h he i s a s s o c i a t e d a m a t u r i n g b u s i n e s s o p p o r t u n i t y w h i c h 
h i s company i s a c t i v e l y p u r s u i n g ; he i s a l s o p r e c l u d e d f r o m so 
a c t i n g even a f t e r h i s r e s i g n a t i o n w h e r e t h e r e s i g n a t i o n may f a i r l y 
be s a i d t o be p r o m p t e d o r i n f l u e n c e d b y a w i s h t o a c q u i r e f o r h i m -
s e l f t h e o p p o r t u n i t y s o u g h t by t h e company, o r w h e r e i t was h i s 
p o s i t i o n w i t h t h e company r a t h e r t h a n a f r e s h i n i t i a t i v e t h a t l e d 
h i m t o t h e o p p o r t u n i t y w h i c h he l a t e r a c q u i r e d . " 
As we have s e e n , t h e r u l e s c o n c e r n i n g d i r e c t o r s ' d u t i e s o f 
l o y a l t y a r e v e r y s t r i c t , and b e f o r e we l e a v e t h e t o p i c o n f i d u c i a r y 
d u t i e s , i t i s c o n v e n i e n t t o d i s c u s s b r i e f l y a g a i n t h e e x t e n t t o 
w h i c h d u t i e s w h i c h t h e l a w w o u l d o t h e r w i s e c a s t upon d i r e c t o r s c o u l d 
be l e s s e n e d o r e x c l u d e d by a p p r o p r i a t e d r a f t i n g o f t h e a r t i c l e s and 
t h e e x t e n t t o w h i c h l i a b i l i t y o f d i r e c t o r s f o r b r e a c h e s o f d u t i e s 
o f good f a i t h c o u l d be r e l e a s e d by r a t i f i c a t i o n i n g e n e r a l meeting,, 
1 . E x e m p t i n g b y D r a f t i n g 
I t may be t h o u g h t a c o n v e n i e n t way o f l e s s e n i n g o r even g e t t i n g 
r i d o f t h e d u t i e s w h i c h t h e l a w w o u l d o t h e r w i s e c a s t upon d i r e c t o r s 
t h a t a p p r o p r i a t e c l a u s e s be i n s e r t e d i n t h e a r t i c l e s . F o r example 
a r t i c l e 78 i n T a b l e A o f t h e Companies A c t 1948 p r o v i d e s : 
"A d i r e c t o r o f t h e company may be o r become a d i r e c t o r o r o t h e r 
o f f i c e r o f , o r o t h e r w i s e i n t e r e s t e d i n , any company p r o m o t e d b y 
t h e company o r i n w h i c h t h e company may be i n t e r e s t e d as s h a r e -
h o l d e r o r o t h e r w i s e , and no d i r e c t o r s h a l l be a c c o u n t a b l e t o t h e 
company f o r any r e m u n e r a t i o n o r o t h e r b e n e f i t s r e c e i v e d by h i m 
as a d i r e c t o r o r o f f i c e r o f , o r f r o m h i s i n t e r e s t i n , such o t h e r 
company u n l e s s t h e company o t h e r w i s e d i r e c t s . " 
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May a r t i c l e s be d r a f t e d so as t o p u r p o r t t o r e l i e v e t h e d i r e c t o r 
i n a l l c i r c u m s t a n c e s f r o m t h e d u t y , f o r e x a m p l e , n o t t o make a s e c r e t 
p r o f i t ? 
As s u b m i t t e d b e f o r e , a r t i c l e s p u r p o r t i n g t o e x c l u d e any d u t y 
w h i c h t h e g e n e r a l l a w c a s t s upon a d i r e c t o r , o t h e r t h a n t h e p r o p e r 
p u r p o s e s d o c t r i n e ( 9 ) , a r e v o i d u n d e r s e c t i o n 205 o f t h e Companies 
A c t 1948. However, s o m e t i m e s i t i s p o s s i b l e t o a l t e r t h e s e d u t i e s 
t o some e x t e n t . I t i s b e t t e r t o t r e a t t h e a r t i c l e s i n T a b l e A t h a t 
a p p e a r t o e x c l u d e a d u t y as e x c e p t i o n a l ; t h e y a r e v a l i d b e c a u s e o f 
t h e v e r y f a c t t h a t t h e y a r e c o n t a i n e d i n an A c t . 
As f a r as c o n t r a c t s b e t w e e n t h e company and i t s d i r e c t o r s o r 
c o n t r a c t s o f t h e company i n w h i c h t h e y a r e i n d i r e c t l y i n t e r e s t e d 
a r e c o n c e r n e d , some w a i v e r c l a u s e s have been h e l p f u l t o remove t h e 
s t i n g f r o m t h e g e n e r a l e q u i t a b l e p r i n c i p l e o f good f a i t h . I t h as 
n o t been t h e p r a c t i c e t o i n s e r t w a i v e r c l a u s e s e x c l u d i n g l i a b i l i t y 
t o a c c o u n t t o t h e company f o r p r o f i t s d i r e c t o r s o b t a i n i n some o t h e r 
way as a r e s u l t o f t h e i r p o s i t i o n i n t h e company ( 1 0 ) ; and i t i s 
s u b m i t t e d t h a t such w a i v e r c l a u s e s w o u l d be v o i d . 
2. R a t i f i c a t i o n i n G e n e r a l M e e t i n g 
Some b r e a c h e s o f f i d u c i a r y d u t y b y d i r e c t o r s c a n be r a t i f i e d 
b y t h e s h a r e h o l d e r s i n g e n e r a l m e e t i n g and some c a n n o t , and t h e 
t r a d i t i o n a l t e s t ( 1 ) i s t h a t r a t i f i c a t i o n i s d i s a l l o w e d w h e r e t h e 
d i r e c t o r s a c t mal a f i d e o r wh e r e some " p r o p e r t y " ( l e g a l o r e q u i t a b l e ) 
o f t h e company has been m i s a p p r o p r i a t e d d i r e c t l y o r i n d i r e c t l y . 
( 9 ) T h e r e i s a g r o w t h o f s c h o o l o f t h o u g h t r e g a r d i n g t h e ' p r o p e r 
p u r p o s e s ' as m e r e l y one a s p e c t o f t h e much w i d e r d u t y r e q u i r i n g a 
d i r e c t o r t o a c t bona f i d e i n t h e b e s t i n t e r e s t s o f t h e company as 
a w h o l e . See ab o v e , pp,94-6; Teck C o r p . v . M i l l a r ( 1 9 7 2 ) 33 D.L.R. 
( 3 d ) 288 
( 1 0 ) Gower, p . 5 9 1 . 
( 1 ) See K.W. Wed d e r b u r n ( 1 9 8 1 ) 44 M.L.R. 202, 206. I n h i s a r t i c l e , 
P r o f e s s o r W e d d e r b u r n s t r o n g l y d i s a g r e e s t o V i n e l o t t J.'s t e s t a b o u t 
r a t i f i c a t i o n i n g e n e r a l m e e t i n g . 
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I n P r u d e n t i a l A s s u r a n c e L t d . v . Newman I n d u s t r i e s L t d . ( N o . 2 ) ( 2 ) 
V i n e l o t t J . r e m a r k e d t h a t d i r e c t o r s i n d e f a u l t who a r e a l s o s h a r e -
h o l d e r s c a n v o t e i n g e n e r a l m e e t i n g , b u t i t i s " u n c o n s c i o n a b l e " f o r 
t h e m a j o r i t y t o "use t h e i r v o t i n g power i n g e n e r a l m e e t i n g t o p r e -
v e n t an a c t i o n b e i n g b r o u g h t a g a i n s t t hem. The f r a u d l i e s i n t h e i r 
use o f t h e i r v o t i n g power n o t i n t h e c h a r a c t e r o f t h e a c t o r t r a n -
s a c t i o n g i v i n g r i s e t o t h e ca u s e o f a c t i o n . " ( 3 ) 
Wedderburn s t r o n g l y d i s a g r e e s w i t h V i n e l o t t J . on t h i s p o i n t , 
b u t V i n e l o t t J . may be r i g h t o n h i s i n t e r p r e t a t i o n o f N o r t h - W e s t 
T r a n s p o r t a t i o n Company v . B e a t t y ( 4 ) . I n t h a t c a s e , S i r R i c h a r d 
B a g g a l l a y h e l d t h a t t h e d i r e c t o r ' s b r e a c h e s o f d u t y c o u l d be 
c o n f i r m e d : 
o o p r o v i d e d such a f f i r m a n c e o r a d o p t i o n i s n o t b r o u g h t a b o u t 
by u n f a i r o r i m p r o p e r means, and i s n o t i l l e g a l o r f r a u d u l e n t o r 
o p p r e s s i v e t o w a r d s t h o s e s h a r e h o l d e r s who oppose i t . " ( 5 ) 
I t s h o u l d be n o t e d t h a t t h e u n c o n t r a d i c t e d e v i d e n c e was t h a t 
i t was e s s e n t i a l t o t h e company's b u s i n e s s t o buy a n o t h e r b o a t , 
t h a t t h e b o a t c o n c e r n e d was s u i t a b l e , t h a t no o t h e r e q u a l l y s u i t -
a b l e b o a t was a v a i l a b l e , and t h a t t h e p r i c e was n e i t h e r e x c e s s i v e 
n o r u n r e a s o n a b l e ( 6 ) . I f any o f t h e u n c o n t r a d i c t e d f a c t s had been 
d i f f e r e n t , i t m i g h t be t h a t t h e t r a n s a c t i o n w o u l d n o t have been 
c a p a b l e o f c o n f i r m a t i o n . 
F u r t h e r s u p p o r t c a n be f o u n d i n S i r R i c h a r d B a g g a l l a y ' s r e -
marks i n t h a t c a s e : 
"The o n l y u n f a i r n e s s o r i m p r o p r i e t y w h i c h , c o n s i s t e n t l y w i t h t h e 
a d m i t t e d and e s t a b l i s h e d f a c t s , c o u l d be s u g g e s t e d , a r i s e s o u t o f 
( 2 ) /"1980/ 3 WoL.R. 5 4 3 ; A98Q7 2 A l l E.R. 8 4 1 . See a l s o a b o v e , 
p p . 2 9 - 3 0 . 
( 3 ) /"1980J 2 A l l E.R. 8 4 1 , 8 6 2 . 
( 4 ) ( 1 8 8 7 ) 12 App. Cas. 589; 56 L.J.P.C. 1 0 2 ; 57 L„T„ 4 2 6 ; 3 T.L.R. 
7 8 9 ; 36 W.R. 6 4 7 . 
( 5 ) ( 1 8 8 7 ) 12 App. Cas. 5 8 9 , 5 9 4 . 
( 6 ) ( 1 8 8 7 ) 12 App. Cas. 5 8 9 , 5 9 4 . 
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t h e f a c t t h a t t h e d e f e n d a n t J . H. B e a t t y p o s s e s s e d a v o t i n g 
power 0 0 ° 
I t may be q u i t e r i g h t t h a t , i n s u c h a c a s e , t h e o p p o s i n g 
m i n o r i t y s h o u l d be a b l e , i n a s u i t l i k e t h i s , t o c h a l l e n g e t h e 
t r a n s a c t i o n , and t o show t h a t i t i s an i m p r o p e r o n e , and t o be 
f r e e d f r o m t h e o b j e c t i o n t h a t a s u i t w i t h such an o b j e c t c a n 
o n l y be m a i n t a i n e d by t h e company i t s e l f <> 
B u t t h e c o n s t i t u t i o n o f t h e company e n a b l e d t h e d e f e n d a n t 
J . H. B e a t t y t o a c q u i r e t h i s v o t i n g power...he had a p e r f e c t 
r i g h t . . . t o e x e r c i s e h i s v o t i n g power i n s u c h a manner as t o 
s e c u r e t h e e l e c t i o n o f d i r e c t o r s whose v i e w s upon p o l i c y a g r e e d 
w i t h h i s own, and t o s u p p o r t t h o s e v i e w s a t any s h a r e h o l d e r s ' 
m e e t i n g s t h e a c q u i s i t i o n o f t h e U n i t e d E m p i r e was a p u r e 
q u e s t i o n o f p o l i c y , as t o w h i c h i t m i g h t be e x p e c t e d t h a t 
t h e r e w o u l d be d i f f e r e n c e s o f o p i n i o n , and upon w h i c h t h e 
v o i c e o f t h e m a j o r i t y o u g h t t o p r e v a i l ; t o r e j e c t t h e v o t e s 
o f t h e d e f e n d a n t upon t h e q u e s t i o n o f t h e a d o p t i o n o f t h e 
b y e l a w w o u l d be t o g i v e e f f e c t t o t h e v i e w s o f t h e m i n o r i t y , 
and t o d i s r e g a r d t h o s e o f t h e m a j o r i t y . " 
T h e i r L o r d s h i p s w e r e o f t h e o p i n i o n t h a t t h e j u d g e s o f t h e 
C a n a d i a n Supreme C o u r t a p p e a r e d t o h a v e r e g a r d e d t h e e x e r c i s e by 
t h e d e f e n d a n t o f h i s v o t i n g power as o f so o p p r e s s i v e a 
c h a r a c t e r as t o i n v a l i d a t e t h e a d o p t i o n o f t h e b u y - l a w , b u t 
t h e y w e r e u n a b l e t o a d o p t s u c h a v i e w 0 
B e a t t y ' s c a s e may a l s o be i n t e r p r e t e d t o mean t h a t t h e 
c a s e d e c i d e d t h a t " t h e r e s o l u t i o n i n g e n e r a l m e e t i n g s u p e r s e d e d 
t h e r e s o l u t i o n o f t h e d i r e c t o r s and t h e r e was, t h e r e f o r e , no 
q u e s t i o n o f t h e m a j o r i t y u s i n g t h e i r v o t e s t o p r e v e n t an a c t i o n 
b e i n g b r o u g h t t o s e t a s i d e a t r a n s a c t i o n b e t w e e n t h e b o a r d o f 
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d i r e c t o r s and one o f t h e i r number,," ( 7 ) I n o t h e r w o r d s , t h e r e 
was no c o n f i r m a t i o n o f t h e t r a n s a c t i o n b e t w e e n t h e b o a r d o f 
d i r e c t o r s and one o f t h e m 0 Such c o n f i r m a t i o n was n o t n e c e s s a r y 
b e c a u s e , i t may be a r g u e d , t h e r e was a new c o n t r a c t i n t e r m s 
o f t h e o l d c o n t r a c t w h i c h new c o n t r a c t was c o n c l u d e d a t t h e 
m e e t i n g o f t h e s h a r e h o l d e r s . 
W i t h g r e a t r e s p e c t t o P r o f e s s o r W e d d e r b u r n , i t i s s u b m i t t e d 
t h a t V i n e l o t t J o ' s i n t e r p r e t a t i o n o f B e a t t y 1 s c a s e i s t h e c o r r e c t 
o n e ; B e a t t y 1 s c a s e i s n o t a u t h o r i t y f o r t h e p r o p o s i t i o n t h a t 
a m a j o r i t y s h a r e h o l d e r who i s a l s o a d i r e c t o r c a n use h i s v o t e s 
i n g e n e r a l m e e t i n g t o c o n f i r m o r r a t i f y an a c t o r t r a n s a c t i o n 
w h i c h was n o t f r a u d u l e n t o r u l t r a v i r e s , b u t was a b r e a c h o f h i s 
d u t y as a d i r e c t o r , i n o r d e r t o p r e v e n t a m i n o r i t y s h a r e h o l d e r 
f r o m b r i n g i n g a d e r i v a t i v e a c t i o n ( 8 ) o 
V i n e l o t t J o ( 9 ) does n o t a g r e e t h a t t h e b e s t way t o d e f i n e 
t h e l i m i t o f t h e e x c e p t i o n t o t h e r u l e i n Foss v . H a r b o t t l e 
i s b y r e f e r e n c e t o any c a t e g o r y o f a c t s o r t r a n s a c t i o n s w h i c h 
a r e i n c a p a b l e o f b e i n g a u t h o r i s e d o r r a t i f i e d by t h e m a j o r i t y 
i n g e n e r a l m e e t i n g o A r e l e v a n t t r a n s a c t i o n may be f r a u d u l e n t , 
b u t t h e l a w s h o u l d n o t impose a l i m i t t o t h e power o f t h e 
m a j o r i t y t o r e s o l v e i n g e n e r a l m e e t i n g t o f o r g e t a b o u t t h e 
i n j u r y done t o t h e company and n o t t o t a k e any a c t i o n * I f t h e 
m a j o r i t y a t g e n e r a l m e e t i n g so w i s h , u n d e r c e r t a i n c i r c u m s t a n c e s 
a f r a u d u l e n t t r a n s a c t i o n s h o u l d be a l l o w e d t o be r a t i f i e d and 
l e g a l a c t i o n a l l o w e d n o t t o be t a k e n D T h e r e may be good r e a s o n s 
f o r t h e m a j o r i t y so d e c i d i n g b e c a u s e , e 0 g 0 , t h e r e p u t a t i o n ( 1 0 ) 
o f t h e company m i g h t be i n j u r e d b y t h e p r o p o s e d l e g a l a c t i o n ; 
( 7 ) P r u d e n t i a l v . Newman ( N o a 2 ) [ 1 9 8 0 J 3 WoL eRo 5 4 3 , 570 p e r 
V i n e l o t t J 0 
( 8 ) See a l s o a b o v e , p 0 2 9 0 
( 9 ) P r u d e n t i a l v . Newman (No»2) £1980] 3 WoLoR* 5 4 3 , 568= 
( 1 0 ) I b i d o a t p 3 5 6 8 e 
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t h e o u t c o m e o f t h e l i t i g a t i o n may be u n c e r t a i n ; t h e b u s i n e s s 
w o u l d be d i s r u p t e d by d i s c o v e r y o f d o c u m e n t s , p r e p a r a t i o n 
f o r t r i a l and a t t e n d a n c e a t c o u r t t o g i v e e v i d e n c e ; l e g a l 
c o s t s may p r o v e t o be i r r e c o v e r a b l e ; t h e r e may be damage t o 
t h e company g r e a t e r t h a n any b e n e f i t s t o be o b t a i n e d f r o m t h e 
a c t i o n , e t c a The e m p h a s i s s h o u l d be on ' t h e b e n e f i t o f t h e 
company as a w h o l e ' o r w h e t h e r i t i s t r u l y i n t h e i n t e r e s t s o f 
t h e company t h a t p r o c e e d i n g s s h o u l d be b r o u g h t ( l ) s A b e t t e r 
t e s t w o u l d t h e r e f o r e be w h e t h e r o r n o t t h e w r o n g d o e r s u s e t h e i r 
v o t i n g power ( 2 ) o r some i m p r o p e r means such as m a n i p u l a t i o n o f 
t h e i r p o s i t i o n i n t h e company i n g e n e r a l m e e t i n g t o p r e v e n t 
an a c t i o n b e i n g b r o u g h t a g a i n s t t h e m D 
V i n e l o t t J o s o u g h t t o s u p p o r t h i s -hew t e s t o f 'use o f v o t i n g 
power' by c i t i n g ( 3 ) two d e c i s i o n s o f S i r W i l l i a m Page Wood V 0-C 0 
i n A t w o o d V o M e r r y w e a t h e r ( 4 ) and s a i d : 
"The c o n t r a s t b e t w e e n Page Wood Vo-C.'s two d e c i s i o n s i s 
i m p o r t a n t . The f i r s t shows. . .The second shows t h a t t h e use o f 
a w r o n g d o e r ' s v o t e s t o p r e v e n t p r o c e e d i n g s b e i n g t a k e n b y a 
company t o remedy a w r o n g done t o i t may j u s t i f y a m i n o r i t y 
s h a r e h o l d e r b r i n g i n g a d e r i v a t i v e a c t i o n 0 " ( 5 ) 
P r o f e s s o r Wedderburn has r a i s e d some q u e s t i o n s on V i n e l o t t 
J o ' s new p r i n c i p l e s such as? What a r e v o t e s " c a p a b l e o f b e i n g 
c a s t " ? ( 6 ) How i s t h e " c o n f l i c t " t o be j u d g e d ? ( 7 ) when do 
s h a r e h o l d e r s ' i n t e r e s t s " c o n f l i c t " w i t h t h o s e o f t h e company? ( 8 ) 
Would we a l w a y s need t o i n q u i r e i n t o t h e s u b j e c t i v e m o t i v e s o f 
( 1 ) P r u d e n t i a l v P Newman ( N o , 2 ) |1980] 3 WoL.R. 5 4 3 , 583o 
( 2 ) I b i d o a t p o 5 6 8 . 
( 3 ) I b i d , a t p Q 5 7 7 . 
( 4 ) ( 1 8 6 8 ) uLoRo 5 E q . 4 6 4 0 
( 5 ) T19801 3 WoL.R. 5 4 3 , 5 7 9 . 
( 6 ) ( 1 9 8 1 ) 44 M.LoRo 202 a t 2 0 8 o 
( 7 ) I b i d o a t 2 0 8 o 
( 8 ) I b i d , a t 2 1 1 0 
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e a ch o f t h e s h a r e h o l d e r s v o t i n g ? ( 9 ) 
I t i s s u b m i t t e d t h a t i n p r a c t i c e t h e r e i s no need t o i n q u i r e 
i n t o t h e m o t i v e s o f d i s i n t e r e s t e d s h a r e h o l d e r s , a common s e n s e t e s t 
s h o u l d be a p p l i e d t o d e t e r m i n e w h a t i s good f o r t h e company as a 
w h o l e ( 1 0 ) and a r e a s o n a b l e n e s s t e s t s h o u l d be a p p l i e d t o d e t e r m i n e 
t h e c o n f l i c t b e t w e e n s h a r e h o l d e r s t h e m s e l v e s and b e t w e e n s h a r e -
h o l d e r s and t h e company as a w h o l e . 
V i n e l o t t J . t r i e s t o r e c o n c i l e R e g a l v . G u l l i v e r w i t h Cook v . 
Peeks by r e m a r k i n g t h a t he c o u l d see n o t h i n g i n t h e r e p o r t w h i c h 
i n d i c a t e d t h a t t h e d e f e n d a n t d i r e c t o r s i n t h e R e g a l c a s e c o n t r o l l e d 
t h e v o t i n g ( 1 ) . P r o f e s s o r W e d d e r b u r n d i s a g r e e s , ( 2 ) , b u t he has 
n o t been a b l e t o p o i n t t o a n y t h i n g i n t h e r e l e v a n t r e p o r t w h i c h so 
i n d i c a t e d . 
I f one f a v o u r s t h e t r a d i t i o n a l t e s t , one has t o f a c e t h e d i f -
f i c u l t y o f e x p l a i n i n g " a d v a n t a g e s " , " o p p o r t u n i t i e s " o r " i n f o r m a t i o n " 
as t h e company's " p r o p e r t y " . The w o r d " p r o p e r t y " may c o v e r many, 
many t h i n g s . I t may be s a i d t h a t t h e d i r e c t o r s i n t h e R e g a l c a s e 
u s e d c o r p o r a t e " i n f o r m a t i o n " i n some s e n s e t o make a p r o f i t , and 
t h o s e f a v o u r i n g t h e t r a d i t i o n a l t e s t w o u l d f i n d i t d i f f i c u l t t o 
e x p l a i n why t h e d i r e c t o r s ' b r e a c h c o u l d have been v a l i d a t e d by 
r a t i f i c a t i o n . On t h e c o n t r a r y V i n e l o t t J e has s u g g e s t e d a way t o 
r e c o n c i l e t h e Cook c a s e w i t h t h e R e g a l c a s e and N o r t h - W e s t T r a n s -
p o r t a t i o n Company v . B e a t t y . 
I n s i d e r D e a l i n g 
B e f o r e we pass on t o t h e t o p i c " D u t i e s o f C a r e D i l i g e n c e and 
S k i l l " i t i s p e r h a p s o f i m p o r t a n c e t o n o t e one p a r t i c u l a r a s p e c t 
( 9 ) ( 1 9 8 1 ) 44 M.LcRo 202 a t 2 1 1 . 
( 1 0 ) See a l s o a b o v e , p.17-8. 
( 1 ) I n any e v e n t , i t i s s u b m i t t e d t h a t i t i s r e a s o n a b l e t o f o r b i d 
r a t i f i c a t i o n i n t h e Cook c a s e and t o a l l o w i t i n t h e R e g a l c a s e 
b e c a u s e i n t h e f o r m e r t h e d i r e c t o r s had p r o f i t e d a t t h e company's 
e x p e n s e w h i l e i n t h e l a t t e r t h e d i r e c t o r s had p r o f i t e d w i t h o u t 
d o i n g any harm t o t h e company. 
( 2 ) ( 1 9 8 1 ) 44 M.L.R. 202, 210. 
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o f d i r e c t o r s ' d u t i e s , n a m e l y t h e v e x e d q u e s t i o n o f i n s i d e r d e a l i n g ( 3 ) . 
The i d e a l o f S t o c k M a r k e t t r a d i n g i s b a s e d on a p h i l o s o p h y 
t h a t a l l i n v e s t o r s s h o u l d h a v e r e l a t i v e l y e q u a l a c c e s s t o m a t e r i a l 
i n f o r m a t i o n , and d e a l i n g s i n c o r p o r a t e s e c u r i t i e s w h e r e one p a r t y 
has and t h e o t h e r p a r t y does n o t have a c c e s s t o c o n f i d e n t i a l i n f o r -
m a t i o n w h i c h has a s u b s t a n t i a l b e a r i n g on t h e v a l u e o f t h o s e s e c u -
r i t i e s a r e c o n s i d e r e d t o be w r o n g . 
The use o f c o n f i d e n t i a l i n f o r m a t i o n c a n l e a d t o a p r o f i t i n 
t h e hands o f t h e i n s i d e r w h i c h i f he w ere an o u t s i d e r , he w o u l d be 
u n a b l e t o o b t a i n . T h i s p r o f i t may e i t h e r be i n t h e f o r m o f a 
p o s i t i v e g a i n o r a v o i d i n g a l o s s , b u t i n b o t h c a s e s u n j u s t e n r i s h m e n t . 
P a r t V o f t h e Companies A c t 1980 now makes i n s i d e r d e a l i n g a 
c r i m i n a l o f f e n c e . 
An i n d i v i d u a l may n o t d e a l i n s e c u r i t i e s o f t h e company w i t h 
w h i c h he i s c o n n e c t e d i f he i s , o r a t any t i m e i n t h e p r e v i o u s s i x 
m o n t h s has b e e n , k n o w i n g l y c o n n e c t e d w i t h t h e company; i f he has 
i n f o r m a t i o n w h i c h he h o l d s by v i r t u e o f b e i n g c o n n e c t e d w i t h t h e 
company; i f i t w o u l d be r e a s o n a b l e t o e x p e c t a p e r s o n so c o n n e c t e d 
and i n t h e p o s i t i o n by v i r t u e o f w h i c h he i s so c o n n e c t e d n o t t o 
d i s c l o s e t h a t i n f o r m a t i o n e x c e p t f o r t h e p r o p e r p e r f o r m a n c e o f t h e 
f u n c t i o n s a t t a c h i n g t o t h a t p o s i t i o n ; i f he knows t h a t i n f o r m a t i o n 
i s u n p u b l i s h e d p r i c e - s e n s i t i v e i n f o r m a t i o n i n r e l a t i o n t o t h o s e 
s e c u r i t i e s ( 4 ) . An i n d i v i d u a l may o n l y be c o n n e c t e d w i t h a company 
i n t h e f o l l o w i n g ways: as a d i r e c t o r o f t h a t company o r o f a r e l a t e d 
company, w h i c h means a s u b s i d i a r y o f a h o l d i n g company; as an o f f i c e r 
o r e m p l o y e e o f t h a t company o r o f a r e l a t e d company; as a p e r s o n 
( 3 ) T h i s d u t y i s a l s o i m p o s e d on o f f i c e r s and members o f a company 
and o t h e r s when d e a l i n g i n t h e company's s e c u r i t i e s w i t h i n s i d e 
i n f o r m a t i o n w h i c h a f f e c t s t h e i r v a l u e . See g e n e r a l l y L. L o s s ( 1 9 7 0 ) 
33 M.L.R. 34; N. S p i n k s ( 1 9 7 3 ) 123 N.L.J. 779; N. S p i n k s ( 1 9 7 3 ) 123 
N.L.J. 809; T.M. Ashe ( 1 9 7 3 ) 123 N.L.J, 216. 
( 4 ) s . 6 8 ( l ) o f Companies A c t 1980. 
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o c c u p y i n g a p o s i t i o n i n v o l v i n g a p r o f e s s i o n a l o r b u s i n e s s r e l a t i o n -
s h i p b e t w e e n h i m s e l f o r h i s e m p l o y e r o r a company o f w h i c h he i s a 
d i r e c t o r and t h e company o r a r e l a t e d company w h i c h i n e i t h e r c a s e 
may r e a s o n a b l y be e x p e c t e d t o g i v e h i m a c c e s s t o i n f o r m a t i o n w h i c h 
i n r e l a t i o n t o s e c u r i t i e s o f e i t h e r company, i s u n p u b l i s h e d p r i c e -
s e n s i t i v e i n f o r m a t i o n , and w h i c h i t w o u l d be r e a s o n a b l e t o e x p e c t 
a p e r s o n i n h i s p o s i t i o n n o t t o d i s c l o s e e x c e p t f o r t h e p r o p e r p e r -
f o r m a n c e o f h i s f u n c t i o n s ( 5 ) . 
The p r o h i b i t i o n s a l s o a p p l y i n t h e c a se o f i n f o r m a t i o n a b o u t 
t a k e o v e r b i d s by an i n d i v i d u a l o r g r o u p o f i n d i v i d u a l s ( 6 ) and 
i n f o r m a t i o n o b t a i n e d by Crown s e r v a n t s ( 7 ) i n t h e i r o f f i c i a l c a p a c i t y . 
A t i p p e e f r o m c o n n e c t e d p e r s o n s must n o t d e a l w h e r e he has 
i n f o r m a t i o n w h i c h he k n o w i n g l y o b t a i n e d d i r e c t l y o r i n d i r e c t l y f r o m 
an i n d i v i d u a l c o n n e c t e d ( o r who w i t h i n s i x months p r e v i o u s l y was 
c o n n e c t e d ) w i t h a p a r t i c u l a r company; he knows o r has r e a s o n a b l e 
c a u s e t o b e l i e v e t h a t t h e c o n n e c t e d p e r s o n h e l d t h e i n f o r m a t i o n by 
b e i n g so c o n n e c t e d ; and t h e t i p p e e knows o r has r e a s o n a b l e c a u s e t o 
b e l i e v e t h a t b e c a u s e o f t h e l a t t e r ' s c o n n e c t i o n and p o s i t i o n , i t 
w o u l d be r e a s o n a b l e t o e x p e c t h i m n o t t o d i s c l o s e t h e i n f o r m a t i o n 
save f o r t h e p r o p e r p e r f o r m a n c e o f f u n c t i o n s a t t a c h i n g t o t h a t 
p o s i t i o n ( 8 ) . The t i p p e e must a l s o know t h a t t h e i n f o r m a t i o n i s 
u n p u b l i s h e d p r i c e - s e n s i t i v e i n f o r m a t i o n i n r e l a t i o n t o t h e p a r t i -
c u l a r s e c u r i t i e s . A s i m i l a r p r o h i b i t i o n a p p l i e s t o t i p p e e s o f 
Crown s e r v a n t s ( 9 ) and t o an i n d i v i d u a l who has k n o w i n g l y o b t a i n e d 
d i r e c t l y o r i n d i r e c t l y u n p u b l i s h e d p r i c e - s e n s i t i v e i n f o r m a t i o n f r o m 
an i n d i v i d u a l who i s c o n t e m p l a t i n g o r who has c o n t e m p l a t e d a t a k e -
o v e r o f f e r ( 1 0 ) . 
( 5 ) s . 7 3 ( l ) o f Companies A c t 1980. 
( 6 ) s.68 o f 1980 A c t . 
( 7 ) s.69 o f 1980 A c t . 
( 8 ) s . 6 8 ( 3 ) o f 1980 A c t . 
( 9 ) s.69 o f 1980 A c t . 
( 1 0 ) s . 6 8 ( 5 ) o f 1980 A c t . 
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To be c a u g h t as a t i p p e e by t h e Companies A c t 1980, an i n d i -
v i d u a l has k n o w i n g l y t o have o b t a i n e d c e r t a i n i n f o r m a t i o n d i r e c t l y 
o r i n d i r e c t l y f r o m t h e p e r s o n s mentioned,, A c c o r d i n g l y t h e r e w i l l 
be some p e r s o n s who r e c e i v e i n f o r m a t i o n f r o m t i p p e e s t o whom t h e 
l e g i s l a t i o n w i l l a p p l y , b u t such a s u b - t i p p e e , t o f a l l w i t h i n t h e 
p r o h i b i t i o n s w i l l h ave t o be an i n d i v i d u a l who, f o r e x a m p l e , w i l l 
h a v e had t o k n o w i n g l y o b t a i n i n d i r e c t l y i n f o r m a t i o n f r o m a c o n n e c t e d 
i n d i v i d u a l and know t h a t b e c a u s e o f t h a t i n d i v i d u a l ' s c o n n e c t i o n i t 
w o u l d be r e a s o n a b l e f o r h i m n o t t o b r e a c h h i s c o n f i d e n c e and t h a t 
t h e i n f o r m a t i o n i s p r i c e - s e n s i t i v e . I t seems t h a t most s u b - t i p p e e s 
w o u l d be u n l i k e l y t o be c o n v i c t e d on t h e w o r d i n g o f t h i s l e g i s l a t i o n . 
' U n p u b l i s h e d p r i c e - s e n s i t i v e i n f o r m a t i o n ' i s d e f i n e d i n t h e 
1980 A c t as i n f o r m a t i o n w h i c h r e l a t e s t o s p e c i f i c m a t t e r s r e l a t i n g 
o r o f c o n c e r n d i r e c t l y o r i n d i r e c t l y t o t h a t company and i s n o t 
g e n e r a l l y known t o t h o s e p e r s o n s who a r e a c c u s t o m e d o r w o u l d be 
l i k e l y t o d e a l i n t h o s e s e c u r i t i e s b u t w h i c h w o u l d i f i t w e r e 
g e n e r a l l y known t o them be l i k e l y m a t e r i a l l y t o a f f e c t t h e p r i c e 
o f t h o s e s e c u r i t i e s ( 1 ) . 
I t i s p r o v i d e d t h a t t h e i n f o r m a t i o n i s t h a t w h i c h r e l a t e s t o 
a s p e c i f i c m a t t e r r e l a t i n g e t c . t o t h e company, n o t t o a m a t t e r 
w h i c h r e l a t e s e t c . s p e c i f i c a l l y t o t h e company. A c c o r d i n g l y i n f o r -
m a t i o n o f m a t t e r s o u t s i d e t h e company w i l l be u n p u b l i s h e d p r i c e -
s e n s i t i v e i n f o r m a t i o n i f t h e y a r e s p e c i f i c m a t t e r s , o f c o n c e r n 
d i r e c t l y o r i n d i r e c t l y o r r e l a t e t o t h e company, a r e n o t g e n e r a l l y 
known t o t h e m a r k e t , a f f e c t m a t e r i a l l y t h e p r i c e o f t h e s e c u r i t i e s . 
I n p r a c t i c e , h o w e v e r , i t i s i n t e r n a l m a t t e r s w h i c h a r e more l i k e l y 
t o be u n p u b l i s h e d p r i c e - s e n s i t i v e i n f o r m a t i o n . 
On t h e c o n s t r u c t i o n o f ' m a t e r i a l i t y ' 9 U.S. j u d g e s have s a i d s 
" t h e b a s i c t e s t o f m a t e r i a l i t y i s w h e t h e r a r e a s o n a b l e man w o u l d 
( 1 ) s . 7 3 ( 2 ) o f Companies A c t 1980. 
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a t t a c h i m p o r t a n c e i n d e t e r m i n i n g h i s c h o i c e o f a c t i o n i n t h e 
t r a n s a c t i o n i n q u e s t i o n " ( 2 ) and 
" m a t e r i a l f a c t s i n c l u d e n o t o n l y i n f o r m a t i o n d i s c l o s i n g t h e 
e a r n i n g s and d i s t r i b u t i o n s o f a company b u t a l s o t h o s e f a c t s 
w h i c h may a f f e c t t h e d e s i r e o f i n v e s t o r s t o buy s e l l o r h o l d t h e 
company's s e c u r i t i e s . " ( 3 ) 
The p r o h i b i t i o n s a p p l y t o d e a l i n g on a r e c o g n i s e d S t o c k 
E xchange, c o u n s e l l i n g o r p r o c u r i n g someone e l s e t o d e a l o r p a s s i n g 
on t h e i n f o r m a t i o n when s u b s e q u e n t d e a l i n g i s l i k e l y and t o o f f 
m a r k e t d e a l s i n a d v e r t i s e d s e c u r i t i e s t h r o u g h o r by p r o f e s s i o n a l 
d e a l e r s m a k i n g a m a r k e t i n t h e s e c u r i t i e s . 
T h e r e i s an e x c e p t i o n t o t h e p r o h i b i t i o n s i f t h e t h i n g i s done 
o t h e r w i s e t h a n w i t h a v i e w t o t h e m a k i n g o f a p r o f i t o r a v o i d a n c e 
o f a l o s s by t h e use o f t h e i n f o r m a t i o n . T h e r e a r e a l s o v a r i o u s 
o t h e r d e f e n c e s i n c l u d i n g d e f e n c e s u n d e r c e r t a i n c i r c u m s t a n c e s f o r 
l i q u i d a t o r s , r e c e i v e r s , t r u s t e e s i n b a n k r u p t c y and j o b b e r s . 
P r o c e e d i n g s i n E n g l a n d and Wales can o n l y be b r o u g h t by t h e 
S e c r e t a r y o f S t a t e o r by o r w i t h t h e c o n s e n t o f t h e D i r e c t o r o f 
P u b l i c P r o s e c u t i o n s . The 1980 A c t does n o t c o n f e r a c i v i l remedy 
on a v i c t i m o f i n s i d e r d e a l i n g on a s t o c k e x c h a n g e . I t i s d e p l o r -
a b l e t h a t t h e v i c t i m s h o u l d be d e n i e d a c i v i l remedy, b u t p r o b a b l y 
i t i s due t o t h a t m a t c h i n g - u p o f p a r t i c u l a r t r a n s a c t i o n s i s a l m o s t 
i m p o s s i b l e i n t h e c a s e o f a n o r m a l t r a n s a c t i o n on t h e s t o c k e x c h a n g e . 
( B ) D u t i e s o f C a r e D i l i g e n c e and S k i l l 
H a v i n g d i s c u s s e d t h e f i d u c i a r y d u t i e s o f d i r e c t o r s , l e t us see 
w h a t a r e t h e i r d u t i e s o f c a r e d i l i g e n c e and s k i l l a t l a w . 
A d i r e c t o r may r e a s o n a b l y r e l y on h i s c o - d i r e c t o r s and o f f i c e r s 
o f t h e company. Thus i t i s t h e d u t y o f t h e g e n e r a l manager t o go 
( 2 ) See L i s t v . F a s h i o n P a r k I n c . , 340 F2d 457 p e r Waterman C i r c J . 
( 3 ) SEC v . Texas G u l f S u l p h u r C 0 o 40a F2d 833 a t 849 p e r Waterman 
C i r c . J . 
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c a r e f u l l y t h r o u g h t h e r e t u r n s and t o b r i n g b e f o r e t h e b o a r d any 
m a t t e r r e q u i r i n g t h e c o n s i d e r a t i o n o f t h e o t h e r d i r e c t o r s and a 
d i r e c t o r i s n o t g u i l t y o f n e g l i g e n c e i n n o t e x a m i n i n g them f o r 
h i m s e l f , n o t w i t h s t a n d i n g t h a t t h e y a r e l a i d on t h e t a b l e o f t h e 
b o a r d f o r r e f e r e n c e ( 4 ) . 
On t h e o t h e r hand a d i r e c t o r who s i g n s a cheque c a n n o t c l a i m 
t h a t he d i d so as a mere m i n i s t e r i a l a c t . I f he n e g l e c t s i n q u i r y , 
t r u s t i n g i n h i s c o - d i r e c t o r s o r one o f t h e company's o f f i c e r s , he 
w i l l be h i m s e l f l i a b l e t o t h e company i f t h e cheque i s n o t a u t h o r i s e d 
by t h e b o a r d o r i f i t i s an i m p r o p e r payment ( 5 ) , . 
I n b o t h t h e Denham c a s e and J o i n t S t o c k c a s e , t h e d e f e n d a n t s 
t r u s t e d t h e i r c o - d i r e c t o r s ( a l t h o u g h i n t h e Denham c a s e , t h e c o -
d i r e c t o r was t h e c h a i r m a n o f d i r e c t o r s ) t h e d e f e n d a n t i n t h e f o r m e r 
c a s e was h e l d n o t l i a b l e w h e r e a s t h e d e f e n d a n t i n t h e l a t t e r c a s e 
was h e l d l i a b l e . 
I n R a m s k i l l v . Edwards ( 6 ) w h e r e a d i r e c t o r was n o t p r e s e n t 
a t t h e b o a r d m e e t i n g when a l o a n was a u t h o r i s e d , and had no p a r t i n 
t h e m a k i n g o f i t , i t was h e l d t h a t t h e d i r e c t o r was u n d e r no l i a -
b i l i t y i n r e s p e c t o f t h e l o a n . 
B u t w h e r e an u l t r a v i r e s a c t was d e c i d e d a t a b o a r d m e e t i n g , 
a d i r e c t o r who was n o t p r e s e n t b u t a d o p t e d i t a t a s u b s e q u e n t meet-
i n g was h e l d l i a b l e as i f he had be e n an o r i g i n a l p a r t y ( 7 ) . 
T h e r e i s no r e a l d u t y f o r a d i r e c t o r t o a t t e n d b o a r d m e e t i n g s ( 8 ) 
I n M a r q u i s o f B u t e ' s Case ( 9 ) where t h e r e w e re f i f t y t r u s t e e s 
( 4 ) Re Denham & Co. ( 1 8 8 3 ) 25 Ch. D. 752; 50 L.T. 523; 32 W.R. 487. 
( 5 ) J o i n t S t o c k D i s c o u n t Co. v . Brown ( 1 8 6 9 ) L.R, 8 Eq„ 3 8 1 . See 
a l s o C o a t s v . C r o s s l a n d ( 1 9 0 4 ) 20 T.L.R. 88; 
(6 ) ( 1 8 8 5 ) 31 Ch. D. 100; 55 L . J o C h . 8 1 ; 53 L.T. 949; 34 W.R. 97; 
2 T.L.R. 37. 
( 7 ) Re Lands A l l o t m e n t Co. [1Q9A] 1 Ch. 616; 63 L . J . C h . 29; 70 
L.T. 286; 10 T.L.R. 234; 1 Mans. 107; 7 R. 115; 42 W.R. 404. 
( 8 ) I n Re Denham & Company ( 1 8 8 3 ) 25 Ch. D. 752; 50 L.T, 523; 32 
W.R. 4 8 7 . 
( 9 ) ( 1 8 9 2 ] 2 Ch. 100. 
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( n a m e l y p e r s o n s i n t h e p o s i t i o n o f d i r e c t o r s ) o f a s a v i n g s b a n k , 
a " t r u s t e e " who a t t e n d e d no m e e t i n g s f o r a number o f y e a r s was 
h e l d n o t l i a b l e f o r t h e m i s c o n d u c t o f h i s " c o - t r u s t e e s . " 
B u t L o r d H a r d w i c k e s a i d i n C h a r i t a b l e C o r p o r a t i o n v . S u t t o n ( l O ) 
t h a t c o n t i n u o u s n o n - a t t e n d a n c e a t m e e t i n g s m i g h t r e n d e r a d i r e c t o r 
g u i l t y o f t h e b r e a c h e s o f t r u s t w h i c h w e r e c o m m i t t e d by o t h e r s . 
I n t h a t c a s e i t was t h e r e s p o n s i b i l i t y o f a w a r e h o u s e - k e e p e r 
o f a c h a r t e r e d c o r p o r a t i o n t o make l o a n s t o p o o r p e o p l e on t h e 
s e c u r i t y o f s u i t a b l e p l e d g e s and f i f t y c o m m i t t e e m e n o f t h e c o r p o r a -
t i o n w e r e h e l d l i a b l e f o r l o s s e s r e s u l t i n g f r o m t h e i r f a i l u r e t o 
e n s u r e t h a t t h e a c t i v i t i e s o f t h e w a r e h o u s e - k e e p e r w e r e a d e q u a t e l y 
s u p e r v i s e d . W h i l e d e l i v e r i n g t h e j u d g e m e n t , L o r d H a r d w i c k e 
commented: 
" I n t h i s r e s p e c t ( d i r e c t o r s ) may be g u i l t y o f a c t s o f c o m m i s s i o n 
o r o m i s s i o n , o f m a l f e a s a n c e o r n o n - f e a s a n c e . . . By a c c e p t i n g 
a t r u s t o f t h i s s o r t , a p e r s o n i s o b l i g e d t o e x e c u t e i t w i t h 
f i d e l i t y and r e a s o n a b l e d i l i g e n c e ; and i t i s no e x c u s e t o say 
t h a t t h e y had no b e n e f i t f r o m i t , b u t t h a t i t was m e r e l y 
h o n o r a r y . . . " 
And i n Re F o r e s t o f Dean Co. ( 1 ) J e s s e l M.R. s a i d : 
" . . . ( D i r e c t o r s a r e ) t o use r e a s o n a b l e d i l i g e n c e h a v i n g r e g a r d 
t o t h e i r p o s i t i o n , t h o u g h p r o b a b l y an o r d i n a r y d i r e c t o r , who o n l y 
a t t e n d s a t t h e b o a r d o c c a s i o n a l l y , c a n n o t be e x p e c t e d t o d e v o t e 
as much t i m e and a t t e n t i o n t o t h e b u s i n e s s as t h e s o l e m anaging 
p a r t n e r o f an o r d i n a r y p a r t n e r s h i p , b u t t h e y a r e bound t o use 
f a i r and r e a s o n a b l e d i l i g e n c e i n t h e management o f t h e i r company's 
a f f a i r s , and t o a c t h o n e s t l y . " 
A d i r e c t o r i s n o t e x p e c t e d t o e x e r c i s e s k i l l w h i c h he does n o t 
p o s s e s s . Thus i n Re B r a z i l i a n Rubber P l a n t a t i o n s & E s t a t e s L t d . ( 2 ) 
( 1 0 ) ( 1 7 4 2 ) 2 A t k o 4 0 0 , 4 0 5 . 
( 1 ) ( 1 8 7 8 ) 10 Ch. D. 450, 4 5 2 . 
( 2 ) [19117 1 425; 80 L.J.Ch. 2 2 1 ; 103 L.T. 697; 27 T.L.R. 109. 
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N e v i l l e J «> remarked; 
"(A d i r e c t o r ) i s , I t h i n k n o t bound t o b r i n g any s p e c i a l q u a l i -
f i c a t i o n s t o h i s o f f i c e o He may u n d e r t a k e t h e management o f a 
r u b b e r company i n complete i g n o r a n c e o f e v e r y t h i n g connected 
w i t h r u b b e r , w i t h o u t i n c u r r i n g r e s p o n s i b i l i t y f o r t h e mistakes 
which may r e s u l t from such i g n o r a n c e . " (3) 
I n t h a t case t h r e e d e f e n d a n t s were h e l d n o t l i a b l e f o r l o s s e s 
r e s u l t i n g from a r u i n o u s s p e c u l a t i o n i n r u b b e r p l a n t a t i o n s , and 
N e v i l l e J . had t h i s t o comment: 
"The d i r e c t o r s o f the company . . . were a l l induced t o become 
d i r e c t o r s by Harboard . . . S i r A r t h u s Aylmer was a b s o l u t e l y 
i g n o r a n t o f b u s i n e s s . He o n l y consented t o a c t because he was 
t o l d t he o f f i c e would g i v e him a l i t t l e p l e a s a n t employment w i t h -
o u t h i s i n c u r r i n g any r e s p o n s i b i l i t y . H.W. Tug w e l l was p a r t n e r 
i n a f i r m o f bankers i n a good p o s i t i o n i n Bath; he was s e v e n t y -
f i v e years o f age and v e r y deaf; he was induced t o j o i n t he board 
by r e p r e s e n t a t i o n s made t o him i n January, 1906. Barber was a 
r u b b e r b r o k e r and was t o l d t h a t a l l he would have t o do would be 
t o g i v e an o p i n i o n as t o t h e v a l u e o f r u b b e r when i t a r r i v e d i n 
England. Hancock was a man o f b u s i n e s s who s a i d he was induced 
t o j o i n by s eeing t h e names o f Tugwell and Barber, whom he con-
s i d e r e d good men." ( 4 ) 
And i n Re Denham & Co. ( 5 ) a d i r e c t o r was h e l d not l i a b l e f o r 
n o t d e t e c t i n g the f r a u d s o f t h e chairman o f d i r e c t o r s because he 
was "a c o u n t r y gentleman and not a s k i l l e d a c c o u n t a n t o " (6) 
From the above cases, i t i s f a i r l y c l e a r t h a t ( i n c o n t r a s t t o 
d i r e c t o r s ' v e r y s t r i c t d u t i e s o f l o y a l t y ) d i r e c t o r s ' d u t i e s o f c a r e , 
( 3 ) /1911] 1 Ch. 425 a t 437. 
(4) {19117 1 Ch. 425, 437. 
( 5 ) (1883) 25 Ch. D. 752. 
(6) I b i d . a t p„767, per C h i t t y J . 
- 123 -
d i l i g e n c e and s k i l l are l a x o r f a r from r i g o r o u s . Beyond t h a t , i t 
i s d i f f i c u l t t o d e a l i n g e n e r a l p r o p o s i t i o n s . There are some i n c o n -
s i s t e n c i e s ; i n t h e words o f Romer J . i n Re C i t y E q u i t a b l e F i r e 
I n s u r a n c e Co. (7) " t o t h e q u e s t i o n o f what i s the p a r t i c u l a r degree 
of s k i l l and d i l i g e n c e r e q u i r e d o f (a d i r e c t o r ) , the a u t h o r i t i e s 
do n o t , I t h i n k , g i v e any v e r y c l e a r answer." (8) 
A Case f o r d i f f e r e n t i a t i n g Companies 
P a r t o f t h e d i f f i c u l t y which t h e c o u r t s have had i n t h i s r e s -
p e c t can be a t t r i b u t e d t o t h e f a c t t h a t w h i l e the judges are w e l l 
competent t o a d j u d i c a t e on q u e s t i o n s o f good f a i t h and l o y a l t y , 
t hey f e e l n o t sure when t h e y are c o n f r o n t e d w i t h c o m p l i c a t e d p r o -
blems o f business a d m i n i s t r a t i o n , economics and t r a d i n g , r e s u l t i n g 
i n t h e i r r e l u c t a n c e t o i n t e r f e r e w i t h t h e d i r e c t o r s ' b u s i n e s s 
judgement ( 9 ) . I n s e t t i n g o u t s t a n d a r d s of conduct a p p l i c a b l e t o 
b usinesses of a l l s i z e s and k i n d s , t h e c o u r t s have r e q u i r e d l i t t l e 
more than honesty and e f f o r t so as t o a t t r a c t men o f sound busin e s s 
acumen t o t h e commercial w o r l d . 
I t i s s u b m i t t e d t h a t a n o t h e r reason f o r i n c o n s i s t e n c y o f case 
law i s the c o u r t s ' f a i l u r e t o d i s t i n g u i s h from one a n o t h e r t h e 
p o s i t i o n s o f d i r e c t o r s i n d i f f e r e n t c l a s s e s o f companies, w h i c h , 
i t i s s u b m i t t e d , may be c l a s s i f i e d i n t o t h r e e groups as a rough 
g u i d e , namely l a r g e companies ( p u b l i c o r l a r g e unquoted companies) 
(C l a s s I companies); medium companies (medium unquoted o r l a r g e 
f a m i l y companies) (C l a s s I I companies); and s m a l l companies ( p a r t -
n e r s h i p companies) (C l a s s I I I companies). (10) 
( 7 ) /1925] Cho 407; 94 L c J o C h„445; 133 L.T, 520; 4 0 T X.R. 853; 
/"19257B. & C.R. 109. 
(8) /I9257 Ch. 407, 427. Romer J . a l s o s a i d i n t h a t case: "There 
a r e , i n a d d i t i o n , one or two o t h e r g e n e r a l p r o p o s i t i o n s t h a t seem 
t o be w a r r a n t e d by the r e p o r t e d cases: (1) A d i r e c t o r need n o t 
e x h i b i t i n t h e performance of h i s d u t i e s a g r e a t e r degree o f s k i l l 
t h an may r e a s o n a b l y be expected from a person o f h i s knowledge and 
e x p e r i e n c e . " 
( 9 ) See Gower, p.603. 
(10) On p a r t n e r s h i p companies, see g e n e r a l l y Morse & Tedd (1971) 
J.B.L. 261. C f e Hadden, P.239. 
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The d i f f e r e n t i a t i n g mark o f l a r g e companies ( p u b l i c or l a r g e 
unquoted companies) ( C l a s s I companies) i s t h e s e p a r a t i o n o f owner-
s h i p and c o n t r o l among s h a r e h o l d e r s , management and d i r e c t o r s . 
Roughly they are t h e companies as d i s t i n g u i s h e d from n i n e t e e n t h -
c e n t u r y m i d d l e - c l a s s family-owned p e r s o n a l companies. I n c l u d e d i n 
t h i s c l a s s would be those huge companies which are a t p r e s e n t c h a r -
a c t e r i s e d by a l a r g e number o f s h a r e h o l d e r s , i n many cases more 
s h a r e h o l d e r s than employees; by p r o f e s s i o n a l management teams; and 
by boards o f d i r e c t o r s , sometimes s e l e c t e d from o u t s t a n d i n g names 
and owning minor o r n e g l i g i b l e percentages o f t o t a l s h a r e s . Examples 
o f t h e s e huge companies are dominant c o n t r o l l i n g groups and f o r e i g n 
i n t e r e s t . 
C lass I companies s h o u l d a l s o i n c l u d e those l a r g e - s i z e d com-
pani e s o u t s i d e t h e heavy s e c t o r o f i n d u s t r i a l a c t i v i t y , companies 
o f t h e s e r v i c e t y p e , companies r e p r e s e n t i n g l i g h t or new i n d u s t r i e s , 
and companies dominant i n t h e i r p a r t i c u l a r f i e l d s which have r e c e n t l y 
moved o u t of t h e p r i v a t e s e c t o r . 
I t i s proposed t h a t a l l p u b l i c companies i r r e s p e c t i v e o f the 
number o f t h e i r employees and a l l l i m i t e d companies employing 2 , 0 0 0 
employees o r more should be r e g i s t e r e d as Class I companies. A l l 
e n t e r p r i s e s w i t h i n a group s h o u l d be t r e a t e d as an e n t i t y f o r the 
purpose o f c l a s s i f i c a t i o n . 
Class I companies would be those companies i n whose e x e c u t i v e 
d e c i s i o n - m a k i n g t h e q u e s t i o n of s o c i a l r e s p o n s i b i l i t y s hould weigh 
h e a v i l y . The c r i t e r i o n o f p r o f i t a b i l i t y s h ould n o t be t h e i r s o l e 
t e s t o f good business performance. And because they s h o u l d have 
c r i t e r i a o t h e r than p r o f i t , i t i s i n these companies t h a t one i s 
more l i k e l y t o f i n d a t t e n t i o n g i v e n to such i s s u e s as patronage o f 
a r t s and s c i e n c e s . These companies are those which would be under 
a d u t y t o p r o v i d e and s t a b i l i s e employment. 
- 125 -
I t i s proposed t h a t t h e g e n e r a l f i d u c i a r y d u t y o f d i r e c t o r s 
should be t h e same f o r d i r e c t o r s o f a l l t h r e e c l a s s e s . 
I t i s f u r t h e r proposed t h a t a d i r e c t o r should observe t h e 
utmost good f a i t h towards h i s company i n a l l o f h i s a c t i o n s and t o 
a c t h o n e s t l y i n the e x e r c i s e o f t h e powers and i n the d i s c h a r g e o f 
the d u t i e s o f h i s o f f i c e . 
A d i r e c t o r should n o t do a n y t h i n g o r o m i t t o do a n y t h i n g i f 
the d o i n g o f t h a t t h i n g o r t h e o m i s s i o n t o do i t , as t h e case may 
be, g i v e s r i s e t o a c o n f l i c t , o r might r e a s o n a b l y be expected t o 
g i v e r i s e t o a c o n f l i c t , between h i s p r i v a t e i n t e r e s t s and t h e 
d u t i e s o f h i s o f f i c e . I n p a r t i c u l a r a d i r e c t o r s h o u l d n o t make use 
o f any money o r p r o p e r t y b e l o n g i n g t o h i s company t o b e n e f i t him-
s e l f ; nor o f any r e l e v a n t i n f o r m a t i o n a c q u i r e d by him o r r e l e v a n t 
o p p o r t u n i t y a f f o r d e d t o him by v i r t u e o f h i s p o s i t i o n as a d i r e c t o r 
o f a company, i f by do i n g so he g a i n s an advantage f o r h i m s e l f where 
t h e r e may be a c o n f l i c t w i t h t h e i n t e r e s t s o f t h e company. 
The e x p r e s s i o n ' r e l e v a n t i n f o r m a t i o n ' should mean any i n f o r m -
a t i o n whieh a d i r e c t o r o b t a i n e d w h i l e a d i r e c t o r o r o t h e r o f f i c e r 
o f t h e company and which i t was reasonable t o expect him t o d i s -
c l o s e t o t h e company o r n o t t o d i s c l o s e t o persons unconnected w i t h 
the company. 
The e x p r e s s i o n ' r e l e v a n t o p p o r t u n i t y ' should mean an o p p o r t u -
n i t y which a d i r e c t o r had w h i l e a d i r e c t o r o r o t h e r o f f i c e r o f the 
company and which he had ( i ) by v i r t u e of h i s p o s i t i o n as a d i r e c -
t o r o r o t h e r o f f i c e r o f t h e company; o r ( i i ) i n c i r c u m s t a n c e s i n 
which i t was reasonable t o expect him t o d i s c l o s e t he f a c t t h a t he 
had t h a t o p p o r t u n i t y t o t h e company. 
However, i t i s proposed t h a t a d i r e c t o r should not be l i a b l e 
i n manner a f o r e s a i d f o r any a c t o r o m i s s i o n which i s d u l y a u t h o r i s e d 
o r r a t i f i e d . 
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•Proper purposes' should be merely one aspect o f the w i d e r 
d u t y r e q u i r i n g a d i r e c t o r t o a c t bona f i d e i n t h e b e s t i n t e r e s t s 
o f t h e company as a whole,, 
As t o the degree o f c a r e , d i l i g e n c e and s k i l l o f d i r e c t o r s i n 
Class I companies, i t i s s u b m i t t e d t h a t t h e degree s h o u l d be r a t h e r 
h i g h . The o l d r u l e t h a t company d i r e c t o r s are n o t bound t o do more 
than a c t h o n e s t l y and t o t h e b e s t o f t h e i r a b i l i t y i n whatever they 
a c t u a l l y do i s c l e a r l y i n a d e q u a t e . C u r r e n t commercial a t t i t u d e (1) 
i s c e r t a i n l y more demanding. I t i s r e c o g n i s e d , however, t h a t i t i s 
unreasonable t o expect every d i r e c t o r t o have equal knowledge and 
e x p e r i e n c e o f e v e r y aspect o f t h e b u s i n e s s o f t h e company ( 2 ) . 
T h e r e f o r e , i t i s proposed t h a t i n the case o f Class I companies' 
d i r e c t o r s , w i t h t h e e x c e p t i o n o f employee d i r e c t o r s , w i t h i n t h e 
f i e l d o f p r o f e s s e d o r i n f e r r e d competence o f each d i r e c t o r t h e r e 
s h o u l d be imposed an o b j e c t i v e s t a n d a r d o f c a r e , d i l i g e n c e and s k i l l 
so t h a t defences such as l a c k o f knowledge o r l a c k o f e x p e r i e n c e 
w i l l n o t h e l p t h e d i r e c t o r concerned. I n t h e s a i d f i e l d t h e d i r e c -
t o r s h o u l d conform t o p r o f e s s i o n a l s tandards much as l a w y e r s , account-
a n t s , a r c h i t e c t s , e n g i n e e r s , d o c t o r s , e t c . O u t s i d e the s a i d f i e l d 
i t i s proposed t h a t a d i r e c t o r i n Class I companies sh o u l d n o t be 
r e q u i r e d t o e x h i b i t i n t h e performance o f h i s d u t i e s a g r e a t e r 
degree o f s k i l l t han may r e a s o n a b l y be expected from a person o f h i s 
knowledge and e x p e r i e n c e . 
I n t he case o f an employee d i r e c t o r i n Class I companies, i t 
i s proposed t h a t he need n o t e x h i b i t i n t h e performance o f h i s d u t i e s 
a g r e a t e r degree o f s k i l l t han may r e a s o n a b l y be expected from a 
person o f h i s knowledge and e x p e r i e n c e . However, i f he i s p r o f e s -
s i o n a l l y q u a l i f i e d , he should be d e a l t w i t h e x a c t l y as a non-employee 
(1) Hadden, p„322„ 
(2) For example i n a b u i l d i n g c o n s t r u c t i o n company, one d i r e c t o r may 
have e x p e r t i s e i n f i n a n c e and a n o t h e r i n c o n s t r u c t i o n e n g i n e e r i n g . 
- 127 -
director« 
I t i s a l s o proposed t h a t i n t h e case o f Class I companies' 
d i r e c t o r s , w i t h t h e e x c e p t i o n o f employee d i r e c t o r s , t h e r e s h o u l d 
be an e v o l u t i o n o f m a n a g e r i a l pr o f e s s i o n , , I t i s h i g h t i m e t h a t , 
a p a r t from employee d i r e c t o r s , company management i n t h e case o f 
l a r g e ( C l a s s I ) companies be a r e c o g n i s e d p r o f e s s i o n w i t h o b j e c t i v e 
p r o f e s s i o n a l s t a n d a r d s . Persons e l i g i b l e t o be such d i r e c t o r s would 
be p r o f e s s i o n a l managers, b u s i n e s s c o n s u l t a n t s , management s p e c i a l i s t s , 
a c c o u n t a n t s , l a w y e r s , e c o n o m i s t s , s o c i a l s c i e n t i s t s , e n g i n e e r s , a r c h i -
t e c t s e t c . I t i s not proposed t h a t t h e management p r o f e s s i o n need 
be a graduate p r o f e s s i o n . The reason f o r r e q u i r i n g a m a n a g e r i a l 
p r o f e s s i o n i s t h a t i n o r d e r t o m a i n t a i n i t s members' r e p u t e and 
s t a n d i n g and t o g a i n and r e t a i n p u b l i c c o n f i d e n c e i n t h e i r a b i l i t i e s , 
a developed p r o f e s s i o n u s u a l l y l a y s down and m a i n t a i n s s t a n d a r d s o f 
e t h i c a l conduct beyond those r e q u i r e d o f t h e o r d i n a r y c i t i z e n by law, 
and by r e q u i r i n g a d i r e c t o r and o r e x e c u t i v e and o r manager t o be a 
member o f a r e c o g n i s e d p r o f e s s i o n , i t would be safeguarded t o a 
r e a s o n a b l y good e x t e n t t h a t those c o n t r o l l i n g companies are imposed 
by r u l e s o f p r o f e s s i o n a l conduct which can s a t i s f y t h e needs o f 
modern s o c i e t y . The s a n c t i o n o r p o s s i b i l i t y t h e r e o f o f d i s c i p l i n a r y 
p r o c eedings o r suspension or removal o f membership from a r e c o g n i s e d 
p r o f e s s i o n would o p e r a t e t o a g r e a t e x t e n t t o d e t e r d i r e c t o r s from 
p u r s u i n g f r a u d u l e n t o r n e g l i g e n t courses o f conduct. Moreover, 
busin e s s e d u c t i o n and p r o f e s s i o n a l t r a i n i n g h e l p t o encourage c o r -
p o r a t e r e s p o n s i b i l i t y . 
Small companies ( p a r t n e r s h i p companies) (Class I I I companies) 
would be those companies which are i n essence i n c o r p o r a t e d p a r t n e r s h i p s 
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o r s o l e t r a d e r s nowadays ( 3 ) . They would i n c l u d e those companies 
which have been r e g i s t e r e d t o take over businesses o r p r o f e s s i o n a l 
p r a c t i c e s p r e v i o u s l y c a r r i e d on by p a r t n e r s h i p s . U s u a l l y i n these 
companies the s h a r e h o l d e r s wish t o j o i n t l y t a k e p a r t i n management 
and r e g a r d themselves f o r p r a c t i c a l purposes as p a r t n e r s i n the 
company. They have been i n c o r p o r a t e d p r i n c i p a l l y t o o b t a i n t h e 
advantage o f l i m i t e d l i a b i l i t y or t a x advantage o r o t h e r advantages 
which f l o w from i n c o r p o r a t i o n . The p r e s e n t Companies A c t s are i l l -
adapted f o r r e g u l a t i n g t h e r e l a t i o n s h i p w i t h i n a group o f persons 
who c o n s i d e r themselves as p a r t n e r s i n a s m a l l company and w i s h t o 
have t h e same freedom i n t h e r u n n i n g o f i t s b u s i n e s s and i n the 
r e g u l a t i o n o f t h e i r i n t e r n a l l e g a l r e l a t i o n s h i p s as would be a v a i l -
a b l e t o them under a p a r t n e r s h i p regime ( 4 ) . There sh o u l d be a 
g r e a t e r degree o f f l e x i b i l i t y i n the r u l e s g o v e r n i n g t h e e x t e r n a l 
and i n t e r n a l r e l a t i o n s o f such companies t o meet t h e v a r y i n g r e q u i r e -
ments o f the e n t r e p r e n e u r s . These problems cannot s a t i s f a c t o r i l y 
be met by amendments w i t h i n t h e framework o f the e x i s t i n g Companies 
A c t s , b u t c a l l f o r a new l e g i s l a t i v e approach. 
I t i s proposed t h a t t h e b u s i n e s s r e l a t i o n s h i p between t h e 
s h a r e h o l d e r s should be governed by such si m p l e assumptions as good 
f a i t h , mutual t r u s t , and u n a n i m i t y i n r e a c h i n g d e c i s i o n s o f b a s i c 
(3) The laws of many c o u n t r i e s draw a c l e a r d i s t i n c t i o n between 
j o i n t s t o c k companies and o t h e r companies, e.g. i n France the 
s o c i e t e anonyme and t h e s o c i e t e a_ r e s p o n s i b i l i t y l i m i t e e and i n 
Germany the A k t i e n q e s e l l s c h a f t and the G e s e l l s c h a f t m i t b e s c h r a n k t e r 
H a f t u n q . I n U.S. some s t a t e l e g i s l a t u r e s have passed laws s p e c f i -
c a l l y r e g u l a t i n g c l o s e companies. Brightman J . once a t t e m p t e d t o 
d e f i n e a p a r t n e r s h i p company; see h i s judgement i n Re L e a d e n h a l l 
General Hardware S t o r e s L t d . (1971) 115 S.J„ 202. 
(4) The d i f f i c u l t i e s caused by p a r t n e r s h i p companies are w e l l 
i l l u s t r a t e d by Re Westbourne G a l l e r i e s L t d . [1910] 3 A l l E.R. 374; 
f l 9 7 l j 1 A l l E.R. 5 6 . A l t h o u g h t h e case a s s e r t s t h e a b i l i t y o f the 
c o u r t s t o a c t on e q u i t a b l e grounds i n compulsory w i n d i n g up, t h i s 
remedy may i n many cases be worse than the d i s e a s e . I t i s s u b m i t t e d 
t h a t i t i s d e s i r a b l e t o have a new s e t o f s t a t u t o r y r u l e s r e g u l a t i n g 
t h e i r i n t e r n a l r e l a t i o n s h i p s a c c o r d i n g t o t h e i r own i n t e n t i o n s . See 
a l s o above, pp.37-8. 
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importance and s i m i l a r p a r t n e r s h i p r u l e s under the P a r t n e r s h i p A c t . 
There should a l s o be an easy r e g i s t r a t i o n procedure and a s i m p l i -
f i e d c o n s t i t u t i o n - perhaps a s e t o f p a r t n e r s h i p a r t i c l e s i n s t e a d 
o f t h e memorandum and a r t i c l e s o f a s s o c i a t i o n , p r i m a r i l y as a guide 
f o r o r d i n a r y Class I I I companies b u t which c o u l d , l i k e T a b l e A 
under t h e Companies A c t 1948, be adopted i n whole o r i n p a r t . Of 
course t h e s e t o f p a r t n e r s h i p a r t i c l e s may be m o d i f i e d i n w r i t i n g 
by a supplemental agreement, b u t such a supplemental agreement, i t 
i s proposed, need not be f i l e d on a p u b l i c r e g i s t e r . 
I t i s proposed t h a t o n l y those i n t e n d i n g companies t h a t employ 
no t more than 50 people may be r e g i s t e r e d as Class I I I companies. 
A g a i n , a l l e n t e r p r i s e s w i t h i n a group are t r e a t e d as an e n t i t y f o r 
the purpose o f c l a s s i f i c a t i o n . 
As a f o r e s a i d ( 5 ) , t h e g e n e r a l f i d u c i a r y d u t y o f d i r e c t o r s o f 
Class I I I companies should be t h e same as t h a t o f d i r e c t o r s o f 
C l a s s I companies. 
As t o t h e degree of d i l i g e n c e and care o f d i r e c t o r s o f Class I I I 
companies, i t i s proposed t h a t i t should be s e t t l e d by agreement so 
t h a t t he p a r t i e s concerned can agree on the amount o f time t o be devoted 
by each p a r t y t o t h e b u s i n e s s , b u t i n t h e absence of any c o n t r a r y 
agreement, each d i r e c t o r s h o u l d a t t e n d d i l i g e n t l y and e x c l u s i v e l y 
t o t he management o f t h e b u s i n e s s . 
As r e g a r d s t h e degree of s k i l l , i t i s proposed t h a t each d i r e c -
t o r o f a Class I I I company sh o u l d e x e r c i s e the degree o f s k i l l which 
may r e a s o n a b l y be expected o f a person o f h i s knowledge and e x p e r i e n c e . 
L i m i t e d companies which do not f a l l w i t h i n Class I companies 
and Class I I I companies s h o u l d be r e g i s t e r e d as medium companies 
(medium unquoted or l a r g e f a m i l y companies) (Class I I companies). 
The c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s o f Class I I companies are t h a t t h e r e i s no such 
(5 ) See above, pp.125-6. 
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s e p a r a t i o n o f ownership and c o n t r o l as i s e v i d e n t i n Class I com-
p a n i e s . The owner s h i p , t h e d i r e c t i o n and t h e management are a l l 
much more c o i n c i d e n t . But they are l a r g e r than Class I I I companies. 
Some o f these companies do have p r o f e s s i o n a l managers and d i r e c t o r s ; 
w h i l e o t h e r s have s e v e r a l o u t s i d e m i n o r i t y s h a r e h o l d e r s . Together 
w i t h Class I I I companies t h e y are the t r u e p r i v a t e c a p i t a l i s m o f 
the n i n e t e e n t h - c e n t u r y t y p e . But on the whole Class I I companies 
are more a m b i t i o u s than Class I I I companies. I n some o f these 
Class I I companies one sees the ferment o f p r i v a t e c a p i t a l i s m . 
Here i s t h e f i e l d f o r b o l d e x e r c i s e o f i n t u i t i o n , f o r a d v e n t u r e -
someness and f o r a g i l i t y . R i sks are r e c o g n i s e d and undertaken 
w i t h t h e aim o f becoming b i g g e r , s t r o n g e r and f i n d i n g a f i r m p o s i -
t i o n i n the i n d u s t r i a l s t r u c t u r e e i t h e r t h r o u g h growth o r combina-
t i o n . Some o f these companies are d i v i s i o n s o f t h e g r e a t i n s t i t u -
t i o n a l o r g a n i s a t i o n s ( C l a s s I companies) b u t , f o r one reason o r 
a n o t h e r , have not moved i n t o t h e i r a reas. 
I t i s i n r e s p e c t o f C l a s s I I companies t h a t c o m p a r a t i v e l y 
t h e q u e s t i o n o f p r o t e c t i o n o f m i n o r i t i e s a r i s e s more f r e q u e n t l y . 
As a f o r e s a i d ( 6 ) , t h e g e n e r a l f i d u c i a r y d u t y o f d i r e c t o r s o f 
Class I I companies sh o u l d be t h e same as t h a t o f d i r e c t o r s o f Class I 
companies. 
However,as t o t h e degree o f c a r e , d i l i g e n c e and s k i l l , a d i r e c -
t o r o f Class I I companies sh o u l d be r e q u i r e d t o e x e r c i s e t h a t degree 
o f c a r e and d i l i g e n c e t h a t a r e a s o n a b l y p r u d e n t person would e x e r -
c i s e i n comparable c i r c u m s t a n c e s and th e degree o f s k i l l which may 
re a s o n a b l y be expected o f a person o f h i s knowledge and e x p e r i e n c e . 
I t i s perhaps n o t o u t o f p l a c e t o note c e r t a i n comment g i v e n 
by L o r d Macnaghten i n Dovey v. Cory ( 7 ) : 
( 6 ) See above, pp. 125-6. 
(7) [1301] A.C. 477 a t 488. 
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" I do n ot t h i n k i t d e s i r a b l e f o r any t r i b u n a l t o do t h a t which 
P a r l i a m e n t has a b s t a i n e d from d o i n g - t h a t i s , t o f o r m u l a t e 
p r e c i s e r u l e s f o r t h e guidance o r embarrassment o f businessmen 
i n t h e conduct o f bu s i n e s s a f f a i r s , . There never has been, and 
I t h i n k t h e r e never w i l l be, much d i f f i c u l t y i n d e a l i n g w i t h 
any p a r t i c u l a r case on i t s own f a c t s and c i r c u m s t a n c e s ; and, 
speaking f o r m y s e l f , I r a t h e r doubt t h e wisdom o f a t t e m p t i n g t o 
do more." 
But are n o t d i r e c t o r s , e x e c u t i v e s , and t h e i r a d v i s o r s e n t i t l e d 
t o demand from t h e law some r e a s o n a b l y c e r t a i n r u l e s o f p e r m i s s i b l e 
conduct? When laws become outmoded i n s o c i e t y , when th e y do not 
r e f l e c t t h e way i n which people l i v e , then s e r i o u s c o n s i d e r a t i o n 
s h o u l d be g i v e n t o t h e i r m o d i f i c a t i o n o r a b o l i t i o n . There should 
be a sane r a t i o n a l i s a t i o n and c o d i f i c a t i o n o f t h e law r e l a t i n g t o 
company d i r e c t o r s . 
As t o the problem o f enforcement o f d i r e c t o r s ' d u t i e s , t h e law 
should be amended so t h a t i t i s a c o n d i t i o n o f t h e r e c e i p t o f c e r -
t a i n s u b s i d i e s or l i c e n c e s g r a n t e d by government t h a t t h e new 
proposed r e f o r m i n these t h r e e Chapters and o r c e r t a i n d u t i e s be 
o b s e r v e d . Other s a n c t i o n s may be suspension, t e m p o r a r i l y o r p e r -
manently, from p r a c t i c e as a p r o f e s s i o n a l d i r e c t o r , manager o r 
e x e c u t i v e , assuming t h e law i s amended so as t o r e q u i r e t h a t a 
d i r e c t o r of a l a r g e company s h o u l d bea member o f a r e l e v a n t p r o f e s -
s i o n a l body; a compulsory w i n d i n g up o f the companies concerned; 
s t r i k i n g from the r e g i s t e r o f t h e companies concerned; a d e c l a r a t i o n 
t h a t the d i r e c t o r concerned be b a r r e d from being employed as d i r e c -
t o r by anyone o r any company f o r a number o f years from the d a t e o f 
c o u r t o r d e r ( 8 ) . P r o v i s i o n s should a l s o be made t o a l l o w employees, 
(8) Cf„ Companies A c t 1948, s . 1 8 8 ( 1 ) ; I n s o l v e n c y A c t 1976, s.9; 
Companies (No.2) B i l l 1981 (As Amended i n Committee), c l a u s e 6 1 . 
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u n i o n s o r s h a r e h o l d e r s t o t a k e d i r e c t o r s i n c l u d i n g employee d i r e c -
t o r s t o c o u r t f o r incompetence o r f a i l u r e t o observe d i r e c t o r s ' 
d u t i e s and t o a l l o w t h e c o u r t s t o suspend o r r e p l a c e t h e d i r e c t o r s 
i n d e f a u l t . 
Enforcement o f C o r p o r a t e D u t i e s 
I n o r d e r t o make t h e d u t i e s o f d i r e c t o r s more e f f e c t i v e , i t 
i s i m p o r t a n t t o have a good system o f enforcement o f c o r p o r a t e 
d u t i e s . 
There are s e v e r a l ways o f e n f o r c i n g c o r p o r a t e d u t i e s . 
F i r s t , t h e company may b r i n g an a c t i o n a g a i n s t i t s d i r e c t o r ( s ) 
f o r breaches of d u t i e s o f l o y a l t y , c a r e , d i l i g e n c e o r s k i l l . 
Secondly, t h e r e are t h e d e r i v a t i v e a c t i o n , p e r s o n a l a c t i o n , 
a l t e r n a t i v e remedy under s e c t i o n 75 o f t h e Companies Act 1980 and 
w i n d i n g up under s . 2 2 2 ( f ) o f the Companies A c t 1948, a l l o f which 
were d i s c u s s e d i n Chapter 1 h e r e i n . 
Two o t h e r means o f enforcement (one o f which i s proposed) 
namely department o f t r a d e i n v e s t i g a t i o n s and w a t c h i n g committees 
remain t o be d i s c u s s e d , and t o these we s h a l l now t u r n . 
1. Department o f Trade I n v e s t i g a t i o n s 
The Department o f Trade now have e x t e n s i v e powers t o i n v e s t i -
g a t e companies ( 9 ) , and t h e e x i s t e n c e o f these powers i s i m p o r t a n t 
b o t h as a remedy a g a i n s t u n f a i r t r e a t m e n t and as a p r e l i m i n a r y t o 
c i v i l or c r i m i n a l p roceedings a g a i n s t t h e wrongdoers. U n t i l 1967 
these powers were e x e r c i s a b l e o n l y by t h e f o r m a l appointment o f an 
i n s p e c t o r t o i n v e s t i g a t e t h e company's a f f a i r s and t h e y were r a r e l y 
e x e r c i s e d owing t o t h e o v e r l a p i n the f u n c t i o n s of v a r i o u s government 
(9) The Government's Companies (No.2) B i l l 1981 (As Amended i n 
Committee) proposes t h a t t h e c l a s s e s o f persons who may be r e q u i r e d 
t o g i v e evidence i n t h e course o f i n v e s t i g a t i o n s should be extended 
and proposes t o p r o v i d e i n s p e c t o r s w i t h power t o examine d i r e c t o r s ' 
bank accounts. See c l a u s e s 57 and 59. See a l s o c l a u s e s 56, 58 and 
60 t h e r e o f . 
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a u t h o r i t i e s i n t h e a f f a i r s o f p u b l i c companies and the absence o f 
any c l e a r l y d e f i n e d r e s p o n s i b i l i t y w i t h i n t h e Board o f Trade, t h e 
predecessor o f t h e Department o f Trade, f o r t h e o v e r s i g h t o f the 
market. They took t h e view t h a t i f an appointment was made b e f o r e 
i t was a b s o l u t e l y necessary, e x p e c i a l l y i n t h e case o f a p u b l i c 
company, i r r e p a r a b l e damage might be occasioned t o the company i f 
the a l l e g a t i o n s made a g a i n s t i t were proved t o be f r i v o l o u s , f a l s e 
o r i n c o r r e c t . T h i s d i f f i c u l t y has been removed by t h e g r a n t t o 
the Department o f new powers o f p r e l i m i n a r y e n q u i r y , by v i r t u e o f 
which i t may demand t h e p r o d u c t i o n o f documents and accounts from 
any company w i t h o u t n e c e s s a r i l y c o n d u c t i n g a f u l l i n s p e c t i o n ( 1 0 ) . 
To save c o s t s and i n c r e a s e manpower, a f t e r 1967 a c o r p s o f i n s p e c t -
i n g o f f i c e r s was e s t a b l i s h e d on a f u l l t i m e b a s i s t o un d e r t a k e t h e 
more r o u t i n e i n s p e c t i o n s which would n o t m e r i t the appointment o f 
eminent p r o f e s s i o n a l l a w y e r s and a c c o u n t a n t s . 
There are t h r e e t ypes o f i n v e s t i g a t i o n which can be c a r r i e d 
o u t by t h e Department, namely an i n v e s t i g a t i o n o f t h e company's 
a f f a i r s , o f t h e company's ownership and o f share d e a l i n g s . 
The Department may a p p o i n t i n s p e c t o r s t o i n v e s t i g a t e and 
r e p o r t on a company's a f f a i r s on t h e a p p l i c a t i o n o f a t l e a s t 200 
members o r members h o l d i n g a t l e a s t o n e - t e n t h of t h e shares i s s u e d 
i n t h e case o f a company h a v i n g a share c a p i t a l and on the a p p l i -
c a t i o n o f a t l e a s t o n e - f i f t h o f t h e members i n t h e case o f a com-
pany h a v i n g no share c a p i t a l ( 1 ) . 
The Department may a p p o i n t i n s p e c t o r s t o i n v e s t i g a t e t h e com-
pany's a f f a i r s i f i t appears ( i ) t h a t the business i s b e i n g or has 
been conducted w i t h i n t e n t t o d e f r a u d c r e d i t o r s , f o r a f r a u d u l e n t 
o r u n l a w f u l purpose, i n a manner which i s o p p r e s s i v e t o any o f i t s 
(10) S e c t i o n 109 o f Companies A c t 1967. 
(1) S e c t i o n 164(1) o f Companies A c t 1948. 
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members, o r t h a t t h e b u s i n e s s was formed f o r a f r a u d u l e n t o r unlaw-
f u l purpose, o r ( i i ) t h a t t h e persons concerned w i t h f o r m a t i o n o r 
management have been g u i l t y o f f r a u d , misfeasance o r o t h e r miscon-
d u c t towards the company o r t h e members. The Department may a l s o 
a p p o i n t i n s p e c t o r s i f i t appears t h a t t h e members o f a company have 
n o t been g i v e n a l l t h e i n f o r m a t i o n about i t s a f f a i r s which they 
m i g h t r e a s o n a b l y expect ( 2 ) . I n t h i s way the Department may not 
o n l y h e l p t h e members t o get i n f o r m a t i o n t o which t h e y were a l r e a d y 
l e g a l l y e n t i t l e d ; t h e y add somewhat t o t h e i r l e g a l e n t i t l e m e n t . 
T h i s b e n e f i t i s sometimes v e r y u s e f u l t o e s t a b l i s h t h a t t h e member's 
r i g h t s have been i n f r i n g e d . One o f the g r e a t weaknesses o f an 
a g g r i e v e d s h a r e h o l d e r who has been oppressed by the d i r e c t o r s i s 
t h a t he i s not e n t i t l e d t o access t o t h e company's books and r e c o r d s 
whereas the d i r e c t o r s have such access. 
I f an i n s p e c t o r t h i n k s i t necessary, he may a l s o i n v e s t i g a t e 
t h e a f f a i r s o f r e l a t e d companies ( 3 ) . 
A l l o f f i c e r s and agents o f the company (and an a u d i t o r i s an 
agent f o r t h i s purpose) must a t t e n d b e f o r e t h e i n s p e c t o r s when 
r e q u i r e d and g i v e a l l t h e a s s i s t a n c e t h a t they can ( 4 ) . I n so 
d o i n g , they are n o t e n t i t l e d t o make s t i p u l a t i o n s , o r r e q u i r e 
assurances from t h e i n s p e c t o r s , as t o t h e procedure t o be f o l l o w e d . 
T h i s i s an e x p l i c i t d u t y on t h e o f f i c e r s o r agents who are be i n g 
i n v e s t i g a t e d t o a t t e n d b e f o r e t h e i n s p e c t o r s i f r e q u i r e d t o do so, 
and t h e y cannot use excuses n o t t o a t t e n d i n o r d e r t o a v o i d being 
q u e s t i o n e d . A r e f u s a l t o a t t e n d b e f o r e i n s p e c t o r s when r e q u i r e d 
t o do so i s a ground f o r b r i n g i n g an o f f i c e r o r an agent b e f o r e 
(2) S e c t i o n 165(b) of 1948 as amended by s e c t i o n 38 o f 1967 A c t . 
(3) S e c t i o n 166 o f 1948 A c t . 
(4) S e c t i o n 167(1) o f 1948 A c t as amended by s e c t i o n 39 o f 1967 
A c t . 
- 135 -
the c o u r t , and i f t h e y s t i l l r e f u s e t o produce t he books, t h i s 
would be a contempt o f c o u r t . 
The i n s p e c t o r may examine t h e o f f i c e r s o r agents on o a t h ( 5 ) 
and may ap p l y t o t h e c o u r t f o r an o r d e r f o r t h e e x a m i n a t i o n b e f o r e 
i t on o a t h o f any o t h e r persons whom he t h i n k s i t necessary t o 
examine ( 6 ) . 
S e c t i o n 41 o f t h e Companies A c t 1967 empowers t h e i n s p e c t o r 
a t any time i n t h e course o f h i s i n v e s t i g a t i o n t o i n f o r m t h e Depa r t -
ment o f m a t t e r s t e n d i n g t o show t h e commission o f an o f f e n c e , w i t h -
o u t t he n e c e s s i t y o f making an i n t e r i m r e p o r t . I t had been found 
t h a t t h e i n f o r m a t i o n o b t a i n e d by i n s p e c t o r s was sometimes c o n f i d -
e n t i a l and c o u l d be made a v a i l a b l e t o the Board o f Trade o n l y by 
means o f a f o r m a l i n t e r i m r e p o r t o r a f o r m a l f i n a l r e p o r t . T h i s 
s e c t i o n removes t h e d i f f i c u l t y o v er c o n f i d e n t i a l i t y and t h e i n s p e c -
t o r s may i n f o r m anytime now. 
I f i t appears t o t h e Department from any i n s p e c t o r ' s r e p o r t o r 
from any i n f o r m a t i o n o r document o b t a i n e d under s.109 o f t h e 1967 
Act t h a t i t i s e x p e d i e n t i n the p u b l i c i n t e r e s t t h a t t h e company 
shou l d be wound up, i t may, u n l e s s t he company i s a l r e a d y b e i n g 
wound up by t h e c o u r t , p r e s e n t a p e t i t i o n f o r i t t o be so wound up 
i f t h e c o u r t t h i n k s i t j u s t and e q u i t a b l e . 
I f i t appears t o the Department from any i n s p e c t o r ' s r e p o r t o r 
from any i n f o r m a t i o n o r document o b t a i n e d under s.109 o f the 1967 
Ac t t h a t t h e company's busine s s i s b e i n g conducted o r has been 
conducted i n a manner u n f a i r l y p r e j u d i c i a l t o any p a r t o f i t s mem-
b e r s , i t may, as w e l l as o r i n s t e a d o f p r e s e n t i n g a w i n d i n g up 
p e t i t i o n , p r e s e n t a p e t i t i o n f o r an o r d e r under s e c t i o n 75 o f t h e 
Companies Act 1980. 
The Department may i t s e l f b r i n g c i v i l p r oceedings i n the name 
o f any company wherever i t appears i n t h e p u b l i c i n t e r e s t t o do so. 
(5) S e c t i o n 167(2) o f 1948 A c t . 
(6) S e c t i o n 167(4) o f 1948 A c t . 
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I t i s advantageous t o make a c o m p l a i n t t o the Department w i t h 
a view t o t h e i r e x e r c i s i n g t h e i r powers. L i k e a p e t i t i o n by a 
member f o r w i n d i n g up o r the a l t e r n a t i v e remedy i t can be made by 
a s i n g l e member w i t h o u t r e g a r d t o the r u l e i n Foss v. H a r b o t t l e , 
b u t , u n l i k e those remedies, i t may l e a d t o a s u c c e s s f u l c o n c l u s i o n 
e n t i r e l y w i t h o u t expense o r t r o u b l e t o the c o m p l a i n a n t . Moreover, 
th e Department i n e x e r c i s i n g t h e i r f o l l o w - u p powers may be i n a 
s t r o n g e r p o s i t i o n than t h e member, f o r on a p e t i t i o n t o wind up 
t h e y , u n l i k e him, w i l l n o t have t o show t h a t t h e r e w i l l be something 
l e f t i n the company f o r t h e members ( 7 ) . The Department's i n q u i s i -
t o r i a l powers may p r e v e n t o p p r e s s i o n from o c c u r r i n g a t a l l i f e x e r -
c i s e d i n good t i m e . 
An i n s p e c t i o n i s u s u a l l y conducted t o g e t h e r w i t h an O f f i c i a l 
R e c e i v e r ' s o r Fraud Squad i n v e s t i g a t i o n s . T h i s had caused d e l a y s 
i n some cases, esp. where a d e t a i l e d s c r u t i n y o f t h e company's 
books o f account i s necessary because c o n t a c t i s necessary between 
them. Another reason f o r the d e l a y s i s t h a t eminent n o n - o f f i c i a l 
i n s p e c t o r s work o n l y p a r t - t i m e . 
I t i s s u b m i t t e d t h a t the f u n c t i o n s o f t h e Department o f Trade 
and i t s i n s p e c t o r s , t h e O f f i c i a l R e c e i v e r , t h e D i r e c t o r o f P u b l i c 
P r o s e c u t i o n s and t h e P o l i c e Fraud Squad i n t h i s f i e l d s h o u l d be 
b r o u g h t t o g e t h e r and e x e r c i s e d by a s i n g l e company law enforcement 
u n i t so t h a t t h e r e i s independence o f a c t i o n which t h e r e l e v a n t 
a u t h o r i t i e s a t p r e s e n t l a c k i n d i v i d u a l l y . There sh o u l d be a body 
o f s k i l l e d and e x p e r i e n c e d i n v e s t i g a t o r s i n such a u n i t w i t h i t s 
own l e g a l and a c c o u n t i n g a d v i s e r s , who under the e x i s t i n g a r r a n g e -
ments are n o t e a s i l y a v a i l a b l e a t s h o r t n o t i c e . Much t i m e can thus 
be saved i n i n v e s t i g a t i n g and r e p o r t i n g on i n d i v i d u a l cases. I t i s 
i m p o r t a n t t h a t our system o f i n v e s t i g a t i o n and enforcement sh o u l d 
( 7 ) See Gower, p.679, 
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be f l e x i b l e w i t h e x t e n s i v e s t a t u t o r y power f o r i n v e s t i g a t i o n and 
enforcement o 
2. Watching Committees 
The p o s i t i o n o f t h e m i n o r i t y s h a r e h o l d e r has always been 
u n e n v i a b l e , as i s e v i d e n t from a passage i n the judgement i n 
W a l l e r s t e i n e r v. Moir (No.2) ( 8 ) . 
" T h i s case has b r o u g h t t o l i g h t a s e r i o u s d e f e c t i n t h e a d m i n i -
s t r a t i o n o f j u s t i c e . . . (Mr. M o i r ) a p p l i e d many times t o the 
Department o f Trade t o a p p o i n t an i n s p e c t o r , b u t t h a t department 
put him o f f . . . He a p p l i e d t o t h e ombudsman, b u t he c o u l d do 
n o t h i n g . He r a i s e d t h e m a t t e r a t s h a r e h o l d e r s ' m e e t i n g s , b u t 
was a b r u p t l y c u t o f f . The o n l y way i n which he has been a b l e 
t o have h i s c o m p l a i n t i n v e s t i g a t e d i s by a c t i o n i n these c o u r t s . 
And here he has come t o t h e end o f h i s t e t h e r . He has f o u g h t 
t h i s case f o r over t e n years on h i s own. H e has expended a l l h i s 
f i n a n c i a l r e s o u r c e s on i t and a l l h i s time and l a b o u r . He has 
r e c e i v e d c o n t r i b u t i o n s from o t h e r s h a r e h o l d e r s b u t these are now 
exhausted." 
Crusading p l a i n t i f f s i n d e r i v a t i v e a c t i o n s are v e r y few and f a r 
between. I n t h e t e n years o r so of hazards and c o m p l i c a t i o n s o f 
l i t i g a t i o n t h e r e must have been many times when Mr. Moir was c l o s e 
t o abandoning the a c t i o n . There are not many d e d i c a t e d , determined 
and r e s o u r c e f u l m i n o r i t y s h a r e h o l d e r s as Mr. M o i r , and i t pays t o 
p r e v e n t c o r p o r a t e abuses a r i s i n g i n the f i r s t p l a c e r a t h e r than t o 
cure them a f t e r t he e v e n t . I t i s t r u e t h a t c r i m i n a l proceedings and 
Department o f Trade i n v e s t i g a t i o n s f o r c o r p o r a t e m a l p r a c t i c e are 
not i n f r e q u e n t today, b u t they are u s u a l l y taken when t h e w o r s t has 
happened ( 9 ) , as a r e s u l t o f which t he i n t e r e s t s o f s h a r e h o l d e r s , 
(8) [1915] 1 A l l E.R. 849 a t p.846 per Lord Denning M.R. 
(9) See Mr. M o i r ' s example i n W a l l e r s t e i n e r v. M o i r (No.2) 
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employees, c r e d i t o r s , consumers e t c have already been severely 
damaged ( 1 0 ) , 
The preventive measure takes the form of i n t e r n a l s e l f -
r e g u l a t i o n , and i t i s proposed t h a t f o r every p u b l i c company or 
large unquoted company, watching committees ( l ) be set up. These 
committees should be composed e n t i r e l y of the company's outside 
d i r e c t o r s . Their f u n c t i o n i s to supervise management and company 
operations g e n e r a l l y , and i n p a r t i c u l a r to examine the adequacy of 
accounting procedures, to analyse the o v e r a l l f i n a n c i a l p o s i t i o n 
and t o s e l e c t the company's a u d i t o r s . The watching committee should 
have i t s own small independent s t a f f which i s only answerable to the 
non-executive d i r e c t o r s and t o t a l l y independent of management con-
t r o l . Further, the committee should be authorised to h i r e s k i l l e d 
consultants to advise i t and provide an independent source of exper-
t i s e . Any person who i s an executive o f the company, or who has a 
pr o f e s s i o n a l r e l a t i o n s h i p or m a t e r i a l business dealings w i t h the 
company, and any close r e l a t i v e s of such persons should be d i s q u a l i -
f i e d from being appointed as a committee member. The committee 
members should p r e f e r a b l y be drawn from p r o f e s s i o n a l managers, b u s i -
ness consultants, management s p e c i a l i s t s , accountants, lawyers, 
economists or s o c i a l s c i e n t i s t s , but only those w i t h an enq u i r i n g 
mind and strength of character. The committee members should no 
longer be honorary or ornamental and should be amply rewarded. I n 
order t o ensure t h a t the committee members have s u f f i c i e n t time and 
energy to do t h e i r work p r o p e r l y , i t i s proposed t h a t a person 
should not hold more than three such committee memberships at any 
given time. 
(10) See also above, p.45. 
(1) Cf. A.J. Boyle (1978) 27 I.C.L.Q. 487. 
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CONCLUSIONS 
Recently the courts have been more ready to intervene to cor-
r e c t abuse of m a j o r i t y power and unfairness, which they should be 
able to do s t i l l more e f f e c t i v e l y under the newly improved remedy 
a l t e r n a t i v e to winding up. 
I t i s to be hoped t h a t the courts w i l l adopt a much more 
l i b e r a l a t t i t u d e to the question of the m i n o r i t y shareholders' 
locus standi i n d e r i v a t i v e actions so as to remove any need to 
categorise types or degrees of breach of duty by d i r e c t o r s i n 
terms of t h e i r being e i t h e r r a t i f i a b l e or n o n - r a t i f i a b l e and or 
the law w i l l be changed by l e g i s l a t i o n to give the courts an e x p l i -
c i t d i s c r e t i o n to permit a d e r i v a t i v e s u i t f o r any breach of duty 
i n c l u d i n g perhaps t h a t of care d i l i g e n c e and s k i l l too, and whether 
or not the wrongdoers are i n c o n t r o l . 
I t i s submitted t h a t there are s t i l l some weaknesses of the 
newly enacted section 75 of the Companies Act 1980, and i t i s 
proposed t h a t the courts should be allowed to deal under the new 
sect i o n w i t h u n f a i r l y p r e j u d i c i a l conduct s u f f e r e d by a member i n 
a capacity other than t h a t of a member or by a debenture holder 
whose debentures are c o n v e r t i b l e i n t o shares; the court should have 
u n f e t t e r e d d i s c r e t i o n . 
As to the proposal t h a t i t might be b e t t e r to introduce em-
ployee representatives d i r e c t l y i n t o the supervisory and or manag-
ing organs of companies, i t i s submitted t h a t the time has now come 
to introduce employee p a r t i c i p a t i o n at board l e v e l . I t i s proposed 
t h a t f o r every p u b l i c company or large unquoted company or a l t e r -
n a t i v e l y f o r every company employing more than 50 employees there 
should be a r e c o n s t i t u t e d u n i t a r y board w i t h an equal number of 
shareholder and employee d i r e c t o r s and an independent t h i r d group 
from p r o f e s s i o n a l s o I n order to ensure an extension of i n d u s t r i a l 
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democracy s u f f i c i e n t l y , works councils should also be required,, 
The management and the workforce should be taught and made to act 
on the p r i n c i p l e t h a t a company i s f o r both i n v e s t o r s and employees 
equally and there i s a duty upon employees to work, upon employers 
to provide work, and upon both to co-operate at work. I t i s sub-
m i t t e d t h a t the essence of success i n achieving u n i t y i s not 
p l u r a l i s t i c bargaining or compromise, but co-operation. 
An examination of the case law about d i r e c t o r s ' d u t i e s seems 
to show t h a t there are some inc o n s i s t e n c i e s i n t h e i r d u t i e s of care 
and d i l i g e n c e . Roughly t h e i r d u t i e s o f l o y a l t y are very s t r i c t , 
on the other hand t h e i r d u t i e s of care d i l i g e n c e and s k i l l are 
q u i t e l a x . The reason f o r the l a t t e r might be t h a t many d i r e c t o r s 
worked and work p a r t time and company management i s up to date not 
a recognised profession w i t h p r o f e s s i o n a l standards. Current com-
mercial a t t i t u d e i s now more demanding, and i t i s proposed t h a t i n 
the case of p u b l i c or larg e unquoted companies, w i t h the exception 
of employee d i r e c t o r s , the law should r e q u i r e a d i r e c t o r to possess 
a p r o f e s s i o n a l q u a l i f i c a t i o n . Another reason f o r the inconsistency 
of case law i s the court s ' f a i l u r e to d i s t i n g u i s h from one another 
the p o s i t i o n s of d i r e c t o r s i n small companies, medium companies and 
large companies r e s p e c t i v e l y . Accordingly i t i s proposed t h a t a l l 
companies should be c l a s s i f i e d i n t o three groups and there should 
be a c o d i f i c a t i o n of the law r e l a t i n g to d i r e c t o r s ' d u t i e s f o r each 
of the three classes of companies. I t i s also proposed t h a t f o r 
every p u b l i c or large unquoted company there be set up a watching 
committee c o n s i s t i n g of independent outside d i r e c t o r s who should 
p r e f e r a b l y be p r o f e s s i o n a l s . The t h i r d group of d i r e c t o r s proposed 
to be required f o r c e r t a i n companies mentioned e a r l i e r i s meant to 
be the same as these watching committees. 
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